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by Frank33

The Underwear Bomber Conspiracy Goes Delusional As It Becomes Another Official Coverup And Pretext For More Neo-Con War

10:02 am in Uncategorized by Frank33

The Christmas Day Bombing of 2009 has now become an official coverup. The SSCI Report about the Christmas Day Bombing is the equivalent of a Seinfeld TV episode. This Report is about nothing and it has no content.

There is nothing in the report about the attempted terrorist attack on Flight 253, or the aftermath. The accounts by passengers and press reports have claimed that the terrorist Abdulmutallab was allowed through security by US Intelligence Officials without a passport, and without being searched. Abdulmutallab was assisted by a possible Al Qaeda double agent who remains at large. Another suspect was taken away after Flight 253 landed. Even though US Intelligence officials were responsible for the "failed" attack, there has been no accountability for their incompetence.

The identity of a possible Al Qaeda double agent who assisted the Bomber is being protected and concealed by Intelligence officials. The CIA has been involved with double agents and terrorists Ali Mohamed and David Headley. At least two attacks blamed on Al Qaeda by the CIA are actually False Flag Ops, the Madrid Train Bombings and the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. Attacks involving Al Qaeda double agents are used as propaganda for more war.

This story does seem delusional with the SSCI Report contradicting the well publicized stories of the witnesses. This is similar to the WMD Irak War delusions and the Torture for False Confessions delusions. Four journalists, Michelle Shephard of the Toronto Star, Paul Koring of The Globe and Mail, Steven Edwards of Canwest News Service and Carol Rosenberg of The Miami Herald had the delusion that Sgt. Joshua Claus was ordered to torture, to support the neo-con Oil Wars. The four journalists were banished from a US "Military Commission" in Cuba for telling about the torturer and the torture.

This is the military way of discipline to control delusions. Punish a few as a lesson to the rest of the corporate stenographers. These corporate cowards could be called the "Press Pen", inspired by the "Veal Pen", which describes the phony Dee Cee activists who are not active.

The military and the neo-con secret police must control all information in order to maintain the perpetual oil wars and impose disaster capitalism. The usual tactic to keep the many other delusions secret is to use the corporate sheep who pretend to be journalists. There are so many secrets to keep, such as the False Confessions from torture, Niger Forgeries, Al Qaeda double agents such as Ali Mohamed, the CIA’s favorite banks, BCCI and Riggs, the Carlyle Group and the Bin Laden business partnership, Nuclear Weapon Technology from Halliburton and Nuclear Weapons plans from the CIA supplied to Iran, and many more. Any disagreement with the official coverup is delusional. Those who disagree are ridiculed. The Dee Cee "Public Relations Firms" and the government "Public Diplomacy" and the "Think Tanks" are secretly paid with taxpayer money to repeat the coverup narratives. The Underwear Bomber Conspiracy has now been added to the list of forbidden topics.

"The Unclassified Executive Summary of the Committee Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253" was released by the SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE.

There is a PDF file of the report, but no easily accessible HTML version. TPM did have a version, with some cutting and pasting, an HTML file was put together.

This report has almost zero information about the actual sabotage attempted against Flight 253. It contains numerous falsehoods that contradict government statements and witness testimony. The rest is disinformation from from a corrupt national security establishment. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was known to be a terrorist and was escorted aboard Flight 253 by a US intelligence official or an Al Qaeda double agent. He had no passport or he may have had a false passport. Abdulmutallab was allowed aboard Flight 253 as part of surveillance operation to follow him to other Al Qaeda agents. At least that was one previous government story told on Jan. 27.

None of this is in the Report. There is nothing about Abdulmutallab, and his movements. Nothing about airport security. Nothing about his passport. Nothing about his Handler who told the ticket agent, "He has no passport. He is from the Sudan and we do this all the time." Nothing about why this terrorist was seated above the fuel tank. Nothing about the bomb or Saudi bombmaker. Nothing about the video recording of the terrorist attack. Nothing about the six hour lockdown of passengers, where another suspect was taken away in handcuffs. Nothing about FBI intimidation of passengers. Nothing about the repeated government statements proven to be false. There is not even anything about the passengers and flight crew who quickly subdued the Underwear Bomber.

The Committee found there were systemic failures across the Intelligence Community (IC), which contributed to the failure to identify the threat posed by Ablulmutallab.

There are systemic failures in the system, of that secret right wing cabal called the Intelligence Community. This is after years of continuous fear mongering of 9-11 and billions of dollars to fight 1000 or less terrorists of AQ. Part of the failure is total concealment by top secret classification of any true information about Al Qaeda. The term "Al Qaeda" does not refer to an well organized structure. Rather Al Qaeda is an informal criminal conspiracy supported by the Saudi secret service. The Bin Laden family and Usama in particular provided the funding. The government probably does not know how many Al Qaeda agents there are because the CIA depends on Saudi Arabia for information about AQ. That may explain the successes of AQ. We are told repeatedly there exist Al Qaeda "affiliates" all over the world and how scary they are. But the "IC" does not tell us about the biggest Al Qaeda affiliate, Saudi Arabia.

