You are browsing the archive for Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

by Frank33

The Underwear Bomber Conspiracy Goes Delusional As It Becomes Another Official Coverup And Pretext For More Neo-Con War

10:02 am in Uncategorized by Frank33

The Christmas Day Bombing of 2009 has now become an official coverup. The SSCI Report about the Christmas Day Bombing is the equivalent of a Seinfeld TV episode. This Report is about nothing and it has no content.

There is nothing in the report about the attempted terrorist attack on Flight 253, or the aftermath. The accounts by passengers and press reports have claimed that the terrorist Abdulmutallab was allowed through security by US Intelligence Officials without a passport, and without being searched. Abdulmutallab was assisted by a possible Al Qaeda double agent who remains at large. Another suspect was taken away after Flight 253 landed. Even though US Intelligence officials were responsible for the "failed" attack, there has been no accountability for their incompetence.

The identity of a possible Al Qaeda double agent who assisted the Bomber is being protected and concealed by Intelligence officials. The CIA has been involved with double agents and terrorists Ali Mohamed and David Headley. At least two attacks blamed on Al Qaeda by the CIA are actually False Flag Ops, the Madrid Train Bombings and the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. Attacks involving Al Qaeda double agents are used as propaganda for more war.

This story does seem delusional with the SSCI Report contradicting the well publicized stories of the witnesses. This is similar to the WMD Irak War delusions and the Torture for False Confessions delusions. Four journalists, Michelle Shephard of the Toronto Star, Paul Koring of The Globe and Mail, Steven Edwards of Canwest News Service and Carol Rosenberg of The Miami Herald had the delusion that Sgt. Joshua Claus was ordered to torture, to support the neo-con Oil Wars. The four journalists were banished from a US "Military Commission" in Cuba for telling about the torturer and the torture.

This is the military way of discipline to control delusions. Punish a few as a lesson to the rest of the corporate stenographers. These corporate cowards could be called the "Press Pen", inspired by the "Veal Pen", which describes the phony Dee Cee activists who are not active.

The military and the neo-con secret police must control all information in order to maintain the perpetual oil wars and impose disaster capitalism. The usual tactic to keep the many other delusions secret is to use the corporate sheep who pretend to be journalists. There are so many secrets to keep, such as the False Confessions from torture, Niger Forgeries, Al Qaeda double agents such as Ali Mohamed, the CIA’s favorite banks, BCCI and Riggs, the Carlyle Group and the Bin Laden business partnership, Nuclear Weapon Technology from Halliburton and Nuclear Weapons plans from the CIA supplied to Iran, and many more. Any disagreement with the official coverup is delusional. Those who disagree are ridiculed. The Dee Cee "Public Relations Firms" and the government "Public Diplomacy" and the "Think Tanks" are secretly paid with taxpayer money to repeat the coverup narratives. The Underwear Bomber Conspiracy has now been added to the list of forbidden topics.

"The Unclassified Executive Summary of the Committee Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253" was released by the SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE.

There is a PDF file of the report, but no easily accessible HTML version. TPM did have a version, with some cutting and pasting, an HTML file was put together.

This report has almost zero information about the actual sabotage attempted against Flight 253. It contains numerous falsehoods that contradict government statements and witness testimony. The rest is disinformation from from a corrupt national security establishment. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was known to be a terrorist and was escorted aboard Flight 253 by a US intelligence official or an Al Qaeda double agent. He had no passport or he may have had a false passport. Abdulmutallab was allowed aboard Flight 253 as part of surveillance operation to follow him to other Al Qaeda agents. At least that was one previous government story told on Jan. 27.

None of this is in the Report. There is nothing about Abdulmutallab, and his movements. Nothing about airport security. Nothing about his passport. Nothing about his Handler who told the ticket agent, "He has no passport. He is from the Sudan and we do this all the time." Nothing about why this terrorist was seated above the fuel tank. Nothing about the bomb or Saudi bombmaker. Nothing about the video recording of the terrorist attack. Nothing about the six hour lockdown of passengers, where another suspect was taken away in handcuffs. Nothing about FBI intimidation of passengers. Nothing about the repeated government statements proven to be false. There is not even anything about the passengers and flight crew who quickly subdued the Underwear Bomber.

The Committee found there were systemic failures across the Intelligence Community (IC), which contributed to the failure to identify the threat posed by Ablulmutallab.

There are systemic failures in the system, of that secret right wing cabal called the Intelligence Community. This is after years of continuous fear mongering of 9-11 and billions of dollars to fight 1000 or less terrorists of AQ. Part of the failure is total concealment by top secret classification of any true information about Al Qaeda. The term "Al Qaeda" does not refer to an well organized structure. Rather Al Qaeda is an informal criminal conspiracy supported by the Saudi secret service. The Bin Laden family and Usama in particular provided the funding. The government probably does not know how many Al Qaeda agents there are because the CIA depends on Saudi Arabia for information about AQ. That may explain the successes of AQ. We are told repeatedly there exist Al Qaeda "affiliates" all over the world and how scary they are. But the "IC" does not tell us about the biggest Al Qaeda affiliate, Saudi Arabia.

The SSCI report identifies fourteen specific points of failure—a series of human errors, technical problems, systemic obstacles, analytical misjudgments, and competing priorities—which resulted in Abdulmutallab being able to travel to the United States on December 25, 2009. Those points of failure are:

1. The State Department Did Not Revoke Abdulmutallab’s U.S. Visa.
2. Abdulmutallab Was Not Placed in the "Terrorist Screening Database" (TSDB), on
the Selectee List, or on the No Fly List.
3. Reporting Was Not Distributed to All Appropriate CIA Elements.
4. A CIA Regional Division, at CIA Headquarters, Did Not Search Databases
Containing Reports Related to Abdulmutallab.
5. CIA Did Not Disseminate Key Reporting Until after the 12/25 Attempted Attack.
6. A CIA Counterterrorism Center (CTC) Office’s Limited Name Search Failed to
Uncover the Key Reports on Abdulmutallab.
7. CIA CTC Analysts Failed to Connect the Reporting on Abdulmutallab.
8. FBI Counterterrorism Analysts Could Not Access All Relevant Reports.
9. NCTC’s Directorate of Intelligence Failed to Connect the Reporting on Abdulmutallab.
10. NCTC’s Watchlisting Office Did Not Conduct Additional Research to Find
Additional Derogatory Information to Place Abdulmutallab on a Watchlist.
11. NSA Did Not Pursue Potential Collection Opportunities That Could Have Provided
Information on Abdulmutallab.
12. Analysts Did Not Connect Key Reports Partly Identifying Abdulmutallab and
Failed to Ensure Dissemination of All Relevant Reporting.
13. NSA Did Not Nominate Abdulmutallab for Watchlisting or the Terrorist Identities
Datamart Environment (TIDE) Based on Information Partly Identifying Him.
14. Intelligence Analysts Were Primarily Focused on Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) Threats to U.S. Interests in Yemen, Rather than on Potential
AQAP Threats to the U.S. Homeland.

