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by Frank33

Gottfrid Svartholm and Robert Levinson, Two More Victims Of Lying, Spying, Thieving Generals

2:54 pm in Uncategorized by Frank33

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0oCs4w3vGKI

General Petraeus, General Clapper, General Allen, General Alexander, and General Dempsey have led the Phony War On Terror for twelve years. They have failed, or perhaps they intended to fail. These high ranking military officers deserve a special place in hell and certainly a special place as the worst military leaders in history.

***A GIANT OCTOPUS SUCKING EVERYTHING ESPECIALLY MONEY***

The failed Generals have led the wars, secret and otherwise for twelve years. They have created a Police State, in the USA supported with lies catapulted by corporate shills. They have given us an Assassination Industry of murder by Robot Assassin Drones. They have created a corrupt network of false front corporations that privatize the violence and propaganda. They “retire” and receive million dollar salaries.

The current General leading us to victory in Afghanistan, General Dempsey, threatened the Afghan Government, such as it is, with a civil war funded by US taxpayers. Afghans object to Drone murder and have not been sufficiently subservient to to the US neo-cons. President Karzai, who receives Bags of Cash from America, may want more Bags of Cash.

In a response to a somewhat leading question from the French newspaper Le Monde in an interview published Tuesday, “Do you think the USA is behaving like a colonial power,” President Karzai said:

“Absolutely. They threaten us by saying ‘We will no longer pay your salaries; we will drive you into a civil war.’ These are threats,” Karzai said.

These rotten military leaders have disgraced the US Military. They have used the troops for cannonfodder, as these Generals get rewarded with million dollar payoffs.

There are military leaders who do demonstrate honor and duty. Most have been purged, if they do not promote the neo-con new world order. Marine General Michael Lehnert is one General who has shown courage and integrity. This General opened the Guantanamo prison. Now he wants it closed. Shoutout to General Lehnert.

In retrospect, the entire detention and interrogation strategy was wrong. We squandered the goodwill of the world after we were attacked by our actions in Guantánamo, both in terms of detention and torture. Our decision to keep Guantánamo open has helped our enemies because it validates every negative perception of the United States…

It is time to close Guantánamo. Our departure from Afghanistan is a perfect point in history to close the facility.

The worst of the worst of these Generals is General Michael Hayden. This General was the Director of the CIA until 2009. Under his leadership, the CIA spy Robert Levinson, was dispatched to Iran in 2007. For six years, the Spies and Generals lied about Levinson claiming he was a private citizens. Levinson was captured, probably by the Iranian secret police. But the Spies and Generals lied to the American people and they lied to Congress. Their criminal wars need a continuing “bodyguard of lies”.

The news organization AP has given us some information about Levinson and his CIA spying mission. CNN says they can confirm AP’s story.

Both the State Department and Bob Levinson’s family have long denied he was working for the U.S. government when he disappeared on a trip to Iran in 2007.

A source who’s involved in the matter told CNN that there’s proof that Levinson worked for the CIA undercover and under contract while also working as a private investigator.

AP says they learned that Levinson was a CIA Spy in 2010. Government censors suppressed the story three times. How many other stories has the Government suppressed”?

“The AP first confirmed Levinson’s CIA ties in 2010 and continued reporting to uncover more details. It agreed three times to delay publishing the story because the U.S. government said it was pursuing promising leads to get him home,” the news agency said in its report. “The AP is reporting the story now because, nearly seven years after his disappearance, those efforts have repeatedly come up empty. The government has not received any sign of life in nearly three years. Top U.S. officials, meanwhile, say his captors almost certainly already know about his CIA association.”

Here is another story AP and the CIA has suppressed. The founder of Pirate Bay, Gottfrid Svartholm has been imprisoned in Dennmark. His crime was playing computer games better than the National Security Agency, NSA. His punishment is probably similar to Levinson’s, indefinite detention in solitary confinement.