The SSCI report identifies fourteen specific points of failure—a series of human errors, technical problems, systemic obstacles, analytical misjudgments, and competing priorities—which resulted in Abdulmutallab being able to travel to the United States on December 25, 2009. Those points of failure are:

1. The State Department Did Not Revoke Abdulmutallab’s U.S. Visa.
2. Abdulmutallab Was Not Placed in the "Terrorist Screening Database" (TSDB), on
the Selectee List, or on the No Fly List.
3. Reporting Was Not Distributed to All Appropriate CIA Elements.
4. A CIA Regional Division, at CIA Headquarters, Did Not Search Databases
Containing Reports Related to Abdulmutallab.
5. CIA Did Not Disseminate Key Reporting Until after the 12/25 Attempted Attack.
6. A CIA Counterterrorism Center (CTC) Office’s Limited Name Search Failed to
Uncover the Key Reports on Abdulmutallab.
7. CIA CTC Analysts Failed to Connect the Reporting on Abdulmutallab.
8. FBI Counterterrorism Analysts Could Not Access All Relevant Reports.
9. NCTC’s Directorate of Intelligence Failed to Connect the Reporting on Abdulmutallab.
10. NCTC’s Watchlisting Office Did Not Conduct Additional Research to Find
Additional Derogatory Information to Place Abdulmutallab on a Watchlist.
11. NSA Did Not Pursue Potential Collection Opportunities That Could Have Provided
Information on Abdulmutallab.
12. Analysts Did Not Connect Key Reports Partly Identifying Abdulmutallab and
Failed to Ensure Dissemination of All Relevant Reporting.
13. NSA Did Not Nominate Abdulmutallab for Watchlisting or the Terrorist Identities
Datamart Environment (TIDE) Based on Information Partly Identifying Him.
14. Intelligence Analysts Were Primarily Focused on Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) Threats to U.S. Interests in Yemen, Rather than on Potential
AQAP Threats to the U.S. Homeland.

These fourteen points leave something out-the actual events on Christmas Day. The first point seems to blame the State Department because it did not revoke the visa. But the State Department has publicly explained this. Abdulmullatab was put on Flight 253 by intelligence officials. This was reported on Jan. 27 by Nathan Hurst of the Detroit News.

The State Department didn’t revoke the visa of foiled terrorism suspect Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab because federal counterterrorism officials had begged off revocation, a top State Department official revealed Wednesday.

Patrick F. Kennedy, an undersecretary for management at the State Department, said Abdulmutallab’s visa wasn’t taken away because intelligence officials asked his agency not to deny a visa to the suspected terrorist
over concerns that a denial would’ve foiled a larger investigation into al-Qaida threats against the United States.

“Revocation action would’ve disclosed what they were doing,” Kennedy said in testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security. Allowing Adbulmutallab to keep the visa increased chances federal investigators would be able to get closer to apprehending the terror network he is accused of working with, “rather than simply knocking out one soldier in that effort.”

So Point of Failure #1 is a big fat lie. The other thirteen points of failure are also big fat lies to cover up the first big fat lie. They imply that allowing Abdumullatab aboard was some sort of accidental bureaucratic mistake. But it is worrisome that a terrorist was allowed aboard by claiming to be from the Sudan. And this is done all the time? Are other terrorists similarly given covert cover by our intelligence officials? Kurt Haskell has stuck to his original story about Flight 253. Haskell was interviewed the day after Christmas.

Haskell said he and his wife were sitting on the ground near their boarding gate in Amsterdam, which is when they saw Mutallab approach the gate with an unidentified man.

Kurt and Lori Haskell are attorneys with Haskell Law Firm in Taylor. Their expertise includes bankruptcy, family law and estate planning.

While Mutallab was poorly dressed, his friend was dressed in an expensive suit, Haskell said. He says the suited man asked ticket agents whether Mutallab could board without a passport. “The guy said, ‘He’s from Sudan and we do this all the time.’”

Mutallab is Nigerian. Haskell believes the man may have been trying to garner sympathy for Mutallab’s lack of documents by portraying him as a Sudanese refugee.

The ticket agent referred Mutallab and his companion to her manager down the hall, and Haskell didn’t see Mutallab again until after he allegedly tried to detonate an explosive on the plane.

Also on Dec. 26, Newsweek reported that a Dutch counter-terrorism official government described special security procedures for Abdumullatab. But the issues of the passport and physical search remain uncertain.

Judith Sluyter, spokeswoman for the NCTB, the office of Holland’s national counter-terrorism coordinator, said that before Flight 253 left Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport, the passenger list was transmitted in full to U.S. authorities for review…

Sluyter said that not only did the airline have the Flight 253 passenger list reviewed and cleared by U.S. authorities, but also Mudallad went through some kind of security screening at Schiphol Airport after his arrival on a connecting flight from Lagos, Nigeria, and before he boarded Flight 253 for the U.S. She said she could not provide full details of the kind of screening that Mudallad passed at Schiphol, but said she believed it involved at least some basic physical search. She said she could not confirm at this point how thorough the physical search might have been.

The Government responded by denials of the Handler who did the talking for Abdulmutallab. Abdulmultallab did not talk and was described as "dazed"and "unemotional". Even when badly burnt by the device he remained silent, suggesting perhaps he had been drugged. ABC News reported there was a Handler who might be AQ.

Federal agents also tell ABCNews.com they are attempting to identify a man who passengers said helped Abdulmutallab change planes for Detroit when he landed in Amsterdam from Lagos, Nigeria.

Authorities had initially discounted the passenger accounts, but the agents say there is a growing belief the man have played a role to make sure Abdulmutallab "did not get cold feet."

If intelligence officials let terrorists travel as refugees from Sudan "all the time", this is assisting terrorism. If "rogue" intelligence officials decided to blow up an airliner it would be easy to smuggle an effective explosive device. The real lessons of the Christmas Day Bombing is

1) Do not let suspected terrorists board airliners and endanger innocent people.
2) Do not let unaccountable spies endanger innocent people with their False Flag Ops.