These fourteen points leave something out-the actual events on Christmas Day. The first point seems to blame the State Department because it did not revoke the visa. But the State Department has publicly explained this. Abdulmullatab was put on Flight 253 by intelligence officials. This was reported on Jan. 27 by Nathan Hurst of the Detroit News.

The State Department didn’t revoke the visa of foiled terrorism suspect Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab because federal counterterrorism officials had begged off revocation, a top State Department official revealed Wednesday.

Patrick F. Kennedy, an undersecretary for management at the State Department, said Abdulmutallab’s visa wasn’t taken away because intelligence officials asked his agency not to deny a visa to the suspected terrorist
over concerns that a denial would’ve foiled a larger investigation into al-Qaida threats against the United States.

“Revocation action would’ve disclosed what they were doing,” Kennedy said in testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security. Allowing Adbulmutallab to keep the visa increased chances federal investigators would be able to get closer to apprehending the terror network he is accused of working with, “rather than simply knocking out one soldier in that effort.”

So Point of Failure #1 is a big fat lie. The other thirteen points of failure are also big fat lies to cover up the first big fat lie. They imply that allowing Abdumullatab aboard was some sort of accidental bureaucratic mistake. But it is worrisome that a terrorist was allowed aboard by claiming to be from the Sudan. And this is done all the time? Are other terrorists similarly given covert cover by our intelligence officials? Kurt Haskell has stuck to his original story about Flight 253. Haskell was interviewed the day after Christmas.

Haskell said he and his wife were sitting on the ground near their boarding gate in Amsterdam, which is when they saw Mutallab approach the gate with an unidentified man.

Kurt and Lori Haskell are attorneys with Haskell Law Firm in Taylor. Their expertise includes bankruptcy, family law and estate planning.

While Mutallab was poorly dressed, his friend was dressed in an expensive suit, Haskell said. He says the suited man asked ticket agents whether Mutallab could board without a passport. “The guy said, ‘He’s from Sudan and we do this all the time.’”

Mutallab is Nigerian. Haskell believes the man may have been trying to garner sympathy for Mutallab’s lack of documents by portraying him as a Sudanese refugee.

The ticket agent referred Mutallab and his companion to her manager down the hall, and Haskell didn’t see Mutallab again until after he allegedly tried to detonate an explosive on the plane.

Also on Dec. 26, Newsweek reported that a Dutch counter-terrorism official government described special security procedures for Abdumullatab. But the issues of the passport and physical search remain uncertain.

Judith Sluyter, spokeswoman for the NCTB, the office of Holland’s national counter-terrorism coordinator, said that before Flight 253 left Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport, the passenger list was transmitted in full to U.S. authorities for review…

Sluyter said that not only did the airline have the Flight 253 passenger list reviewed and cleared by U.S. authorities, but also Mudallad went through some kind of security screening at Schiphol Airport after his arrival on a connecting flight from Lagos, Nigeria, and before he boarded Flight 253 for the U.S. She said she could not provide full details of the kind of screening that Mudallad passed at Schiphol, but said she believed it involved at least some basic physical search. She said she could not confirm at this point how thorough the physical search might have been.

The Government responded by denials of the Handler who did the talking for Abdulmutallab. Abdulmultallab did not talk and was described as "dazed"and "unemotional". Even when badly burnt by the device he remained silent, suggesting perhaps he had been drugged. ABC News reported there was a Handler who might be AQ.

Federal agents also tell ABCNews.com they are attempting to identify a man who passengers said helped Abdulmutallab change planes for Detroit when he landed in Amsterdam from Lagos, Nigeria.

Authorities had initially discounted the passenger accounts, but the agents say there is a growing belief the man have played a role to make sure Abdulmutallab "did not get cold feet."

If intelligence officials let terrorists travel as refugees from Sudan "all the time", this is assisting terrorism. If "rogue" intelligence officials decided to blow up an airliner it would be easy to smuggle an effective explosive device. The real lessons of the Christmas Day Bombing is

1) Do not let suspected terrorists board airliners and endanger innocent people.
2) Do not let unaccountable spies endanger innocent people with their False Flag Ops.

The official Report says the Dots Did Not Get Connected. The Beltway Press Pen all agree. Those Dots Did Not Get Connected! Spencer Ackerman endorsed the Report, but failed to notice there is nothing in the Report about Flight 253, other than the dots. Except, there are too many dots. He cites the Cato Institute for an analysis of the SSCI Report and ignores the coverup and the facts being covered up.
The Cato Institute story by Julian Sanchez likewise catapulted the neo-con false story about the Christmas Day Bombing. Nothing to see here but too many dots, move along! Sanchez also failed to notice what Ackerman had said that contradicts Big Fat Lie #1, about the Visa. The "Intelligence Community" did not want the State Department to revoke the Visa as reported at FDL.

The Detroit News didn’t “discover” anything — no disrespect to them — they faithfully reported Pat Kennedy’s January testimony about how the intelligence community didn’t want Abdulmutallab’s visa revoked because it would jeopardize their investigation of Abdulmutallab.

The Detroit News story by Nathan Hurst, deserves credit and was one of the few places where this story was featured. Ackerman has had some commendable posts. But Ackerman ignores that the main duty of the Intelligence Community is to suppress the "left", as the Intelligence Community promotes global domination by multinational corporations. In Ackerman’s world, there are no False Flag Ops, no PNAC, no Total Information Awareness, and no Disaster Capitalism.

False Flag Ops , such as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, TPAJAX, and Operation Gladio, suggest we critically examine the truth about terrorism. The Gladio bombings and murders were used to blame European terrorism on "leftists". The Niger Forgeries was a False Flag Op to provide a pretext for War against Irak. The Taliban support of AQ was a pretext for the Afghanistan War. Al Qaeda and the Taliban are controlled and financed by Saudi Arabia. False Flag Ops and Terrorism require lots of financing. AQ is most of all, a criminal gang that murders for money.

The 9-11 Report said about AQ finances, "Al Qaeda had many avenues of funding." But the 9-11 Report keeps these sources of money secret. The sophisticated financial network of AQ is concealed and protected by neo-cons who created them originally to fight the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Al Qaeda does investment banking with the Saudi Royal Family through the Al Shamal Bank in the Sudan.

Al Shamal Bank in the Sudan was founded by Bin Laden. By 1992 the US government and prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald knew that it was Bin Laden’s bank. Bin Laden was involved in currency and stock market trading, and had an import export business among others. Al Shamal is still in business.

Through the years, the finances of AQ have become as sophisticated as their violence is crude. They copy our own banksters big time stock fraud such as the suspicious airline "puts" prior to 9-11. They also go small time using mortgage fraud. All the financial transactions are concealed by the Intelligence Community, so AQ can maintain their financial networks.

But it was discovered that some of the UAL Puts before 9-11, were wagered by the investment bank AB Brown. This company was run by Buzzy Krongard, who became number three top spy at the CIA. Krongard helped obtain the Assassinations Contract for Blackwater.

