(Part 2 of my report on the SIGIR Report) (Part 1)

Shortly after ‘Shock and Awe’ and the staged toppling of Saddam’s statue, it became increasingly apparent that Centcom’s Phase IV plans (or lack of) were not working and a Plan B (or C?) would be necessary. Why? Well, as Bowen wrote, Centcom’s ORHA under Gen. Garner was ill-advised and ill-equipped…

The part of the mission that Feith and Rumsfeld told
Garner would be least essential was now crucial, and ORHA was not well staffed to carry it out. [...] The goals Garner had set for himself were enormous, as were the obstacles to accomplishing them. For example, adequate, reliable power was unavailable. "It is a Catch-22," senior oil advisor Gary Vogler explained. Without fuel oil, electric plants can’t produce electricity, yet without a steady supply of electricity, crude can’t be refined into fuel oil. In Basra, Coalition personnel trying to restart essential services faced a similar conundrum. "The circle was amazing," JTF-4′s Lt. Col. Joseph Morgan said. "Just in that one area, just looking at how we could turn on power, so we could turn on water, so we could turn on electricity." Many of Garner’s other goals fell under the purview of the civil administration pillar, where plans were less developed and leadership weakest.

Having ignored Powell’s warning that Iraq would shatter like crystal and, subsequently, Shinseki’s advice to go in with sufficient numbers to secure all the Ministries(not just the Oil Ministry) and the critical infrastructure. All led to the sudden shift in policy. How sudden…?

…on May 6, just fifteen days after Jay Garner arrived in Baghdad, President Bush announced that L. Paul Bremer III, a former ambassador, would become Iraq’s new civil administrator. Bremer was to head the "Coalition Provisional Authority," a civil authority under CENTCOM that General Franks had mentioned in his April 16 freedom message. Ambassador Bremer had been approached less than two weeks before by senior officials in the Defense Department and the Office of the Vice-President. Although Garner had been told when first tapped to head ORHA that he would eventually be followed by a person of greater national stature, he did not learn of Bremer’s appointment until Rumsfeld phoned him with the news on the evening of April 21, Garner’s first night in Baghdad. "I never saw CPA coming," Garner said. He did not immediately tell his staff of the impending change.

Hence the Viceroyalty of Iraq was created…

But the President’s instructions to me…when I had lunch with him alone on May 6th, were that we’re going to take our time to get it right…The President had effectively, though perhaps not formally, changed his position on the question of a short or long occupation, having before the war been in favor of a short occupation. By the time I came in, that was gone. -Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, CPA Administrator (2003-2004)

Bowen writes about what Viceroy Bremer inherited when he ascended Saddam’s Republican Palace’s throne…

Bremer was more than an envoy–he was now effectively the viceroy of a country slipping quickly into chaos. He took charge of a country in political and economic crisis: no government, no electricity, and no functioning security forces. Not a single drop of oil flowed to export spigots in May 2003. He and his staff struggled to restart virtually every aspect of Iraqi life, from reopening ministries to paying government salaries, from restoring essential services to providing health care, collecting garbage, and cleaning sewage from the streets.

Ironically, it wasn’t just Garner and Centcom that was surprised by the seismic shift in policy…

The significant shift in U.S. policy that Bremer implemented–from a quick transition to an occupation–surprised many Iraqis, who, according to senior exile leader Ali Allawi, were "completely flabbergasted." Allawi, who would later serve as both Minister of Trade and Minister of Defense in Iraq, was shocked that "within the space of a few days, the entire process that was to lead to a provisional Iraqi government had been abruptly stopped, and then upended." The change raised suspicions among Iraq’s indigenous tribal, political, and religious leadership, who chafed at the idea of an occupation by foreigners, after suffering under Saddam’s dictatorship for nearly four decades.

You ain’t seen nothing yet, Allawi!

Viceroy Bremer took the stage with the grandiose "Vision of Iraq"…

The Vision for Iraq defined the CPA mission as working with the Iraqi people and an interim Iraqi administration "to establish the condition for a free, sovereign, democratically-elected representative government." The document outlined in general terms five "core foundations" that CPA would build to guide Iraq through its transformation: security, essential services and civil society, economy, governance, and strategic communications. The highest priority was "to create a secure and safe environment, without which the CPA recognized there could be little progress on other goals." The CPA would restore security by recruiting and training Iraqi police and military forces. Other goals included the rapid transition to a market economy and establishing an effective rule-of-law system. The Vision called for programs to develop democracy in Iraq, install equitable criminal justice processes, write a new and fair penal code, and build new courthouses and prisons. The new plan’s success depended upon a "coherent and coordinated information campaign" that would explain the scope and nature of U.S. programs to Iraqis. The document offered neither programs nor estimates of what it would cost to achieve these goals.

Noble intentions indeed, however, the old adages of; ‘the road to hell is paved…’, and, ‘the devil’s in the details,’ held sway… Viceroy Bremer’s first three royal fiats immediately laid waste to that deluded fantasy…

On May 16th, 2003 Bremer issued Order #1, De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society. Effectively purging what was left of the Iraqi government of virtually all remaining competent and capable individuals across all Ministries. Bowen elaborated…

conceived in Washington and promulgated with little Iraqi involvement or Coalition consultation, formally eliminated all Ba’ath Party structures and banned "Senior Party Members"–those in the top four ranks of the party–from serving in the Iraqi public sector. All were to be evaluated for criminal conduct and, where appropriate, investigated, detained, or arrested. The order further provided for the immediate dismissal of anyone in the top three layers of management in any government institution (including ministries, state-owned enterprises, universities, and hospitals) if found to be a "full member" of the Ba’ath party. Given the fact that the vast majority of senior officials in Saddam Hussein’s regime were Ba’ath party members, the order effectively removed most senior leaders in Iraq’s government. Moreover, the order’s implementation severely depleted the lower levels of the bureaucracy–from engineers and physicians to school teachers.

With a single stroke of the pen he eradicated the entire Iraqi public sector…

As this is rather lengthy I shall continue with the devastation Bremer wrought in another diary… Plenty of meat to chew on…! Bon Apetit!