The official Report says the Dots Did Not Get Connected. The Beltway Press Pen all agree. Those Dots Did Not Get Connected! Spencer Ackerman endorsed the Report, but failed to notice there is nothing in the Report about Flight 253, other than the dots. Except, there are too many dots. He cites the Cato Institute for an analysis of the SSCI Report and ignores the coverup and the facts being covered up.
The Cato Institute story by Julian Sanchez likewise catapulted the neo-con false story about the Christmas Day Bombing. Nothing to see here but too many dots, move along! Sanchez also failed to notice what Ackerman had said that contradicts Big Fat Lie #1, about the Visa. The "Intelligence Community" did not want the State Department to revoke the Visa as reported at FDL.

The Detroit News didn’t “discover” anything — no disrespect to them — they faithfully reported Pat Kennedy’s January testimony about how the intelligence community didn’t want Abdulmutallab’s visa revoked because it would jeopardize their investigation of Abdulmutallab.

The Detroit News story by Nathan Hurst, deserves credit and was one of the few places where this story was featured. Ackerman has had some commendable posts. But Ackerman ignores that the main duty of the Intelligence Community is to suppress the "left", as the Intelligence Community promotes global domination by multinational corporations. In Ackerman’s world, there are no False Flag Ops, no PNAC, no Total Information Awareness, and no Disaster Capitalism.

False Flag Ops , such as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, TPAJAX, and Operation Gladio, suggest we critically examine the truth about terrorism. The Gladio bombings and murders were used to blame European terrorism on "leftists". The Niger Forgeries was a False Flag Op to provide a pretext for War against Irak. The Taliban support of AQ was a pretext for the Afghanistan War. Al Qaeda and the Taliban are controlled and financed by Saudi Arabia. False Flag Ops and Terrorism require lots of financing. AQ is most of all, a criminal gang that murders for money.

The 9-11 Report said about AQ finances, "Al Qaeda had many avenues of funding." But the 9-11 Report keeps these sources of money secret. The sophisticated financial network of AQ is concealed and protected by neo-cons who created them originally to fight the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Al Qaeda does investment banking with the Saudi Royal Family through the Al Shamal Bank in the Sudan.

Al Shamal Bank in the Sudan was founded by Bin Laden. By 1992 the US government and prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald knew that it was Bin Laden’s bank. Bin Laden was involved in currency and stock market trading, and had an import export business among others. Al Shamal is still in business.

Through the years, the finances of AQ have become as sophisticated as their violence is crude. They copy our own banksters big time stock fraud such as the suspicious airline "puts" prior to 9-11. They also go small time using mortgage fraud. All the financial transactions are concealed by the Intelligence Community, so AQ can maintain their financial networks.

But it was discovered that some of the UAL Puts before 9-11, were wagered by the investment bank AB Brown. This company was run by Buzzy Krongard, who became number three top spy at the CIA. Krongard helped obtain the Assassinations Contract for Blackwater.

The Riggs Bank in Washington DC was a CIA front. Dictators supported by the CIA used Riggs to stash their plundered loot. Saudi Arabia financed 9-11 through Riggs. Prior to that the CIA used the BCCI Bank to finance the Iran-Contra-Cocaine weapons and drug deals. Bin Laden also used BCCI.

Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., who conducted an investigation into the fraud-ridden Bank of Credit and Commerce International, said bin Laden held a number of accounts with BCCI…

Levin said bin Laden allegedly provided the AlShamal Islamic Bank (www.shamalbank.com) with $50 million in start-up capital.

Levin said he believes that at least until last year, bin Laden had been the leading shareholder of the bank. Levin also pointed out that in testimony given earlier this year at the embassy bombing trials, one witness testified that bin Laden’s network had half a dozen accounts at the AlShamal Bank to fund their activities. One account was in bin Laden’s own name.

The AlShamal bank’s Web site says it has correspondent relationships with major banks in financial capitals, Levin said. They include Credit Lyonnaise (based in Geneva), Commerz Bank in Germany, ING Bank in Indonesia, and Standard Bank in South Africa.

Immediately after the attack against Flight 253 the usual warmongers made the usual political posturing. Specifically, President Obama was soft on terror. Dots were not connected. X-ray scanners that can cause cancer are now needed to protect us from terrorists. Anwar Al-Awlaki, AQ leader and US citizen was declared eligible for assassination. More war in Yemen. Military Commissions were necessary because torture should be used for terrorists.

DNI Spy Chief Dennis Blair wanted the spies to take over law enforcement and he publicly criticized the FBI for their legal interrogation. But Abdumuttallab was talking, without torture, and perhaps talking too much. An early story said there was a Saudi Arabian who made the bomb. Blair resigned and the SSCI Report of course did not say if it was Blair who approved the plot for Abdulmutallab to travel to Detroit as a Sudanese refugee.

Even the right wing critics realized that the Flight 253 passengers were talking and the government statements kept changing. This story needed to be put to rest. Thus we have a report about the Christmas Day Bombing that has nothing at all about the Christmas Day Bombing. This attack is being covered up at the same time it is used as an excuse for more War in Yemen, and Torture in Military Commissions and even Assassinations of US citizens.

Coverups, Torture and Assassinations are a feature, not a bug of the Intelligence Community. During that horror movie called the War in Vietnam, Operation Phoenix was an assassination program that murdered tens of thousands of the "enemy". But sometimes those enemies were Americans, such as Bobby Garwood.