The Riggs Bank in Washington DC was a CIA front. Dictators supported by the CIA used Riggs to stash their plundered loot. Saudi Arabia financed 9-11 through Riggs. Prior to that the CIA used the BCCI Bank to finance the Iran-Contra-Cocaine weapons and drug deals. Bin Laden also used BCCI.

Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., who conducted an investigation into the fraud-ridden Bank of Credit and Commerce International, said bin Laden held a number of accounts with BCCI…

Levin said bin Laden allegedly provided the AlShamal Islamic Bank (www.shamalbank.com) with $50 million in start-up capital.

Levin said he believes that at least until last year, bin Laden had been the leading shareholder of the bank. Levin also pointed out that in testimony given earlier this year at the embassy bombing trials, one witness testified that bin Laden’s network had half a dozen accounts at the AlShamal Bank to fund their activities. One account was in bin Laden’s own name.

The AlShamal bank’s Web site says it has correspondent relationships with major banks in financial capitals, Levin said. They include Credit Lyonnaise (based in Geneva), Commerz Bank in Germany, ING Bank in Indonesia, and Standard Bank in South Africa.

Immediately after the attack against Flight 253 the usual warmongers made the usual political posturing. Specifically, President Obama was soft on terror. Dots were not connected. X-ray scanners that can cause cancer are now needed to protect us from terrorists. Anwar Al-Awlaki, AQ leader and US citizen was declared eligible for assassination. More war in Yemen. Military Commissions were necessary because torture should be used for terrorists.

DNI Spy Chief Dennis Blair wanted the spies to take over law enforcement and he publicly criticized the FBI for their legal interrogation. But Abdumuttallab was talking, without torture, and perhaps talking too much. An early story said there was a Saudi Arabian who made the bomb. Blair resigned and the SSCI Report of course did not say if it was Blair who approved the plot for Abdulmutallab to travel to Detroit as a Sudanese refugee.

Even the right wing critics realized that the Flight 253 passengers were talking and the government statements kept changing. This story needed to be put to rest. Thus we have a report about the Christmas Day Bombing that has nothing at all about the Christmas Day Bombing. This attack is being covered up at the same time it is used as an excuse for more War in Yemen, and Torture in Military Commissions and even Assassinations of US citizens.

Coverups, Torture and Assassinations are a feature, not a bug of the Intelligence Community. During that horror movie called the War in Vietnam, Operation Phoenix was an assassination program that murdered tens of thousands of the "enemy". But sometimes those enemies were Americans, such as Bobby Garwood.

In this world, torture, assassination, even the killing of fellow Americans were given official, if unwritten, sanction. We are told that United States ”hunter-killer” teams, working from a list of suspected American deserters and defectors, had standing orders to kill them on sight. And, according to at least one former marine, that in 1973, after the signing of the peace accords, the C.I.A. assembled five-man sniper teams and paid them $12,000 to $25,000 a head for assassinating alleged renegade Americans.

There was also the War At Home. COINTELPRO by the FBI and the illegal Operation CHAOS by the CIA were espionage operations against anti-war Americans. Some of these were ops were getting people fired from jobs. Or provocateurs would promote violence or bombings. Or local police would be told to use an arrest for drugs, that is marijuana to harass and disrupt the anti-war freaks. The information gathered on dissidents was quite detailed.

As campus anti-war protest activity spread across the nation, the CIA reacted by implementing two new domestic operations. The first, Project RESISTANCE, was designed to provide security to CIA recruiters on college campuses. Under this program, the CIA sought active cooperation from college administrators, campus security, and local police to help identify anti-war activists, political dissidents, and "radicals." Eventually information was provided to all government recruiters on college campuses (6) and directly to the super-secret DOD on thousands of students and dozens of groups. The CIA’s Office of Security also created Project MERRIMAC, to provide warnings about demonstrations being carried out against CIA facilities or personnel in the Washington area. (7)

Under both Projects, the CIA infiltrated agents into domestic groups of all types and activities. It used its contacts with local police departments and their intelligence units to pick up its "police skills" and began in earnest to pull off burglaries, illegal entries, use of explosives, criminal frame-ups, shared interrogations, and disinformation. CIA teams purchased sophisticated equipment for many starved police departments and in return got to see arrest records, suspect lists, and intelligence reports. Many large police departments, in conjunction with the CIA, carried out illegal, warrantless searches of private properties, to provide intelligence for a report requested by President Johnson and later entitled "Restless Youth." (8)

Would the USA use similar tactics today against anti-war citizens? Probably not, except for indefinite detentions, enhanced interrogations and targeted assassinations. In the current Global War On Terror everywhere is a battlefield (except for Saudi Arabia). That includes the new digital communications. That battlefield requires cognitive censorship to conceal the web of wars, gunrunning, international bankers, drugs, secret armies, and oil pipelines supporting neo-con/globalist imperialism.

Ackerman is similar to the the government in not being able to handle criticism. I do not mind the invective Ackerman directs at me. But I do object to his Posts which have contained false information. I also object to his consistent support, for the neo-con wars and concealment of neo-con crimes. As I previously discussed, he used the Christmas Day Bombing Plot to portray AQ terrorists as mentally ill, and "Conspiracy theorists" are also mentally ill. If this reporting sounds as if it is government propaganda, it probably is. Ackerman has a source who is an insider, CIA "analyst" Philip Mudd, AQ expert.

I hesitate to disagree with Phil Mudd, who has forgotten more about al-Qaeda than I’ll ever know

Mudd was part of "enhanced interrogation", that is torture to get false confessions to justify the Oil Wars. Mudd has "retired" assuming spies retire. He is a "senior fellow" at the New America Foundation. The New America Foundation "invests in new thinkers and new ideas to address the next generation of challenges facing the United States".

You can certainly expect new ideas from their Board of Directors. Christine Todd Whitman lied to New Yorkers about the safety of breathing the air after 9-11. Walter Russell Mead, is a Henry Kissinger Senior Fellow. Francis Fukuyama signed the PNAC manifesto for supporting global domination by neo-cons.

The NAF does have a few "liberals" but it is doubtful they do anything to offend the NAF globalist donors. The NAF donors includes billionaires, The Rockefeller Foundation, Peter G. Peterson Foundation, Levi Strauss Foundation, and The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. This is a perfect place for a "retired" CIA expert to catapult the neo-con propaganda, without any annoying conspiracy theorizing bloggers.

Mudd may be an expert about AQ, but he ignores the finances of AQ and how they profit from terror. Mudd gives the government approved coverup in a Newsweek article.

The question Al Qaeda faced before 9/11 was how to increase that pressure. How could a relatively small, stateless organization really take on an adversary as powerful as the United States?

Because AQ is not stateless. It is Saudi Arabian sponsored terrorism, and Saudi Arabia provides protection and safe haven. The Saudi Wahhabi are as extreme as AQ and by 1997, the CIA considered Saudi Secret Service, a

Still, there’s cause for optimism. The leaders of this revolution have increasingly faced tough questions about the murders they commit, even from people who share their anger and frustration. (None other than Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s No. 2, felt compelled to defend himself in an Internet interview in 2008, when he got a question from Algeria about how Al Qaeda justifies killing so many innocents.) Our goal should be to magnify this growing disillusionment.

