Is it really our job or our mission in life to change the behavior pattern and belief system of the Afghan leadership class and people?

What are we doing in Afghanistan? According to Rahm Emmanuel, we have committed ourselves to a “process that can provide the security and the type of services that the Afghan people need[.]” For Rahm, then, our job over there is to build a nation. Arlen Specter has already said the right thing about that:

While I think it is laudable to want to protect the Afghan people and to provide good governance there, it is my view that is not of sufficient national interest for the United States to put our troops at risk or to expend substantial additional sums there. The principal question, as I see it, is whether Afghanistan is indispensable to be secured to prevent al-Qaida from launching another attack against the United States.

And I think President Obama wants us to think he agrees with Specter, and so (whatever Rahm says) Obama’s official rationale for the Afghanistan occupation and Af-Pak war is to “disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda, its allies, and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.” Two weeks ago Secretary of State Clinton repeated the phrase as our reason for fighting there, that the goal “is to disrupt, dismantle, defeat Al Qaeda and its extremist allies” (she added that not every Taliban may be an extremist ally). And in his most recent comments on the war and occupation, Obama has “omitted mention of the Taliban and Afghan nation-building.”

But does the second rationale, the official one, pass the laugh test, when there are fewer than a 100 Al Qaeda in Afghanistan? Let’s ask Senator Byrd:

I am compelled to ask,” he said, “does it really take 100,000 (U.S.) troops to find Osama bin Laden? If Al Qaeda has moved to Pakistan, will these troops in Afghanistan add what to the effort to defeat Al Qaeda?”

He added angrily: “And how much will this cost? How much in terms of more dollars? How much in terms of American blood?”

He criticized, not Obama, but generals Petraeus and McChrystal, who Byrd said had bought into the “mission creep” of Afghan nation-building. “These generals,” Byrd said, “have lost sight of America’s primary strategic objective to disrupt and defang — in other words, pull the teeth right out of the bone — of Al Qaeda.”

Let’s talk, as the recent winner of Celebrity Apprentice likes to say. ‘We all know’ (don’t we? including Obama?) that we are in Afghanistan either to build a nation Americans would like to cuddle up with (does that pass the smell test?) or for some other U.S.-centric reason (‘Great Game’ energy politics?).

And then there’s the war itself, that tragicomedy. And our soldiers, professional killers miscast and miscostumed, according to William Wong:

Some of the most riveting scenes for me from the Frontline documentary ((“Obama’s War“)) were ones of a young U.S. Marine talking with Afghan villagers. He had an interpreter whose grasp of English was minimal, and there was undoubtedly a lot lost in translation, and some visible anger and frustration on the part of the Marine.

That was part of the “counter-insurgency” strategy our troops are trying to implement right now. This translates into Marines and other soldiers trying to get to know ordinary Afghan villagers. Sounds like a version of the much derided Vietnam War strategy of trying to win the “hearts and minds” of ordinary Vietnamese.

The theory apparently is that our soldiers could somehow lessen their military/fighting personas — what they are trained to do — and transform themselves to kinder, gentler visitors to protect ordinary Afghans. Something like that.

How absurd. Some of the experts quoted in the Frontline documentary, including Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander of our military in Afghanistan, strained to explain the rationale behind this “counter-insurgency” strategy. Their explanations fell short of their mark.

Let’s get real here. Why should Afghan villagers listen to U.S. Marines and other soldiers, loaded to the hilt with body armor, assault rifles, and other items that can kill?

The language and cultural divide is so gaping as to be laughable. Our men and women in full fighting uniforms aren’t Peace Corps volunteers, humanitarian workers, or cultural anthropologists. They’re trained to kill the enemy.

How many of our warriors know or even care about Afghan history, culture, and religion, let alone know the languages of the people there?

From what I’ve read of the Taliban, they are at least Afghans, not young American interlopers armed to the teeth. The Taliban believe in far different values than we Americans do, and some of them treat other Afghans, especially women, with contempt and utter disrespect.

But is it really our job or our mission in life to change the behavior pattern and belief system of the Afghan leadership class and people?