In this world, torture, assassination, even the killing of fellow Americans were given official, if unwritten, sanction. We are told that United States ”hunter-killer” teams, working from a list of suspected American deserters and defectors, had standing orders to kill them on sight. And, according to at least one former marine, that in 1973, after the signing of the peace accords, the C.I.A. assembled five-man sniper teams and paid them $12,000 to $25,000 a head for assassinating alleged renegade Americans.

There was also the War At Home. COINTELPRO by the FBI and the illegal Operation CHAOS by the CIA were espionage operations against anti-war Americans. Some of these were ops were getting people fired from jobs. Or provocateurs would promote violence or bombings. Or local police would be told to use an arrest for drugs, that is marijuana to harass and disrupt the anti-war freaks. The information gathered on dissidents was quite detailed.

As campus anti-war protest activity spread across the nation, the CIA reacted by implementing two new domestic operations. The first, Project RESISTANCE, was designed to provide security to CIA recruiters on college campuses. Under this program, the CIA sought active cooperation from college administrators, campus security, and local police to help identify anti-war activists, political dissidents, and "radicals." Eventually information was provided to all government recruiters on college campuses (6) and directly to the super-secret DOD on thousands of students and dozens of groups. The CIA’s Office of Security also created Project MERRIMAC, to provide warnings about demonstrations being carried out against CIA facilities or personnel in the Washington area. (7)

Under both Projects, the CIA infiltrated agents into domestic groups of all types and activities. It used its contacts with local police departments and their intelligence units to pick up its "police skills" and began in earnest to pull off burglaries, illegal entries, use of explosives, criminal frame-ups, shared interrogations, and disinformation. CIA teams purchased sophisticated equipment for many starved police departments and in return got to see arrest records, suspect lists, and intelligence reports. Many large police departments, in conjunction with the CIA, carried out illegal, warrantless searches of private properties, to provide intelligence for a report requested by President Johnson and later entitled "Restless Youth." (8)

Would the USA use similar tactics today against anti-war citizens? Probably not, except for indefinite detentions, enhanced interrogations and targeted assassinations. In the current Global War On Terror everywhere is a battlefield (except for Saudi Arabia). That includes the new digital communications. That battlefield requires cognitive censorship to conceal the web of wars, gunrunning, international bankers, drugs, secret armies, and oil pipelines supporting neo-con/globalist imperialism.

Ackerman is similar to the the government in not being able to handle criticism. I do not mind the invective Ackerman directs at me. But I do object to his Posts which have contained false information. I also object to his consistent support, for the neo-con wars and concealment of neo-con crimes. As I previously discussed, he used the Christmas Day Bombing Plot to portray AQ terrorists as mentally ill, and "Conspiracy theorists" are also mentally ill. If this reporting sounds as if it is government propaganda, it probably is. Ackerman has a source who is an insider, CIA "analyst" Philip Mudd, AQ expert.

I hesitate to disagree with Phil Mudd, who has forgotten more about al-Qaeda than I’ll ever know

Mudd was part of "enhanced interrogation", that is torture to get false confessions to justify the Oil Wars. Mudd has "retired" assuming spies retire. He is a "senior fellow" at the New America Foundation. The New America Foundation "invests in new thinkers and new ideas to address the next generation of challenges facing the United States".

You can certainly expect new ideas from their Board of Directors. Christine Todd Whitman lied to New Yorkers about the safety of breathing the air after 9-11. Walter Russell Mead, is a Henry Kissinger Senior Fellow. Francis Fukuyama signed the PNAC manifesto for supporting global domination by neo-cons.

The NAF does have a few "liberals" but it is doubtful they do anything to offend the NAF globalist donors. The NAF donors includes billionaires, The Rockefeller Foundation, Peter G. Peterson Foundation, Levi Strauss Foundation, and The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. This is a perfect place for a "retired" CIA expert to catapult the neo-con propaganda, without any annoying conspiracy theorizing bloggers.

Mudd may be an expert about AQ, but he ignores the finances of AQ and how they profit from terror. Mudd gives the government approved coverup in a Newsweek article.

The question Al Qaeda faced before 9/11 was how to increase that pressure. How could a relatively small, stateless organization really take on an adversary as powerful as the United States?

Because AQ is not stateless. It is Saudi Arabian sponsored terrorism, and Saudi Arabia provides protection and safe haven. The Saudi Wahhabi are as extreme as AQ and by 1997, the CIA considered Saudi Secret Service, a

Still, there’s cause for optimism. The leaders of this revolution have increasingly faced tough questions about the murders they commit, even from people who share their anger and frustration. (None other than Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s No. 2, felt compelled to defend himself in an Internet interview in 2008, when he got a question from Algeria about how Al Qaeda justifies killing so many innocents.) Our goal should be to magnify this growing disillusionment.

I agree we should magnify the disillusionment with killing innocents. The last nine years of Afghanistan and seven years of Irak War For Oil has had hundreds of thousands killed. Possibly some of the victims of PNAC’s staged wars were innocent. These wars and their associated torture violate international law. It is possible killing hundreds of thousands whether guilty or innocent, causes hatred against America. The upside is war profiteers have continued to make more enemies of America for more wars. The unmanned killer drones are also the coward’s way of killing and it is terrorism that violates international law.

In a recent New America Foundation article Mudd uses the Mumbai attacks, the Spanish Train Bombing and the Christmas Day bombing among others, to justify the War On Terror. The "failure" of Abdulmutallab is claimed to be evidence of success by the Intelligence Community.