I agree we should magnify the disillusionment with killing innocents. The last nine years of Afghanistan and seven years of Irak War For Oil has had hundreds of thousands killed. Possibly some of the victims of PNAC’s staged wars were innocent. These wars and their associated torture violate international law. It is possible killing hundreds of thousands whether guilty or innocent, causes hatred against America. The upside is war profiteers have continued to make more enemies of America for more wars. The unmanned killer drones are also the coward’s way of killing and it is terrorism that violates international law.

In a recent New America Foundation article Mudd uses the Mumbai attacks, the Spanish Train Bombing and the Christmas Day bombing among others, to justify the War On Terror. The "failure" of Abdulmutallab is claimed to be evidence of success by the Intelligence Community.

Patience, though, and steady resolve also pay dividends for us. An attacker failed on Christmas Day on a plane bound for Detroit.

The cowardly crimes that Mudd lists are horrible. But these attacks cannot be compared to the violence and mass murder of the Irak and Afghanistan wars. Mudd uses the excuse of terrorism to promote more war. Perhaps when Mudd was officially at the CIA, he was involved in the CIA’s secret support of Al Qaeda.

They have seen their attacks on Manhattan and Morocco, Bombay and Bali, Saudi Arabia and Spain, all conducted in the span of a decade, many not by al Qaeda members but by individuals inspired only by the group’s message.

They may have been "inspired". But the Spanish Train Bombings were False Flag attacks, not AQ. Informers for the Spanish Civil Guard Bomb Squad stole the explosives and provided them to the AQ inspired killers who did make the bombs. The FBI confused the investigation by falsely blaming a Oregon lawyer of being part of the conspiracy.

The 2008 (26/11) Mumbai (Bombay) attacks killed 173, including 6 Americans, and wounded over 300 people. These attacks had little or nothing to do with AQ. This was another False Flag attack. The Indian Secret Service provided SIM cards for cell phones to the Pakistan terror group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) which was likely supported by Pakistan’s ISI. Perhaps for spies such as Mudd, it is considered professional courtesy not to reveal the False Flag Ops of other espionage services. Mudd tells us we should be grateful to the spies.

Intelligence, law enforcement and foreign security allies have crippled al Qaeda affiliates in Europe, Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

This is a good example of disinformation by Mudd. But the irony, Mudd mentions "a Pakistani-American from Chicago who was affiliated with the Mumbai murderers". That is, another murdering AQ affiliate terrorist can be anywhere, even Chicago. Mudd is talking about Daood Gilani, who also used the name David Headley. Headley is double agent, affiliated with DEA and CIA. Mudd neglects to mention that. But affiliated is not exactly correct. Headley helped plan the murders, and it was reported he was one of the leaders of the attacks.

Headley was born in Washington DC, to a Pakistani diplomat father and American mother. He was raised in both the US and Pakistan. Headley was convicted of Heroin Smuggling but was released from prison early to work as a secret DEA informer. Indian officials think he may have gone "rogue".

“The feeling in India is that the US has not been transparent,” said B. Raman, a former counter-terrorism chief in the Indian foreign intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing.

“That Headley was an agent for the DEA is known. Whether he was being used by the CIA as well is a matter of speculation, but it is almost certain that the CIA was aware of him and his movements across the subcontinent.”

It is not known when Headley stopped working for the DEA and started working for LeT. But he first infiltrated the terrorist group LeT in 2002. He made at least five trips to Mumbai to survey targets. He was also under surveillance himself by the FBI, before the attacks. This included tape recordings of some of his conversations. People he met in Mumbai, called him "Agent Headley".

The plot thickens as the Indian Consulate in Chicago cannot find the visa papers of Headley, allowing travel to India. It was considered unusual that a Pakistani convicted of heroin drug charges, could easily travel back and forth to India. A recent news report said Headley was with LeT commanders who were directly controlling the operation on 26/11. The United States has refused India’s request to extradite Headley.

Who handles AQ double agents best? That would be AQ expert Patrick Fitzgerald, the same prosecutor who covered up the Niger Forgeries. Fitz is personally handling the Headley Case. Fitz also handled AQ double agent Ali Mohamed. Fitz handled Ali by letting him loose time and time again to assist Bin Laden and AQ. Is Ali working on another terrorist attack? Only Fitz knows.

There are so many AQ double agents, we will need a scorecard to count them. Ali Mohamed helped murder hundreds at the African Embassy Bombings and Ali is getting a US government pension. We should also ask how much the DEA paid Headley to plan the Mumbai terror attacks. Underwear Bomber’s handler got a bomb through security and then the handler vanished. The handler may be a double agent, because his existence has been denied by the Intelligence Community.

Headley and Ali pled guilty to at least some of their crimes, so there was no embarrassing court trial. I do not expect an open trial for Abdulmutallab, other than a guilty plea. It would be too revealing of secrets that the Intelligence Community want suppressed.

by Frank33

SSCI Committee Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253

9:07 am in Uncategorized by Frank33

SSCI Committee Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253

[The SSCI Report was released as a PDF file. TPM did provide a version, which required some editing, to produce this HTML version.]

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Unclassified Executive Summary of the
Committee Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253
May 18, 2010

Background: On December 25, 2009, a 23 year-old Nigerian man, Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab (hereafter Abdulmutallab) attempted to detonate a concealed non-
metallic device containing the explosive pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) on
Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan, as the plane was
descending into Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport.

Committee Investigation: Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) announced on December 31, 2009, that the Committee would conduct hearings on the attempted Christmas Day terrorist attack and "collect all intelligence related to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab held by various intelligence agencies in order to determine who had what, and how the information was handled. In addition, the Committee [would] review national security policies on sharing information and terrorist watchlisting." [ SSCI Press Release, "lntelligence Committee Announces Hearings into Failed Christmas Day Terrorism Attack," available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=321274]

Background on Report: This report contains information gathered by the Committee through hearings, briefings, and document requests from the following agencies:

• Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
• National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
• Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
• National Security Agency (NSA)
• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
• Department of State
• Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—including agencies under its purview, such as the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A).

Findings and Conclusions: The Committee found there were systemic failures
across the Intelligence Community (IC), which contributed to the failure to identify the
threat posed by Ablulmutallab. Specifically, the NCTC was not organized adequately
to fulfill its missions. Following 9/ l l, Congress created the NCTC and charged it with
serving as "the primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and

Page l of 12

integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism …. " [50 U.S.C. 404o(d)]. In practice, however, the Committee found that no one agency saw itself as being responsible for tracking and identifying all terrorism threats. In addition, technology across the IC is not adequate to provide search enhancing tools for analysts, which contributed to the failure of the IC to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat.


The SSCI report identifies fourteen specific points of failure—a series of human
errors, technical problems, systemic obstacles, analytical misjudgments, and competing
priorities—which resulted in Abdulmutallab being able to travel to the United States on
December 25, 2009. Those points of failure are:

1. The State Department Did Not Revoke Abdulmutallab’s U.S. Visa.

2. Abdulmutallab Was Not Placed in the "Terrorist Screening Database" (TSDB), on
the Selectee List, or on the No Fly List.