Since his arrival in Denmark to face hacking charges Gottfrid Svartholm has sat in solitary confinement, denied free access to mail and denied access to his books. The situation has outraged Wikileaks’ Julian Assange who says Gottfrid is now a political prisoner. Meanwhile Gottfrid’s mother Kristina has written to Amnesty hoping that they will take notice of her son’s plight…

In a recent letter sent to Amnesty and shared with TorrentFreak, Gottfrid’s mother Kristina explains her son’s plight. She says that Gottfrid is being kept in solitary and treated as if he were a “dangerous, violent and aggressive criminal” even though his only crime – if any – is hacking.

Solitary confienement is torture. And there are many other freedom fighters who have been punished for revealing the truth about government crimes. Bradley Manning was tortured in a military prison. Susan Lindauer was imprisoned for a year in a military prison. She revealed information that suggested the 9-11 attacks were an inside job.

Gottfrid Svarholm-Warg appears to be a talented hacker. He is accused of breaking into a secretive, and powerful corporation, Computer Science Corporation, CSC.

The 29-year-old Svartholm Warg, along with a 20-year-old Dane, are suspected of breaching computers with Danish firm CSC, a company that manages back-end IT operations for several public agencies in Denmark.

Specifically, it is alleged that the Swede downloaded a large number of files from CSC mainframes, including police records.

Svartholm-Warg has previously appealed to the Swedish government to stop the extradition, arguing that while the Danish hacker attack may have been traced to his computer, he had not actually carried it out.

CSC is apparently another affiliate of the NSA. It is just another tip of the iceberg of Universal NSA Dragnet. Governments give money to their spies. The spies give money to corporations that then hire the spies at inflated salaries.

Between 2009 and 2013, three German subsidiaries of CSC were given 100 contracts by ten ministries and the Chancellor’s office, a report by German TV channel NDR and Munich daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung said.

Their investigation showed that CSC was also cooperating with the National Security Agency (NSA) to develop a new IT system and an espionage software. The US’ Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also used the company’s services, the report said.

General Hayden and General Clapper have worked for more than twenty years to give generous government contracts to CSC. It is all about the money.

The collaboration between Computer Science Corporation and the NSA has existed for quite some time. On its homepage, the company states that it has been delivering computer hardware and software to the NSA for the past twenty years. The cooperation is so extensive that the computer company CSC has an exchange agreement with the intelligence agency NSA. The agreement means that the computer company and the intelligence agency can exchange employees for brief or extended periods of time.

Hayden, who was the NSA director at the time, “put a lot of trust in the private sector, and a lot of trust in Clapper, because Clapper was his mentor,” added Loomis. And once he got approval, “he was hell-bent on privatization and nothing was going to derail that.” Clapper is now President Obama’s director of national intelligence, and has denounced the Guardian leaks as “reprehensible.”

We should mention that the mendacious General Clapper lied about Weapons of Mass Destruction in Irak, in order to have a war.

Strangely enough, CSC is being investigated for corruption.

Just as Gottfrid’s mother is strongly defending her son, the Levinson’s family is similarly standing by the breadwinner of their family. But the Levinson’s have received millions of dollars of our taxpayer money. Levinson was paid significant amounts for his spying. For the family and his wife the pain is almost impossible to bear. But the money certainly helps to ease the pain. They have had their seventh Thanksgiving without “Bob”.

Our family will soon gather for our seventh Thanksgiving without Bob, and the pain will be almost impossible to bear. Yet, as we endure this terrible nightmare from which we can not wake, we know that we must bear it for Bob, the most extraordinary man we have ever known.

Gottfrid’s mother may miss her son also. The victims of Drone terror attacks may consider that robot murder is impossible pain. The innocent victims in the Gitmo Gulag probably think they are in a nightmare.

***IF YOU LIKE YOUR NSA/CIA SPY, YOU CAN KEEP YOUR NSA/CIA SPY***

The CIA is claiming that Levinson was on a “rogue” mission. Levinson wanted to meet with an assassin of the Iranian government, Dawud Salahuddin. What could go wrong? Levinson was captured immediately after that. AP claims this meeting was set up by an NBC producer Ira Silverman. Silverman is described as an investigative reporter. And the plot gets weirder.