Patience, though, and steady resolve also pay dividends for us. An attacker failed on Christmas Day on a plane bound for Detroit.

The cowardly crimes that Mudd lists are horrible. But these attacks cannot be compared to the violence and mass murder of the Irak and Afghanistan wars. Mudd uses the excuse of terrorism to promote more war. Perhaps when Mudd was officially at the CIA, he was involved in the CIA’s secret support of Al Qaeda.

They have seen their attacks on Manhattan and Morocco, Bombay and Bali, Saudi Arabia and Spain, all conducted in the span of a decade, many not by al Qaeda members but by individuals inspired only by the group’s message.

They may have been "inspired". But the Spanish Train Bombings were False Flag attacks, not AQ. Informers for the Spanish Civil Guard Bomb Squad stole the explosives and provided them to the AQ inspired killers who did make the bombs. The FBI confused the investigation by falsely blaming a Oregon lawyer of being part of the conspiracy.

The 2008 (26/11) Mumbai (Bombay) attacks killed 173, including 6 Americans, and wounded over 300 people. These attacks had little or nothing to do with AQ. This was another False Flag attack. The Indian Secret Service provided SIM cards for cell phones to the Pakistan terror group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) which was likely supported by Pakistan’s ISI. Perhaps for spies such as Mudd, it is considered professional courtesy not to reveal the False Flag Ops of other espionage services. Mudd tells us we should be grateful to the spies.

Intelligence, law enforcement and foreign security allies have crippled al Qaeda affiliates in Europe, Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

This is a good example of disinformation by Mudd. But the irony, Mudd mentions "a Pakistani-American from Chicago who was affiliated with the Mumbai murderers". That is, another murdering AQ affiliate terrorist can be anywhere, even Chicago. Mudd is talking about Daood Gilani, who also used the name David Headley. Headley is double agent, affiliated with DEA and CIA. Mudd neglects to mention that. But affiliated is not exactly correct. Headley helped plan the murders, and it was reported he was one of the leaders of the attacks.

Headley was born in Washington DC, to a Pakistani diplomat father and American mother. He was raised in both the US and Pakistan. Headley was convicted of Heroin Smuggling but was released from prison early to work as a secret DEA informer. Indian officials think he may have gone "rogue".

“The feeling in India is that the US has not been transparent,” said B. Raman, a former counter-terrorism chief in the Indian foreign intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing.

“That Headley was an agent for the DEA is known. Whether he was being used by the CIA as well is a matter of speculation, but it is almost certain that the CIA was aware of him and his movements across the subcontinent.”

It is not known when Headley stopped working for the DEA and started working for LeT. But he first infiltrated the terrorist group LeT in 2002. He made at least five trips to Mumbai to survey targets. He was also under surveillance himself by the FBI, before the attacks. This included tape recordings of some of his conversations. People he met in Mumbai, called him "Agent Headley".

The plot thickens as the Indian Consulate in Chicago cannot find the visa papers of Headley, allowing travel to India. It was considered unusual that a Pakistani convicted of heroin drug charges, could easily travel back and forth to India. A recent news report said Headley was with LeT commanders who were directly controlling the operation on 26/11. The United States has refused India’s request to extradite Headley.

Who handles AQ double agents best? That would be AQ expert Patrick Fitzgerald, the same prosecutor who covered up the Niger Forgeries. Fitz is personally handling the Headley Case. Fitz also handled AQ double agent Ali Mohamed. Fitz handled Ali by letting him loose time and time again to assist Bin Laden and AQ. Is Ali working on another terrorist attack? Only Fitz knows.

There are so many AQ double agents, we will need a scorecard to count them. Ali Mohamed helped murder hundreds at the African Embassy Bombings and Ali is getting a US government pension. We should also ask how much the DEA paid Headley to plan the Mumbai terror attacks. Underwear Bomber’s handler got a bomb through security and then the handler vanished. The handler may be a double agent, because his existence has been denied by the Intelligence Community.

Headley and Ali pled guilty to at least some of their crimes, so there was no embarrassing court trial. I do not expect an open trial for Abdulmutallab, other than a guilty plea. It would be too revealing of secrets that the Intelligence Community want suppressed.

by Frank33

SSCI Committee Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253

9:07 am in Uncategorized by Frank33

SSCI Committee Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253

[The SSCI Report was released as a PDF file. TPM did provide a version, which required some editing, to produce this HTML version.]

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Unclassified Executive Summary of the
Committee Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253
May 18, 2010

Background: On December 25, 2009, a 23 year-old Nigerian man, Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab (hereafter Abdulmutallab) attempted to detonate a concealed non-
metallic device containing the explosive pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) on
Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan, as the plane was
descending into Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport.

Committee Investigation: Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) announced on December 31, 2009, that the Committee would conduct hearings on the attempted Christmas Day terrorist attack and "collect all intelligence related to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab held by various intelligence agencies in order to determine who had what, and how the information was handled. In addition, the Committee [would] review national security policies on sharing information and terrorist watchlisting." [ SSCI Press Release, "lntelligence Committee Announces Hearings into Failed Christmas Day Terrorism Attack," available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=321274]

Background on Report: This report contains information gathered by the Committee through hearings, briefings, and document requests from the following agencies:

• Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
• National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
• Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
• National Security Agency (NSA)
• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
• Department of State
• Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—including agencies under its purview, such as the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A).