3. Reporting Was Not Distributed to All Appropriate CIA Elements.

4. A CIA Regional Division, at CIA Headquarters, Did Not Search Databases
Containing Reports Related to Abdulmutallab.

5. CIA Did Not Disseminate Key Reporting Until after the 12/25 Attempted Attack.

6. A CIA Counterterrorism Center (CTC) Office’s Limited Name Search Failed to
Uncover the Key Reports on Abdulmutallab.

7. CIA CTC Analysts Failed to Connect the Reporting on Abdulmutallab.

8. FBI Counterterrorism Analysts Could Not Access All Relevant Reports.

9. NCTC’s Directorate of Intelligence Failed to Connect the Reporting on Abdulmutallab.

10. NCTC’s Watchlisting Office Did Not Conduct Additional Research to Find
Additional Derogatory Information to Place Abdulmutallab on a Watchlist.

11. NSA Did Not Pursue Potential Collection Opportunities That Could Have Provided
Information on Abdulmutallab.

12. Analysts Did Not Connect Key Reports Partly Identifying Abdulmutallab and
Failed to Ensure Dissemination of All Relevant Reporting.

13. NSA Did Not Nominate Abdulmutallab for Watchlisting or the Terrorist Identities
Datamart Environment (TIDE) Based on Information Partly Identifying Him.

14. Intelligence Analysts Were Primarily Focused on Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) Threats to U.S. Interests in Yemen, Rather than on Potential
AQAP Threats to the U.S. Homeland.

Page 2 of 12

Based on the information provided, the Committee concludes that the Intelligence
Community failed to connect and appropriately analyze the information in its possession
prior to December 25, 2009 that would have identified Abdulmutallab as a possible
terrorist threat to the United States. The Committee believes the IC, and other parts of
the U.S. Government, should have taken steps to prevent Abdulmutallab from boarding
Northwest Flight 253 to Detroit, Michigan, on Christmas Day.

Points of failure #1 and #2 relate to failures of the systems and procedures in
place to prevent suspected terrorists from entering the United States. Points of failure
#3 through #14 discuss why the relevant intelligence was not connected. Doing so may
have led analysts to link sufficient threat and biographical information on Abdulmutallab to place him on the watchlists.

Committee Action: On March 16, 2010, the Committee unanimously approved a 55-page report and provided it to the Intelligence Community for a classification review. This unclassified Executive Summary was prepared based on that Intelligence Community review.

In the Committee’s March 16th report, each point of failure includes a
description, a Committee conclusion, Committee recommendations, and a discussion of
the corrective actions being taken by the Intelligence Community. Because the other
parts of the report remain classified, this Executive Summary only contains unclassified
portions of the Committee’s conclusions and recommendations about each failure.

The SSCI report also includes classified appendices which describe: (1) the
intelligence collected on Abdulmutallab prior to the terrorist plot and what was or was
not done with that intelligence; (2) the terrorist watchlisting process and standards as
they existed at the time; and (3) additional biographical information on Abdulmutallab.

In addition to the review conducted by the Committee, the Director of National
Intelligence created an Intelligence Community Review Panel that was chaired by John
McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of the CIA. That panel’s report endorsed three of
the specific classified recommendations made by the SSCI report. The panel also
disagreed with one of the Committee’s recommendations to expand access to certain
counterterrorism information. The Committee stands by its recommendation.

Note on Historical Hindsight: As is the case with many reports analyzing the past performance of the IC, the SSCI report presents information that was relevant to the Flight 253 plot in hindsight. Briefers and intelligence officials stated frequently that the intelligence described in the classified SSCI report was among thousands of other intelligence reports and that other terrorist threats were assessed to be more pressing at

Page 3 of 12

the time. Thus, while the SSC] report presents the information as it was known, and as
it could have been known, the Committee recognizes the benefit of "20-20 hindsight" in
our evaluation of the lC’s performance.

I. The State Department Did Not Revoke Abdulmutallab ’s U.S. Visa.

Conclusion:

The State Department could have revoked Abdulmutallab ’s US. visa based on
the information available to the Department. The State Department consular officer in
Abuja, Nigeria should have used all of the tools available, including using "fuzzy logic"
or a passport number, to search for a visa for Abdulmutallab. Had this occurred, it is
likely that Abdulmutallab’s active U.S. visa would have been located in the
Department’s database.

The State Department has an independent obligation to evaluate a non-U.S. person’s
suitability for entry into the U.S., but instead relies on the lC’s assessment of whether an
individual meets the standard for placement on the terrorist watchlists. The Committee
believes Abdulmuta1lab’s visa should have been identified and revoked independently
by the State Department based on the information provided to the consulate by other
embassy officers, which included an assessment that Abdulmutallab should be
watchlisted because of suspected "involvement with Yemeni-based extremists?

Recommendations:

• The State Department must use its independent judgment and authority to revoke
visas for anyone suspected of being involved with terrorism or a terrorist group,
and must be able to do so in real-time in coordination with the Intelligence
Community.

• The Director of NCTC should make recommendations to deny or revoke a US.
visa based on terrorism related intelligence. In addition to exercising its own
independent authority to revoke visas, the State Department should accept the
Director of NCTC ’s recommendations.

• The State Department should develop a system for electronically notifying all
airlines of individuals whose visas have been revoked.

Page 4 of 12

2. Abdalmutallab Was Not Placed in the "Terrorist Screening Database" (TSDB), on
the Selectee List, or on the No Fly List.

Conclusion:

The standards to place an individual on the Terrorist Watchlists were interpreted too rigidly and may be too complicated to address terrorist threats. Although U.S. Embassy officials in Abuja recommended that Abdulmutallab be placed on the No Fly List, the determination was made at CIA Headquarters and at the NCTC Watchlisting Office that there was only sufficient derogatory information to enter Abdulmutallab’s information in the general "Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment" (TIDE) database, but not sufficient derogatory information to place him on any of the watchlists. Because of the language of the watchlisting standard, the manner in which it was being interpreted at the time, or both, analysts responsible for making the watchlisting determination did not believe they had the ability to give additional weight to significant pieces of information from the field, such as the report that resulted from the meeting with Abdulmutallab’s father.

Recommendations:

• The Administration, in consultation with Congress, should simplify, strengthen,
and add flexibility to watchlisting practices to better protect the U.S. homeland.

• intelligence officers responsible for watchlisting terrorist suspects should have the
flexibility to give added weight to significant information, such as
recommendations from Chiefs of Station or other experienced intelligence
professionals, in determining whether to place an individual on a watchlist.

3. Reporting was Not Distributed to All Appropriate CIA Elements.

Conclusion:

The inconsistencies in distributing key intelligence reports may have
contributed to the failure of the Intelligence Community to identify Abdulmutallab as
a potential threat. While there was no intent to limit access to the reports, processes
failed to disseminate relevant intelligence to all offices and individuals with a need to
know.