Levinson’s source on Kish was Dawud Salahuddin, an American fugitive wanted for killing a former Iranian diplomat in Maryland in 1980. In interviews with ABC News and the New Yorker, Salahuddin has admitted killing the diplomat

Since fleeing to Iran, Salahuddin had become close to some in the Iranian government, particularly to those seen as reformers and moderates.

To set up the meeting, Levinson worked with a longtime friend, retired NBC investigative reporter Ira Silverman. Silverman had talked at length with Salahuddin and, in a 2002 piece for the New Yorker magazine, portrayed him as a potential intelligence source if the U.S. could coax him out of Iran. The subtitle of the article: “He’s an assassin who fled the country. Could he help Washington now?”

Two of Levinson’s CIA co-conspirators were Anne Jablonski and Tim Sampson who hired Levinson in 2006. Levinson travelled to Iran and disappeared. Levinson was a former FBI agent and the FBI asked the CIA if Levinson was a CIA agent. AP says Jablonski and Sampson lied to the CIA internal investigators. The CIA then lied to the FBI, and said that Levinson was not a CIA agent. The CIA also lied to members of the Congressional Intelligence Committee.

Are you confused yet? A colleague of Levinson, David McGee discovered personal e-mails between Levinson and Jablonski. He gave them to the Senate Intelligence Committe in 2007. Obviously, they should have asked NSA for e-mails, since NSA has everybody’s e-mail.

And were Jablonski and Sampson punished? No. They were rewarded. They did not receive almost three million dollars as did the Levinson family. They were hired by other affiliates of the Intelligence Community.

Jablonski now analyzes risk for companies doing business overseas.

Sampson, the former head of CIA’s Illicit Finance group, quickly returned to the government, landing a job at the Department of Homeland Security’s intelligence division. O’Toole, the young contracts officer, moved to the Treasury Department.

***NOTHING IS BEYOND THEIR REACH ***

The NSA could solve this mystery. They have records of everyone. They know how to use them for COINTELPRO. They use their surveillance against people who fight for peace, justice and freedom. They use their surveillance to protect war profiteers and spies who lie to Congress. Nothing is beyond their reach.

by Frank33

SSCI Committee Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253

9:07 am in Uncategorized by Frank33

SSCI Committee Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253

[The SSCI Report was released as a PDF file. TPM did provide a version, which required some editing, to produce this HTML version.]

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Unclassified Executive Summary of the
Committee Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253
May 18, 2010

Background: On December 25, 2009, a 23 year-old Nigerian man, Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab (hereafter Abdulmutallab) attempted to detonate a concealed non-
metallic device containing the explosive pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) on
Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan, as the plane was
descending into Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport.

Committee Investigation: Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) announced on December 31, 2009, that the Committee would conduct hearings on the attempted Christmas Day terrorist attack and "collect all intelligence related to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab held by various intelligence agencies in order to determine who had what, and how the information was handled. In addition, the Committee [would] review national security policies on sharing information and terrorist watchlisting." [ SSCI Press Release, "lntelligence Committee Announces Hearings into Failed Christmas Day Terrorism Attack," available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=321274]

Background on Report: This report contains information gathered by the Committee through hearings, briefings, and document requests from the following agencies:

• Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
• National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
• Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
• National Security Agency (NSA)
• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
• Department of State
• Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—including agencies under its purview, such as the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A).

Findings and Conclusions: The Committee found there were systemic failures
across the Intelligence Community (IC), which contributed to the failure to identify the
threat posed by Ablulmutallab. Specifically, the NCTC was not organized adequately
to fulfill its missions. Following 9/ l l, Congress created the NCTC and charged it with
serving as "the primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and

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integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism …. " [50 U.S.C. 404o(d)]. In practice, however, the Committee found that no one agency saw itself as being responsible for tracking and identifying all terrorism threats. In addition, technology across the IC is not adequate to provide search enhancing tools for analysts, which contributed to the failure of the IC to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat.