Findings and Conclusions: The Committee found there were systemic failures
across the Intelligence Community (IC), which contributed to the failure to identify the
threat posed by Ablulmutallab. Specifically, the NCTC was not organized adequately
to fulfill its missions. Following 9/ l l, Congress created the NCTC and charged it with
serving as "the primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and

Page l of 12

integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism …. " [50 U.S.C. 404o(d)]. In practice, however, the Committee found that no one agency saw itself as being responsible for tracking and identifying all terrorism threats. In addition, technology across the IC is not adequate to provide search enhancing tools for analysts, which contributed to the failure of the IC to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat.


The SSCI report identifies fourteen specific points of failure—a series of human
errors, technical problems, systemic obstacles, analytical misjudgments, and competing
priorities—which resulted in Abdulmutallab being able to travel to the United States on
December 25, 2009. Those points of failure are:

1. The State Department Did Not Revoke Abdulmutallab’s U.S. Visa.

2. Abdulmutallab Was Not Placed in the "Terrorist Screening Database" (TSDB), on
the Selectee List, or on the No Fly List.

3. Reporting Was Not Distributed to All Appropriate CIA Elements.

4. A CIA Regional Division, at CIA Headquarters, Did Not Search Databases
Containing Reports Related to Abdulmutallab.

5. CIA Did Not Disseminate Key Reporting Until after the 12/25 Attempted Attack.

6. A CIA Counterterrorism Center (CTC) Office’s Limited Name Search Failed to
Uncover the Key Reports on Abdulmutallab.

7. CIA CTC Analysts Failed to Connect the Reporting on Abdulmutallab.

8. FBI Counterterrorism Analysts Could Not Access All Relevant Reports.

9. NCTC’s Directorate of Intelligence Failed to Connect the Reporting on Abdulmutallab.

10. NCTC’s Watchlisting Office Did Not Conduct Additional Research to Find
Additional Derogatory Information to Place Abdulmutallab on a Watchlist.

11. NSA Did Not Pursue Potential Collection Opportunities That Could Have Provided
Information on Abdulmutallab.

12. Analysts Did Not Connect Key Reports Partly Identifying Abdulmutallab and
Failed to Ensure Dissemination of All Relevant Reporting.

13. NSA Did Not Nominate Abdulmutallab for Watchlisting or the Terrorist Identities
Datamart Environment (TIDE) Based on Information Partly Identifying Him.

14. Intelligence Analysts Were Primarily Focused on Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) Threats to U.S. Interests in Yemen, Rather than on Potential
AQAP Threats to the U.S. Homeland.

Page 2 of 12

Based on the information provided, the Committee concludes that the Intelligence
Community failed to connect and appropriately analyze the information in its possession
prior to December 25, 2009 that would have identified Abdulmutallab as a possible
terrorist threat to the United States. The Committee believes the IC, and other parts of
the U.S. Government, should have taken steps to prevent Abdulmutallab from boarding
Northwest Flight 253 to Detroit, Michigan, on Christmas Day.

Points of failure #1 and #2 relate to failures of the systems and procedures in
place to prevent suspected terrorists from entering the United States. Points of failure
#3 through #14 discuss why the relevant intelligence was not connected. Doing so may
have led analysts to link sufficient threat and biographical information on Abdulmutallab to place him on the watchlists.

Committee Action: On March 16, 2010, the Committee unanimously approved a 55-page report and provided it to the Intelligence Community for a classification review. This unclassified Executive Summary was prepared based on that Intelligence Community review.

In the Committee’s March 16th report, each point of failure includes a
description, a Committee conclusion, Committee recommendations, and a discussion of
the corrective actions being taken by the Intelligence Community. Because the other
parts of the report remain classified, this Executive Summary only contains unclassified
portions of the Committee’s conclusions and recommendations about each failure.

The SSCI report also includes classified appendices which describe: (1) the
intelligence collected on Abdulmutallab prior to the terrorist plot and what was or was
not done with that intelligence; (2) the terrorist watchlisting process and standards as
they existed at the time; and (3) additional biographical information on Abdulmutallab.

In addition to the review conducted by the Committee, the Director of National
Intelligence created an Intelligence Community Review Panel that was chaired by John
McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of the CIA. That panel’s report endorsed three of
the specific classified recommendations made by the SSCI report. The panel also
disagreed with one of the Committee’s recommendations to expand access to certain
counterterrorism information. The Committee stands by its recommendation.

Note on Historical Hindsight: As is the case with many reports analyzing the past performance of the IC, the SSCI report presents information that was relevant to the Flight 253 plot in hindsight. Briefers and intelligence officials stated frequently that the intelligence described in the classified SSCI report was among thousands of other intelligence reports and that other terrorist threats were assessed to be more pressing at

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the time. Thus, while the SSC] report presents the information as it was known, and as
it could have been known, the Committee recognizes the benefit of "20-20 hindsight" in
our evaluation of the lC’s performance.

I. The State Department Did Not Revoke Abdulmutallab ’s U.S. Visa.

Conclusion:

The State Department could have revoked Abdulmutallab ’s US. visa based on
the information available to the Department. The State Department consular officer in
Abuja, Nigeria should have used all of the tools available, including using "fuzzy logic"
or a passport number, to search for a visa for Abdulmutallab. Had this occurred, it is
likely that Abdulmutallab’s active U.S. visa would have been located in the
Department’s database.

The State Department has an independent obligation to evaluate a non-U.S. person’s
suitability for entry into the U.S., but instead relies on the lC’s assessment of whether an
individual meets the standard for placement on the terrorist watchlists. The Committee
believes Abdulmuta1lab’s visa should have been identified and revoked independently
by the State Department based on the information provided to the consulate by other
embassy officers, which included an assessment that Abdulmutallab should be
watchlisted because of suspected "involvement with Yemeni-based extremists?