Page 5 of 12

Recommendations:

• Classified recommendation excluded

4. A CIA Regional Division (at CIA Headquarters) Did Not Search Databases
Containing Reports Related to Abdulmutallab.

Conclusion:

CIA had reports related to Abdulmutallab, but a regional division failed to search
other databases that would have identified relevant information. CIA tasked this
division with the responsibility, but not the tools to adequately identify terrorism-related
reporting. Inadequate technological search tools and the fragmented nature of the
Intelligence Community’s databases made it difficult to find additional intelligence
related to Abdulmutallab.

Recommendations:

• The Director of the CIA should report to the congressional intelligence
committees within 30 days on the increased access to its all-source
counterterrorism database. The report should include the total number of
personnel with increased access and the positions these individuals occupy.

• Classified recommendation excluded

5. CIA Did Not Disseminate Key Reporting Until After the 12/25 Attempted Attack.

Conclusion:

Had the CIA intelligence report been disseminated, other intelligence officers
outside of the CIA and NCTC who tracked intelligence on Yemen and AQAP may
have made the connection between the information provided.

Recommendations:

• The CIA should set standards to ensure that all intelligence reports are
disseminated promptly—within two days for counterterrorism and all other high
priority issues.

Page 6 of 12

• The CIA and other intelligence agencies must ensure that critical intelligence
functions are not delayed when personnel are temporarily deployed to other
assignments.

• The CIA should provide broader access to operational traffic for all analysts with
a need to know, whether those analysts are employed by the CIA or by another
agency in the Intelligence Community.

6. A CIA CTC Office’s Limited Name Search Failed to Uncover the Key Reports on
Abdulmutallab.

Conclusion:

CTC conducted a limited name search of CIA’s all-source database, which
included key reports on Abdulmutallab, to determine if there was other available
information. Because of the limited nature of the search, it failed to uncover key reports
on Abdulmutallab. Thus, CTC failed to draw the link between Abdulmutallab’s father’s
information and the key reports.

7. CIA CTC Analysts Failed To Connect Reporting on Abdulmutallab.

Conclusion:

The failure of CIA CTC analysts to connect the reporting contributed to the
failure of the Intelligence Community to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat.
Like other Intelligence Community analysts, according to CIA, CTC analysts were
focused on Yemen-based AQAP-related threats and supporting operations to counter
these threats.

Recommendations for 6 and 7:

• The Director of the CIA should ensure that CIA personnel understand their
responsibility to connect related all—source information and disseminate all
possible threat reporting, particularly reports that might help identify homeland
threats.

• The DNI should develop a comprehensive plan to implement advanced
information technology systems that can draw connections among related
intelligence reports and assist in the prioritization of terrorism threat streams. The

Page 7 of 12

DNI should notify congressional intelligence committees of the progress made in
implementing the plan on a biannual basis.

8. FBI Counterterrorism Analysts Could Not Access All Relevant Reports.

Conclusion:

The misconfiguration of an analyst ’s computer profile prevented her from
accessing relevant intelligence reports, despite their existence in FBI systems. Had
the FBI counterterrorism analyst ’s computer profile been configured appropriately,
the analyst may have been able to identify the threat stream on Abdulmutallab.

Recommendations:

• The Director of the FBI should conduct a review of FBI’s information
technology systems to ensure all FBI analysts have access to the necessary
intelligence databases and that the FBI information systems are appropriately
configured to support intelligence analysis. The Director should provide a report
to the congressional intelligence committees within 90 days on the changes made
as a result of this review.

9. NCTC ’s Directorate of Intelligence Failed to Connect the Reporting on
Abdulmutallab.

Conclusion:

NCTC personnel had the responsibility and the capability to connect the key
reporting with the other relevant reporting. The NCTC was not adequately organized
and did not have resources appropriately allocated to fulfill its missions.

NCTC has the primary role within the IC to bring together and assess all-source
terrorism-related intelligence. One of the NCTC’s missions, as outlined in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), is:

"to serve as the primary organization in the United States Government for
analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United
States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism. . ." [50 U.S.C. 404o(d)].

Page 8 of 12

NCTC has the primary role within the IC to bring together and assess all-source
terrorism-related intelligence. Prior to 12/25, NCTC’s Directorate of Intelligence was
not staffed adequately and analysts were not tasked to track or identify all threat streams
related to the AQAP threat to the U.S. homeland. Like other analysts in the Intelligence
Community, NCTC’s analysts were primarily focused on Yemen—based AQAP-related
threats.

Recommendations:

• The Director of the NCTC should ensure that all NCTC analysts understand their
responsibility to connect related all-source information and disseminate all
possible threat reporting, particularly reports that might help identify homeland
threats.

• The Director of the NCTC should ensure that NCTC is organized and resourced
to fulfill its responsibility to track, analyze, and report on all terrorist threats to
the United States emanating from terrorist groups overseas.

• Classified recommendation excluded

10. NCTC ’s Watchlisting Office Did Not Conduct Additional Research to Find
Additional Derogatory Information to Place Abdulmutallab on a Watchlist.

Conclusion:

NCTC had the responsibility and the capability to connect the key intelligence
reporting with the other relevant reporting. Doing so could have produced sufficient
information to recommend that Abdulmutallab be placed on the terrorist watchlists.
The NCTC was not adequately organized and did not have resources appropriately
allocated to fulfill its missions.

Under IRTPA a primary role of the NCTC is:

"to serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected
terrorists and international terror groups," [50 U.S.C. 404o(d)]
Prior to 12/25, NCTC’s standard practice was to process watchlisting information
it received, but not to conduct additional analysis or enhance existing records with more
derogatory information. Thus, even though NCTC created a basic terrorist record for

Page 9 of 12

Abdulmutallab in TIDE, NCTC did not conduct additional research to identify other
intelligence related to Abdulmutallab—intelligence that may have placed
Abdulmutallab in the TSDB, and potentially on the Selectee Lists or the No Fly List.

Recommendations:

• NCTC should keep the congressional intelligence committees fully informed of
resources needed to perform the watchlisting function Without compromising its
other missions.

11. NSA Did Not Pursue Potential Collection Opportunities That Could Have
Provided Information on Abdulmutallab.

Conclusion:

NSA did not take all available actions which contributed to the failure of the
Intelligence Community to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat.

Recommendations:

• Classified recommendation excluded
• Classified recommendation excluded
• Classified recommendation excluded

12. Analysts Did Not Connect Key Reports Partly Identifying Abdulmutallab and
Failed to Ensure Dissemination of All Relevant Reporting.

Conclusion:

The failure of analysts to connect and disseminate all relevant reports may have
contributed to the failure of the Intelligence Community to identify Abdulmutallab as
a potential threat

Recommendations:

• Classified recommendation excluded
• Classified recommendation excluded

Page 10 of 12

• Classified recommendation excluded

13. NSA Did Not Nominate Abdulmutallab for Watchlisting or the Terrorist
Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) based on Information Partly Identifying
Him.