The SSCI report identifies fourteen specific points of failure—a series of human
errors, technical problems, systemic obstacles, analytical misjudgments, and competing
priorities—which resulted in Abdulmutallab being able to travel to the United States on
December 25, 2009. Those points of failure are:

1. The State Department Did Not Revoke Abdulmutallab’s U.S. Visa.

2. Abdulmutallab Was Not Placed in the "Terrorist Screening Database" (TSDB), on
the Selectee List, or on the No Fly List.

3. Reporting Was Not Distributed to All Appropriate CIA Elements.

4. A CIA Regional Division, at CIA Headquarters, Did Not Search Databases
Containing Reports Related to Abdulmutallab.

5. CIA Did Not Disseminate Key Reporting Until after the 12/25 Attempted Attack.

6. A CIA Counterterrorism Center (CTC) Office’s Limited Name Search Failed to
Uncover the Key Reports on Abdulmutallab.

7. CIA CTC Analysts Failed to Connect the Reporting on Abdulmutallab.

8. FBI Counterterrorism Analysts Could Not Access All Relevant Reports.

9. NCTC’s Directorate of Intelligence Failed to Connect the Reporting on Abdulmutallab.

10. NCTC’s Watchlisting Office Did Not Conduct Additional Research to Find
Additional Derogatory Information to Place Abdulmutallab on a Watchlist.

11. NSA Did Not Pursue Potential Collection Opportunities That Could Have Provided
Information on Abdulmutallab.

12. Analysts Did Not Connect Key Reports Partly Identifying Abdulmutallab and
Failed to Ensure Dissemination of All Relevant Reporting.

13. NSA Did Not Nominate Abdulmutallab for Watchlisting or the Terrorist Identities
Datamart Environment (TIDE) Based on Information Partly Identifying Him.

14. Intelligence Analysts Were Primarily Focused on Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) Threats to U.S. Interests in Yemen, Rather than on Potential
AQAP Threats to the U.S. Homeland.

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Based on the information provided, the Committee concludes that the Intelligence
Community failed to connect and appropriately analyze the information in its possession
prior to December 25, 2009 that would have identified Abdulmutallab as a possible
terrorist threat to the United States. The Committee believes the IC, and other parts of
the U.S. Government, should have taken steps to prevent Abdulmutallab from boarding
Northwest Flight 253 to Detroit, Michigan, on Christmas Day.

Points of failure #1 and #2 relate to failures of the systems and procedures in
place to prevent suspected terrorists from entering the United States. Points of failure
#3 through #14 discuss why the relevant intelligence was not connected. Doing so may
have led analysts to link sufficient threat and biographical information on Abdulmutallab to place him on the watchlists.

Committee Action: On March 16, 2010, the Committee unanimously approved a 55-page report and provided it to the Intelligence Community for a classification review. This unclassified Executive Summary was prepared based on that Intelligence Community review.

In the Committee’s March 16th report, each point of failure includes a
description, a Committee conclusion, Committee recommendations, and a discussion of
the corrective actions being taken by the Intelligence Community. Because the other
parts of the report remain classified, this Executive Summary only contains unclassified
portions of the Committee’s conclusions and recommendations about each failure.

The SSCI report also includes classified appendices which describe: (1) the
intelligence collected on Abdulmutallab prior to the terrorist plot and what was or was
not done with that intelligence; (2) the terrorist watchlisting process and standards as
they existed at the time; and (3) additional biographical information on Abdulmutallab.

In addition to the review conducted by the Committee, the Director of National
Intelligence created an Intelligence Community Review Panel that was chaired by John
McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of the CIA. That panel’s report endorsed three of
the specific classified recommendations made by the SSCI report. The panel also
disagreed with one of the Committee’s recommendations to expand access to certain
counterterrorism information. The Committee stands by its recommendation.

Note on Historical Hindsight: As is the case with many reports analyzing the past performance of the IC, the SSCI report presents information that was relevant to the Flight 253 plot in hindsight. Briefers and intelligence officials stated frequently that the intelligence described in the classified SSCI report was among thousands of other intelligence reports and that other terrorist threats were assessed to be more pressing at

Page 3 of 12

the time. Thus, while the SSC] report presents the information as it was known, and as
it could have been known, the Committee recognizes the benefit of "20-20 hindsight" in
our evaluation of the lC’s performance.