Recommendations:

• The State Department must use its independent judgment and authority to revoke
visas for anyone suspected of being involved with terrorism or a terrorist group,
and must be able to do so in real-time in coordination with the Intelligence
Community.

• The Director of NCTC should make recommendations to deny or revoke a US.
visa based on terrorism related intelligence. In addition to exercising its own
independent authority to revoke visas, the State Department should accept the
Director of NCTC ’s recommendations.

• The State Department should develop a system for electronically notifying all
airlines of individuals whose visas have been revoked.

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2. Abdalmutallab Was Not Placed in the "Terrorist Screening Database" (TSDB), on
the Selectee List, or on the No Fly List.

Conclusion:

The standards to place an individual on the Terrorist Watchlists were interpreted too rigidly and may be too complicated to address terrorist threats. Although U.S. Embassy officials in Abuja recommended that Abdulmutallab be placed on the No Fly List, the determination was made at CIA Headquarters and at the NCTC Watchlisting Office that there was only sufficient derogatory information to enter Abdulmutallab’s information in the general "Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment" (TIDE) database, but not sufficient derogatory information to place him on any of the watchlists. Because of the language of the watchlisting standard, the manner in which it was being interpreted at the time, or both, analysts responsible for making the watchlisting determination did not believe they had the ability to give additional weight to significant pieces of information from the field, such as the report that resulted from the meeting with Abdulmutallab’s father.

Recommendations:

• The Administration, in consultation with Congress, should simplify, strengthen,
and add flexibility to watchlisting practices to better protect the U.S. homeland.

• intelligence officers responsible for watchlisting terrorist suspects should have the
flexibility to give added weight to significant information, such as
recommendations from Chiefs of Station or other experienced intelligence
professionals, in determining whether to place an individual on a watchlist.

3. Reporting was Not Distributed to All Appropriate CIA Elements.

Conclusion:

The inconsistencies in distributing key intelligence reports may have
contributed to the failure of the Intelligence Community to identify Abdulmutallab as
a potential threat. While there was no intent to limit access to the reports, processes
failed to disseminate relevant intelligence to all offices and individuals with a need to
know.

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Recommendations:

• Classified recommendation excluded

4. A CIA Regional Division (at CIA Headquarters) Did Not Search Databases
Containing Reports Related to Abdulmutallab.

Conclusion:

CIA had reports related to Abdulmutallab, but a regional division failed to search
other databases that would have identified relevant information. CIA tasked this
division with the responsibility, but not the tools to adequately identify terrorism-related
reporting. Inadequate technological search tools and the fragmented nature of the
Intelligence Community’s databases made it difficult to find additional intelligence
related to Abdulmutallab.

Recommendations:

• The Director of the CIA should report to the congressional intelligence
committees within 30 days on the increased access to its all-source
counterterrorism database. The report should include the total number of
personnel with increased access and the positions these individuals occupy.

• Classified recommendation excluded

5. CIA Did Not Disseminate Key Reporting Until After the 12/25 Attempted Attack.

Conclusion:

Had the CIA intelligence report been disseminated, other intelligence officers
outside of the CIA and NCTC who tracked intelligence on Yemen and AQAP may
have made the connection between the information provided.

Recommendations:

• The CIA should set standards to ensure that all intelligence reports are
disseminated promptly—within two days for counterterrorism and all other high
priority issues.

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• The CIA and other intelligence agencies must ensure that critical intelligence
functions are not delayed when personnel are temporarily deployed to other
assignments.

• The CIA should provide broader access to operational traffic for all analysts with
a need to know, whether those analysts are employed by the CIA or by another
agency in the Intelligence Community.

6. A CIA CTC Office’s Limited Name Search Failed to Uncover the Key Reports on
Abdulmutallab.

Conclusion:

CTC conducted a limited name search of CIA’s all-source database, which
included key reports on Abdulmutallab, to determine if there was other available
information. Because of the limited nature of the search, it failed to uncover key reports
on Abdulmutallab. Thus, CTC failed to draw the link between Abdulmutallab’s father’s
information and the key reports.

7. CIA CTC Analysts Failed To Connect Reporting on Abdulmutallab.

Conclusion:

The failure of CIA CTC analysts to connect the reporting contributed to the
failure of the Intelligence Community to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat.
Like other Intelligence Community analysts, according to CIA, CTC analysts were
focused on Yemen-based AQAP-related threats and supporting operations to counter
these threats.

Recommendations for 6 and 7:

• The Director of the CIA should ensure that CIA personnel understand their
responsibility to connect related all—source information and disseminate all
possible threat reporting, particularly reports that might help identify homeland
threats.

• The DNI should develop a comprehensive plan to implement advanced
information technology systems that can draw connections among related
intelligence reports and assist in the prioritization of terrorism threat streams. The

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DNI should notify congressional intelligence committees of the progress made in
implementing the plan on a biannual basis.

8. FBI Counterterrorism Analysts Could Not Access All Relevant Reports.

Conclusion:

The misconfiguration of an analyst ’s computer profile prevented her from
accessing relevant intelligence reports, despite their existence in FBI systems. Had
the FBI counterterrorism analyst ’s computer profile been configured appropriately,
the analyst may have been able to identify the threat stream on Abdulmutallab.