Conclusion:

The policy of not making nominations to TIDE based on information partly
identifying Abdulmutallab may have contributed to the failure of the Intelligence
Community to identify him as a potential threat.

Recommendations:

• NSA should immediately clear the backlog of reports that require review for
watchlisting.

• NCTC should change its practices to allow for nominations to TIDE of partially
identifying or other incomplete information to assist in enhancing terrorist
identities records and other agencies should change their policies accordingly.

14. Intelligence Analysts were Primarily Focused on AQAP Threats to US. Interests
In Yemen, Rather than on Potential AQAP Threats to U.S. Homeland.

Conclusion:

Analysts ’ competing priorities contributed to the failure of the Intelligence
Community to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat. Prior to the 12/ 25 plot,
counterterrorism analysts at NCTC, CIA, and NSA were focused on the threat of
terrorist attacks in Yemen, but were not focused on the possibility of AQAP attacks
against the U.S. homeland. These other priorities contributed to the failure of analysts
to recognize and collate the several pieces of intelligence reporting that mentioned
Abdulmutallab.

Recommendations:

• The DNI should review the roles and responsibilities of counterterrorism analysts
throughout the Intelligence Community to ensure that all agencies understand
their counterterrorism role, their role in identifying and analyzing threats to the

Page 11 of 12

U.S. homeland, and that counterterrorism analysts actively collaborate across the
Intelligence Community to identify such threats. This review should also
investigate how to expand access to counterterrorism intelligence throughout the
Intelligence Community, including whether counterterrorism analysts within each
IC component should be provided access to all counterterrorism intelligence. In
conducting this review, the DNI should be mindful of the intent of Congress to
give NCTC the primary role and responsibility within the IC to bring together and
assess all-source terrorism-related intelligence in [RTPA. The DNI should report
the results of this review to congressional intelligence committees within 60 days.

• The DNI should examine whether adequate intelligence resources are directed
against the homeland threat.

Page 12 of 12

by Frank33

The WASHINGTON INDEPENDENT Continues To Catapult Neo- Con Disinformation About Underwear Bomber And “Al Qaeda”

3:03 pm in Uncategorized by Frank33

The Washington Independent publishes story after story about victory over Al Qaeda, same as most corporate journalists. The "Underwear Bomber" is used for their narratives because of his failure. But he was almost successful because US Intelligence Officials allowed him on board without being searched. This covert operation continues to be ignored by Washington Independent, except a Washington Independent reporter did confirm the story. The narrative about "Al Qaeda" is the same one repeated by most reporters but it is neo-con disinformation. The Madrid Bombing has been mistakenly blamed on Al Qaeda.

The success of Al Qaeda on 9-11 is due to secret assistance from Saudi Arabia and some bizarre coincidences. The 9-11 REPORT contains an incomplete and deceptive history about Al Qaeda. But Adam Arias is a 9-11 hero who deserves recognition. The 9-11 Commission ignored Arias and the 9-11 REPORT is a coverup. The Director of the 9-11 Commission Philip Zelikow now claims to be a victim of a neo-con conspiracy.

On Mar. 19, The Washington Independent declared that there was light at the end of the tunnel, in the great war against Al Qaeda, "Al-Qaeda’s Ambitions Diminish Further?"

If that’s a problem for spy agencies, it’s one of those good problems. Al-Qaeda would not lower its ambitions away from Huge and Simultaneous and Redundant if it had a choice in the matter. If Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab is the future — and remember, he came from al-Qaeda’s Yemen affiliate, not the central, Pakistan core that has previously directed U.S.-focused attacks, an indication of pressure on the senior leadership — well, the guy didn’t even detonate correctly. Even if he had, he would have been a vicious murderer of 300 people, an order of magnitude fewer than those al-Qaeda murdered on 9/11.

This good news also refers to an LA Times article, "Al Qaeda’s new tactic is to seize shortcuts"

An examination of recent plots, including the bombing attempt on a Detroit-bound airliner on Christmas Day, has convinced U.S. counter-terrorism analysts that Al Qaeda is becoming more opportunistic, using fewer operatives and dramatically shrinking the amount of planning and preparation that goes into an attack…

Similarly, the Christmas Day plot showed how quickly Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen was able to devise an operation taking advantage of the arrival in its midst of a Nigerian with a U.S. visa. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab arrived in Yemen in August, and within a matter of months was on a flight to the United States with a bomb sewn into his underwear.

Both of these stories are inaccurate and are from anonymous intelligence officials. Umar came from one of the wealthiest families in Nigeria and was educated in London. Umar was in Yemen during 2005. He also was there for about four months before he became the Underwear bomber. To say he is from the "Yemen affiliate" of AQ is deceiving, unless the Yemeni AQ are financed by Saudi Arabia. Umar may be a patsy, spy, fanatic or mentally ill. But his time in Yemen was brief and he hardly is a typical AQ terrorist.

But AQ is a myth, and both these reports are false. Neither should use Underwear as an example of any type of success. Neither mentions that Umar’s father reported his son’s fanaticism to security officials. Umar had no passport or luggage. He was escorted by an unidentified well dressed man who helped him get through airport security. It was admitted that Umar was allowed to board because US intelligence officials knew he was a terrorist. There is no evidence he was searched or went through any security as other airline passengers are required. Who chose seat 19A?

He was carrying only hand luggage. Even at this late stage, American authorities could have stopped him. Details on every passenger on a US-bound flight, including suspicious ticket purchases and baggage details, are forwarded to the Department of Homeland Security before take-off.

It is not known whether Abdulmutallab chose his seat, 19A, but it was near a fuel tank that would still contain reserves at the end of the flight. David Learmount, an aviation expert, said it was “pretty much the best possible seat in the plane to have the highest chance of bringing it down”.

The explosion would have been similar to a hand grenade and would have probably punctured a hole through the fuselage, rupturing the fuel tank.

Allowing Abdulmuttalab on board risked hundreds of lives. Or to speculate, perhaps it was a False Flag Op to bring down a Democratic President. The story about utterly incompetent intelligence officials, was not reported until Jan. 27, by the Detroit News. Then it mostly disappeared.

Patrick F. Kennedy, an undersecretary for management at the State Department, said Abdulmutallab’s visa wasn’t taken away because intelligence officials asked his agency not to deny a visa to the suspected terrorist over concerns that a denial would’ve foiled a larger investigation into al-Qaida threats against the United States.

“Revocation action would’ve disclosed what they were doing,” Kennedy said in testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security. Allowing Adbulmutallab to keep the visa increased chances federal investigators would be able to get closer to apprehending the terror network he is accused of working with, “rather than simply knocking out one solider in that effort."

Why do we have no-fly lists if the terrorists are exempt from it? Was this clumsy operation done to embarrass the President? Or was it to have a staged public victory against AQ? Sell X-ray body scanning machines? Blow up an airliner? Will these counter intelligence clowns be promoted to do this again?