I. The State Department Did Not Revoke Abdulmutallab ’s U.S. Visa.

Conclusion:

The State Department could have revoked Abdulmutallab ’s US. visa based on
the information available to the Department. The State Department consular officer in
Abuja, Nigeria should have used all of the tools available, including using "fuzzy logic"
or a passport number, to search for a visa for Abdulmutallab. Had this occurred, it is
likely that Abdulmutallab’s active U.S. visa would have been located in the
Department’s database.

The State Department has an independent obligation to evaluate a non-U.S. person’s
suitability for entry into the U.S., but instead relies on the lC’s assessment of whether an
individual meets the standard for placement on the terrorist watchlists. The Committee
believes Abdulmuta1lab’s visa should have been identified and revoked independently
by the State Department based on the information provided to the consulate by other
embassy officers, which included an assessment that Abdulmutallab should be
watchlisted because of suspected "involvement with Yemeni-based extremists?

Recommendations:

• The State Department must use its independent judgment and authority to revoke
visas for anyone suspected of being involved with terrorism or a terrorist group,
and must be able to do so in real-time in coordination with the Intelligence
Community.

• The Director of NCTC should make recommendations to deny or revoke a US.
visa based on terrorism related intelligence. In addition to exercising its own
independent authority to revoke visas, the State Department should accept the
Director of NCTC ’s recommendations.

• The State Department should develop a system for electronically notifying all
airlines of individuals whose visas have been revoked.

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2. Abdalmutallab Was Not Placed in the "Terrorist Screening Database" (TSDB), on
the Selectee List, or on the No Fly List.

Conclusion:

The standards to place an individual on the Terrorist Watchlists were interpreted too rigidly and may be too complicated to address terrorist threats. Although U.S. Embassy officials in Abuja recommended that Abdulmutallab be placed on the No Fly List, the determination was made at CIA Headquarters and at the NCTC Watchlisting Office that there was only sufficient derogatory information to enter Abdulmutallab’s information in the general "Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment" (TIDE) database, but not sufficient derogatory information to place him on any of the watchlists. Because of the language of the watchlisting standard, the manner in which it was being interpreted at the time, or both, analysts responsible for making the watchlisting determination did not believe they had the ability to give additional weight to significant pieces of information from the field, such as the report that resulted from the meeting with Abdulmutallab’s father.

Recommendations:

• The Administration, in consultation with Congress, should simplify, strengthen,
and add flexibility to watchlisting practices to better protect the U.S. homeland.

• intelligence officers responsible for watchlisting terrorist suspects should have the
flexibility to give added weight to significant information, such as
recommendations from Chiefs of Station or other experienced intelligence
professionals, in determining whether to place an individual on a watchlist.

3. Reporting was Not Distributed to All Appropriate CIA Elements.

Conclusion:

The inconsistencies in distributing key intelligence reports may have
contributed to the failure of the Intelligence Community to identify Abdulmutallab as
a potential threat. While there was no intent to limit access to the reports, processes
failed to disseminate relevant intelligence to all offices and individuals with a need to
know.

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Recommendations:

• Classified recommendation excluded

4. A CIA Regional Division (at CIA Headquarters) Did Not Search Databases
Containing Reports Related to Abdulmutallab.

Conclusion:

CIA had reports related to Abdulmutallab, but a regional division failed to search
other databases that would have identified relevant information. CIA tasked this
division with the responsibility, but not the tools to adequately identify terrorism-related
reporting. Inadequate technological search tools and the fragmented nature of the
Intelligence Community’s databases made it difficult to find additional intelligence
related to Abdulmutallab.

Recommendations:

• The Director of the CIA should report to the congressional intelligence
committees within 30 days on the increased access to its all-source
counterterrorism database. The report should include the total number of
personnel with increased access and the positions these individuals occupy.

