For the past three decades, Republicans have promoted the myth that a clean, objective division can be made between law and politics in the context of judging. This view attempts to promote the idea that judging is a simple, mathematical process: a case comes before the Supreme Court, justices (unless they are "activists") identify the right constitutional amendment or statutory provision, and the case basically decides itself. As Sen. Sessions claimed on the first day of Judge Sotomayor’s hearing, law has "fixed meaning"–except when it is hijacked by liberal activist judges.
As David Waldman rightly puts it, this is "an infantile view of legal realities." Everyone who goes to law school and studies the Constitution and Supreme Court decisions learns pretty quickly that the kind of legal case that makes its way to the Supreme Court is not a mathematical equation capable of yielding only one clear and objective answer. The Constitution contains ambiguous terms like "due process", "establishment of religion", and "probable cause". The Constitution does not contain any instructions as to how it is to be interpreted, as to how these grand, ambiguous terms are to be applied to specific cases. This would be impossible: the framers could not anticipate every case to come before the courts.
Given this reality, it has fallen to generations of Supreme Court justices to interpret and apply the Constitution’s grand promises. Its decisions can vindicate what most of us see, at least in retrospect, as foundational principles of democracy (Brown v. Board) or they can tragically fall short of the mark (as in the Dred Scott case or Korematsu v. U.S., a 6-3 decision ruling that the order to intern Japanese-Americans in camps during WWII was constitutional). Its decisions, especially the landmark ones, are often controversial.
In Republican-world, only pinko commie liberal activist judges allow subjectivity to influence their decisions. Judges on the right wing of the spectrum are pure of heart and mind, never influenced by anything but the clarity of the law. In the real world, we see evidence of subjective views even in the opinions of justices like Scalia and Kennedy. In Lawrence v. Texas, the 2003 case in which the Court struck down laws criminalizing certain sexual activity, including same-sex relations, Justice Scalia’s dissent accuses the Court of "largely sign[ing[ onto the so-called homosexual agenda" and compares consensual sex between two men to prostitution, bestiality and obscenity. It must be a coincidence that Justice Scalia also ruled against claims by gay and lesbian people brought in the Romer case in 1996. In Gonzales v. Carhart, the 2007 case in which the Court upheld a federal law prohibiting so-called partial birth abortions, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority opined that "[w]hile we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained." Justice Kennedy concedes that his view is not based on objective data–sounds like he dipped into his own real world experience and views to craft this sentence.
The reality, of course, is that all judges, as human beings, have their personal experiences, biases, and subjective views. That’s not necessarily a bad thing in light of the fact that constitutional and statutory questions don’t always lend themselves to one clear, objective solution. If the Republican view of judging were accurate, then we wouldn’t need human beings to decide cases: computers could do the job. In fact, machines would be preferable to humans as it would be much easier to remove subjectivity and empathy from the process. In reality, judging and applying the Constitution simply doesn’t work that way. The line between objective law and subjective politics is not always clear.
Sometimes, it is easy to see the overlap between law and politics–for instance, during a Supreme Court confirmation hearing presided over by elected U.S. Senators. Sen. Grassley may primly declare that political battles are appropriately fought in the legislative branch, not the judiciary, but, once again, reality is not so black and white. A Supreme Court confirmation hearing gives Senators the opportunity to fight a political battle over the composition of the judiciary. What’s the test for confirming a presidential nominee? To paraphrase Gerald Ford (he was speaking in a different context), it’s whatever 51 (or 60 if cloture is required) senators decide it is.
In the real world, Judge Sotomayor is almost certain to be confirmed, barring a "meltdown" or some sensational turn of events, as even Sen. Lindsey Graham conceded. She will receive the votes of most, if not all Democrats, and will likely receive the votes of a substantial number of Republicans. There is nothing wrong with that: it’s about time a Democratic president gets the chance to appoint a justice to the Court–for just the third time in 42 years. Republicans presidents have appointed 14 justices during that period of time. Given that the law is not a science, that reasonable justices can reach different conclusions about the cases that come before the Court, it would be a good thing to take a first step toward restoring some balance to the Court.



10 Comments







John Ashcroft said the same thing. In his confirmation hearings he pretended that the job of Attorney General was basically a simple clerical post: Look up the law in a book and do what it says. (And the Democrats pretended to agree, because – follow me here – they thought that the best way to move forward with an unelected president was to pretend that he was duly elected, under the Republicans’ “Let’s be bipartisan – you go first” strategy.)
yeah, John Roberts also said something similar when he was being confirmed as chief justice. I think it’s really disingenuous for Republicans to suggest the law is always clear (and ironic given the way the Bush administration ignored, for example, what is an example of a clear legal prohibition in FISA) and frustrating that Democrats don’t do a better job of exposing this phony argument
It’s the legal equivalent of Fundamentalism. To say that the Law has an absolute meaning that requires no subjectivity to interpret is like saying the Bible has an absolute meaning that should be obvious to anyone who can read. In either field, to say that one person’s interpretation is the objectively correct one is not a way to find truth, but rather a way to exercise power.
excellent point. I had a professor in law school who made a similar analogy. Justice Black, one of the leading adherents to the view that the Constitution can be interpreted literally, was also a man of faith and my professor argued that he was a fundamentalist both in his religion and in his approach to the law. I’m no biblical scholar, but I have heard (and your comment suggests) that biblical passages are also open to multiple interpretations
If you do not believe law is what it says it is and is not an absolute then it is putty to be wielded by the hands of activist judges. It must not be that way for unelected officials.
Take the 2nd Amendment as an example. The letter of the law says “the right to bear arms.” But there are markedly different interpretations of what that means. Which interpretation is the best for us to follow is not obvious simply from the text of the amendment itself. It takes consideration of the historical circumstances of when it was written, what the framers were trying to accomplish in writing it, and how our country and our definition of the word “arms” has changed in the intervening years. There’s always ambiguity, which is why our framers were so careful to install check and balances.
indeed –and it’s worth noting that the full text of the 2nd Amendment reads: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” The “militia” language seems to be read out of the amendment by many 2nd Amendment advocates…I’m not saying that automatically nullifies their arguments, but it is a point worth thinking about. There’s a principle of constitutional interpretation that argues every word in the Constitution must mean something, must be there for a reason–why is the militia language there? does it mean people can only bear arms if they are members of a militia? I don’t know, but I think it’s far from clear. In addition, what constitutes “arms”? as you suggest, times have changed–should arms mean only the 18th century muskets the framers knew? do automatic weapons count?
Actually, it is a mathematical process. Its all about dollars and cents when you buy them off to get verdicts in your favor!
RT
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well….I wouldn’t go that far. I will say that when I was practicing law in jurisdictions where judges were elected, there were times that I was concerned about getting a fair look from judges who may have received political support/campaign contributions from my opponent. I don’t see that as a concern for S Ct justices, who are appointed for life and removed from the campaign finance process (at least removed from direct contact)
I don’t know about law being putty, but it is very clear that there are legal provisions, especially in the Constitution, that do not lend themselves to one clear, indisputable objective meaning. That doesn’t mean judges who reach differing conclusions are necessarily “activists” (a term that itself has no objective meaning, as Sen. Feingold observed yesterday)