Recommendations:

• The Director of the FBI should conduct a review of FBI’s information
technology systems to ensure all FBI analysts have access to the necessary
intelligence databases and that the FBI information systems are appropriately
configured to support intelligence analysis. The Director should provide a report
to the congressional intelligence committees within 90 days on the changes made
as a result of this review.

9. NCTC ’s Directorate of Intelligence Failed to Connect the Reporting on
Abdulmutallab.

Conclusion:

NCTC personnel had the responsibility and the capability to connect the key
reporting with the other relevant reporting. The NCTC was not adequately organized
and did not have resources appropriately allocated to fulfill its missions.

NCTC has the primary role within the IC to bring together and assess all-source
terrorism-related intelligence. One of the NCTC’s missions, as outlined in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), is:

"to serve as the primary organization in the United States Government for
analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United
States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism. . ." [50 U.S.C. 404o(d)].

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NCTC has the primary role within the IC to bring together and assess all-source
terrorism-related intelligence. Prior to 12/25, NCTC’s Directorate of Intelligence was
not staffed adequately and analysts were not tasked to track or identify all threat streams
related to the AQAP threat to the U.S. homeland. Like other analysts in the Intelligence
Community, NCTC’s analysts were primarily focused on Yemen—based AQAP-related
threats.

Recommendations:

• The Director of the NCTC should ensure that all NCTC analysts understand their
responsibility to connect related all-source information and disseminate all
possible threat reporting, particularly reports that might help identify homeland
threats.

• The Director of the NCTC should ensure that NCTC is organized and resourced
to fulfill its responsibility to track, analyze, and report on all terrorist threats to
the United States emanating from terrorist groups overseas.

• Classified recommendation excluded

10. NCTC ’s Watchlisting Office Did Not Conduct Additional Research to Find
Additional Derogatory Information to Place Abdulmutallab on a Watchlist.

Conclusion:

NCTC had the responsibility and the capability to connect the key intelligence
reporting with the other relevant reporting. Doing so could have produced sufficient
information to recommend that Abdulmutallab be placed on the terrorist watchlists.
The NCTC was not adequately organized and did not have resources appropriately
allocated to fulfill its missions.

Under IRTPA a primary role of the NCTC is:

"to serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected
terrorists and international terror groups," [50 U.S.C. 404o(d)]
Prior to 12/25, NCTC’s standard practice was to process watchlisting information
it received, but not to conduct additional analysis or enhance existing records with more
derogatory information. Thus, even though NCTC created a basic terrorist record for

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Abdulmutallab in TIDE, NCTC did not conduct additional research to identify other
intelligence related to Abdulmutallab—intelligence that may have placed
Abdulmutallab in the TSDB, and potentially on the Selectee Lists or the No Fly List.

Recommendations:

• NCTC should keep the congressional intelligence committees fully informed of
resources needed to perform the watchlisting function Without compromising its
other missions.

11. NSA Did Not Pursue Potential Collection Opportunities That Could Have
Provided Information on Abdulmutallab.

Conclusion:

NSA did not take all available actions which contributed to the failure of the
Intelligence Community to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat.

Recommendations:

• Classified recommendation excluded
• Classified recommendation excluded
• Classified recommendation excluded

12. Analysts Did Not Connect Key Reports Partly Identifying Abdulmutallab and
Failed to Ensure Dissemination of All Relevant Reporting.

Conclusion:

The failure of analysts to connect and disseminate all relevant reports may have
contributed to the failure of the Intelligence Community to identify Abdulmutallab as
a potential threat

Recommendations:

• Classified recommendation excluded
• Classified recommendation excluded

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• Classified recommendation excluded

13. NSA Did Not Nominate Abdulmutallab for Watchlisting or the Terrorist
Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) based on Information Partly Identifying
Him.

Conclusion:

The policy of not making nominations to TIDE based on information partly
identifying Abdulmutallab may have contributed to the failure of the Intelligence
Community to identify him as a potential threat.

Recommendations:

• NSA should immediately clear the backlog of reports that require review for
watchlisting.

• NCTC should change its practices to allow for nominations to TIDE of partially
identifying or other incomplete information to assist in enhancing terrorist
identities records and other agencies should change their policies accordingly.

14. Intelligence Analysts were Primarily Focused on AQAP Threats to US. Interests
In Yemen, Rather than on Potential AQAP Threats to U.S. Homeland.

Conclusion:

Analysts ’ competing priorities contributed to the failure of the Intelligence
Community to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat. Prior to the 12/ 25 plot,
counterterrorism analysts at NCTC, CIA, and NSA were focused on the threat of
terrorist attacks in Yemen, but were not focused on the possibility of AQAP attacks
against the U.S. homeland. These other priorities contributed to the failure of analysts
to recognize and collate the several pieces of intelligence reporting that mentioned
Abdulmutallab.

Recommendations:

• The DNI should review the roles and responsibilities of counterterrorism analysts
throughout the Intelligence Community to ensure that all agencies understand
their counterterrorism role, their role in identifying and analyzing threats to the

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U.S. homeland, and that counterterrorism analysts actively collaborate across the
Intelligence Community to identify such threats. This review should also
investigate how to expand access to counterterrorism intelligence throughout the
Intelligence Community, including whether counterterrorism analysts within each
IC component should be provided access to all counterterrorism intelligence. In
conducting this review, the DNI should be mindful of the intent of Congress to
give NCTC the primary role and responsibility within the IC to bring together and
assess all-source terrorism-related intelligence in [RTPA. The DNI should report
the results of this review to congressional intelligence committees within 60 days.

• The DNI should examine whether adequate intelligence resources are directed
against the homeland threat.

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