• Classified recommendation excluded

5. CIA Did Not Disseminate Key Reporting Until After the 12/25 Attempted Attack.

Conclusion:

Had the CIA intelligence report been disseminated, other intelligence officers
outside of the CIA and NCTC who tracked intelligence on Yemen and AQAP may
have made the connection between the information provided.

Recommendations:

• The CIA should set standards to ensure that all intelligence reports are
disseminated promptly—within two days for counterterrorism and all other high
priority issues.

Page 6 of 12

• The CIA and other intelligence agencies must ensure that critical intelligence
functions are not delayed when personnel are temporarily deployed to other
assignments.

• The CIA should provide broader access to operational traffic for all analysts with
a need to know, whether those analysts are employed by the CIA or by another
agency in the Intelligence Community.

6. A CIA CTC Office’s Limited Name Search Failed to Uncover the Key Reports on
Abdulmutallab.

Conclusion:

CTC conducted a limited name search of CIA’s all-source database, which
included key reports on Abdulmutallab, to determine if there was other available
information. Because of the limited nature of the search, it failed to uncover key reports
on Abdulmutallab. Thus, CTC failed to draw the link between Abdulmutallab’s father’s
information and the key reports.

7. CIA CTC Analysts Failed To Connect Reporting on Abdulmutallab.

Conclusion:

The failure of CIA CTC analysts to connect the reporting contributed to the
failure of the Intelligence Community to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat.
Like other Intelligence Community analysts, according to CIA, CTC analysts were
focused on Yemen-based AQAP-related threats and supporting operations to counter
these threats.

Recommendations for 6 and 7:

• The Director of the CIA should ensure that CIA personnel understand their
responsibility to connect related all—source information and disseminate all
possible threat reporting, particularly reports that might help identify homeland
threats.

• The DNI should develop a comprehensive plan to implement advanced
information technology systems that can draw connections among related
intelligence reports and assist in the prioritization of terrorism threat streams. The

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DNI should notify congressional intelligence committees of the progress made in
implementing the plan on a biannual basis.

8. FBI Counterterrorism Analysts Could Not Access All Relevant Reports.

Conclusion:

The misconfiguration of an analyst ’s computer profile prevented her from
accessing relevant intelligence reports, despite their existence in FBI systems. Had
the FBI counterterrorism analyst ’s computer profile been configured appropriately,
the analyst may have been able to identify the threat stream on Abdulmutallab.

Recommendations:

• The Director of the FBI should conduct a review of FBI’s information
technology systems to ensure all FBI analysts have access to the necessary
intelligence databases and that the FBI information systems are appropriately
configured to support intelligence analysis. The Director should provide a report
to the congressional intelligence committees within 90 days on the changes made
as a result of this review.

9. NCTC ’s Directorate of Intelligence Failed to Connect the Reporting on
Abdulmutallab.

Conclusion:

NCTC personnel had the responsibility and the capability to connect the key
reporting with the other relevant reporting. The NCTC was not adequately organized
and did not have resources appropriately allocated to fulfill its missions.

NCTC has the primary role within the IC to bring together and assess all-source
terrorism-related intelligence. One of the NCTC’s missions, as outlined in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), is:

"to serve as the primary organization in the United States Government for
analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United
States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism. . ." [50 U.S.C. 404o(d)].

Page 8 of 12

NCTC has the primary role within the IC to bring together and assess all-source
terrorism-related intelligence. Prior to 12/25, NCTC’s Directorate of Intelligence was
not staffed adequately and analysts were not tasked to track or identify all threat streams
related to the AQAP threat to the U.S. homeland. Like other analysts in the Intelligence
Community, NCTC’s analysts were primarily focused on Yemen—based AQAP-related
threats.

Recommendations:

• The Director of the NCTC should ensure that all NCTC analysts understand their
responsibility to connect related all-source information and disseminate all
possible threat reporting, particularly reports that might help identify homeland
threats.

• The Director of the NCTC should ensure that NCTC is organized and resourced
to fulfill its responsibility to track, analyze, and report on all terrorist threats to
the United States emanating from terrorist groups overseas.

• Classified recommendation excluded

10. NCTC ’s Watchlisting Office Did Not Conduct Additional Research to Find
Additional Derogatory Information to Place Abdulmutallab on a Watchlist.

Conclusion:

NCTC had the responsibility and the capability to connect the key intelligence
reporting with the other relevant reporting. Doing so could have produced sufficient
information to recommend that Abdulmutallab be placed on the terrorist watchlists.
The NCTC was not adequately organized and did not have resources appropriately
allocated to fulfill its missions.

Under IRTPA a primary role of the NCTC is:

"to serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected
terrorists and international terror groups," [50 U.S.C. 404o(d)]
Prior to 12/25, NCTC’s standard practice was to process watchlisting information
it received, but not to conduct additional analysis or enhance existing records with more
derogatory information. Thus, even though NCTC created a basic terrorist record for

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Abdulmutallab in TIDE, NCTC did not conduct additional research to identify other
intelligence related to Abdulmutallab—intelligence that may have placed
Abdulmutallab in the TSDB, and potentially on the Selectee Lists or the No Fly List.

Recommendations:

• NCTC should keep the congressional intelligence committees fully informed of
resources needed to perform the watchlisting function Without compromising its
other missions.

11. NSA Did Not Pursue Potential Collection Opportunities That Could Have
Provided Information on Abdulmutallab.

Conclusion:

NSA did not take all available actions which contributed to the failure of the
Intelligence Community to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat.

Recommendations:

• Classified recommendation excluded
• Classified recommendation excluded
• Classified recommendation excluded

12. Analysts Did Not Connect Key Reports Partly Identifying Abdulmutallab and
Failed to Ensure Dissemination of All Relevant Reporting.

Conclusion:

The failure of analysts to connect and disseminate all relevant reports may have
contributed to the failure of the Intelligence Community to identify Abdulmutallab as
a potential threat

Recommendations:

• Classified recommendation excluded
• Classified recommendation excluded

Page 10 of 12

• Classified recommendation excluded

13. NSA Did Not Nominate Abdulmutallab for Watchlisting or the Terrorist
Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) based on Information Partly Identifying
Him.

Conclusion:

The policy of not making nominations to TIDE based on information partly
identifying Abdulmutallab may have contributed to the failure of the Intelligence
Community to identify him as a potential threat.

Recommendations:

• NSA should immediately clear the backlog of reports that require review for
watchlisting.

• NCTC should change its practices to allow for nominations to TIDE of partially
identifying or other incomplete information to assist in enhancing terrorist
identities records and other agencies should change their policies accordingly.

14. Intelligence Analysts were Primarily Focused on AQAP Threats to US. Interests
In Yemen, Rather than on Potential AQAP Threats to U.S. Homeland.

Conclusion:

Analysts ’ competing priorities contributed to the failure of the Intelligence
Community to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat. Prior to the 12/ 25 plot,
counterterrorism analysts at NCTC, CIA, and NSA were focused on the threat of
terrorist attacks in Yemen, but were not focused on the possibility of AQAP attacks
against the U.S. homeland. These other priorities contributed to the failure of analysts
to recognize and collate the several pieces of intelligence reporting that mentioned
Abdulmutallab.

Recommendations:

• The DNI should review the roles and responsibilities of counterterrorism analysts
throughout the Intelligence Community to ensure that all agencies understand
their counterterrorism role, their role in identifying and analyzing threats to the

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U.S. homeland, and that counterterrorism analysts actively collaborate across the
Intelligence Community to identify such threats. This review should also
investigate how to expand access to counterterrorism intelligence throughout the
Intelligence Community, including whether counterterrorism analysts within each
IC component should be provided access to all counterterrorism intelligence. In
conducting this review, the DNI should be mindful of the intent of Congress to
give NCTC the primary role and responsibility within the IC to bring together and
assess all-source terrorism-related intelligence in [RTPA. The DNI should report
the results of this review to congressional intelligence committees within 60 days.

• The DNI should examine whether adequate intelligence resources are directed
against the homeland threat.

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