In fact this testimony of a State Department official was hardly noticed elsewhere. Except, a WI reporter confirmed it to me. First, the WI reporter tried to disrespect the Detroit News exclusive "bombshell". He confirmed "Pat" Kennedy’s testimony and expanded on it, except for his confusing double negatives. It was an investigation, except Underwear’s underwear was not investigated. The material I presented was evidence of a conspiracy. It just is not clear what the conspiracy actually was. I am not the only person that a Washington Independent reporter has smeared.

The Detroit News didn’t “discover” anything — no disrespect to them — they faithfully reported Pat Kennedy’s January testimony about how the intelligence community didn’t want Abdulmutallab’s visa revoked because it would jeopardize their investigation of Abdulmutallab.

That is not anything conspiratorial, it’s a legitimate intel/law enforcement challenge. It’s not a “false flag” or “inside job” operation. And it’s not “allowing” Abdulmutallab onto the plane with a bomb. It’s a legitimate investigative concern, and the trouble is that Abdulmutallab wasn’t not subsequently placed on a no-fly list where he could have been stopped from boarding a plane.

You simply don’t understand the very material you’re presenting as evidence of a conspiracy theory. Nothing I say or do will ever change your mind, and accordingly, I don’t care. It was a mistake for me to respond to your foolish ranting and the mistake ends this moment.

As the Dee Cee Village Wise Men catapulted the usual AQ narrative, another story was ignored. Kurt Haskell was an accidental witness to official utter incompetence. He deserves thanks for his courage while pressure was put on him to stay silent. His whistleblowing forced Pat Kennedy and Michael Leiter to reveal a little bit of the truth. It seems government "Counter intelligence" operatives even tried some minor intimidation against Haskell. Every detail Haskell stated was denied by the "official authorities". But every statement Haskell made was found to be true.

Now it all becomes apparent. Let me detail everything we know about the "Sharp Dressed Man" (SDM).
1. While being held in Customs on Christmas Day, I first told the story of the SDM.

2. My story has never changed.

3. The FBI visited my office on December 29, 2009, and showed me a series of approximately 10 photographs. None were of the SDM. I asked the FBI if they brought the Amsterdam security video to help me identify the SDM, but they acted as though my request was ridiculous. The FBI asked me what accent the SDM spoke in and I indicated that he had an American accent similar to my own. I further indicated that he wore a tan suit without a tie, was Indian looking, around age 50, 6’0" tall and 250-260 lbs. I further indicated that I did not believe that he was an airline employee and that he was not on our flight.

4. During the first week of January, 2010, Dutch Military Police and the FBI indicated that over "200 Hours" of Amsterdam airport security video had been reviewed and it "Shows Nothing".

5. The mainstream media picked up the "Shows nothing" story, which slanders my story. After visiting my office twice for a flight 253 special, Dateline NBC and Chris Hanson indicated that my story was "Unsubstantiated rumor dispelled as myth" and our story did not air during the tv special.

6. On January 2, 2010, I receive a call from a flight 253 passenger who indicated to me that it may be in my best interest to stop talking publicly about the SDM because he believes I am "wrong" in what I saw. He did not make any claim that he saw the SDM boarding gate incident at all. This call was made out of the blue after he made a "revelation" of this event on January 1, 2010. I later discover that this caller has ties to the U.S. Government.

7. On January 20, 2010, current Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Michael E. Leiter, made a startling admission. Leiter indicated that: "I will tell you, that when people come to the country and they are on the watch list, it is because we have generally made the choice that we want them here in the country for some reason or another."

8. On January 22, 2010, CongressDaily reported that intelligence officials "have acknowledged the government knowingly allows foreigners whose names are on terrorist watch lists to enter the country in order to track their movement and activities."

Haskell suggests that that Underwear was escorted by a US official, because of the comment he overheard, "He is from Sudan, we do this all the time". But Underwear is not from Sudan. This is one more reason to have an investigation of this counter-intelligence failure. But we will get *crickets*.

The SDM could not be from Al Qaeda. When speaking at the counter in Amsterdam, the SDM said the following "He is from Sudan, we do this all the time". Who is "we"? If it is Al Qaeda, you surely don’t make such a statement to an airport security official.

To be fair, WI has done some decent reporting. But its reporting of AQ is same old same old. For instance, from six months ago (one Friedman Unit), "Al-Qaeda Is (Almost) Finished".

AQ will never be finished unless we terminate with extreme prejudice the Saudi Arabian oil sheikhs that attacked America on 9-11. These depraved murderers are the leaders of Al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda is a small, deadly group of mercenaries and psychopaths. Bin Laden seems to be, or was its financier and banker. The Bin Laden family fortune is rumored to be in the billions of dollars, and family members have channeled some of that money to AQ. Of course, the close relation between the Bush and Bin Laden families is never questioned by Bin Laden experts, such as Patrick Fitzgerald. Probably no more than a few hundred terrorists have been mythologized to provide a pretext for perpetual mideast wars. But the public record shows the successes of AQ has been due to covert support from other governments, especially Saudi Arabia. This small army of killers was created as a secret army to fight Russia’s occupation of Afghanistan.

Al-Qaeda, meaning "the base", was created in 1989 as Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan and Osama Bin Laden and his colleagues began looking for new jihads.

The organisation grew out of the network of Arab volunteers who had gone to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight under the banner of Islam against Soviet Communism.

During the anti-Soviet jihad Bin Laden and his fighters received American and Saudi funding. Some analysts believe Bin Laden himself had security training from the CIA.

The "Arab Afghans", as they became known, were battle-hardened and highly motivated…

Some analysts have suggested that the word al-Qaeda is now used to refer to a variety of groups connected by little more than shared aims, ideals and methods.

The anonymous sources have set the narrative, exaggerating the power and capabilities of AQ, while concealing AQ’s ties to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The latest story to be censored is the Underwear Bomber. Although, comical, this terrorist almost destroyed a jet airliner with a bomb. But what is censored is that he was allowed aboard the airliner by US intelligence officials. If he had succeeded the President would be blamed for a terrorist strike and hundreds of deaths. The utter incompetent intelligence officials who were part of this conspiracy would have never revealed their blunder, assuming it was a blunder.

Al Qaeda has been lucky with their attacks, helped by chaos, confusion and utter incompetence from our Government officials. Some of these failures have been kept secret also. The incompetent officials have frequently been rewarded and promoted. Jamie Gorelick invented a imaginary "legal" wall to stop investigations of AQ. As a member of the 9-11 Commission, she concealed her conflicts of interest. Dietrich Snell was an assistant to Patrick Fitzgerald. Snell, was on the 9-11 Commission and wrote much of the 9-11 Report. He was responsible for the false claims that Saudi Arabia did not help finance the attacks. It is not clear who wrote the following in the REPORT, but I am guessing Snell.

To date, the U.S. government has not been able to determine the origin of the money used for the 9/11 attacks. Ultimately the question is of little practical significance. Al Qaeda had many avenues of funding. If a particular funding source had dried up, al Qaeda could have easily tapped a different source or diverted funds from another project to fund an operation that cost $400,000–$500,000 over nearly two years.

This is a lie and a coverup. The question is critically significant, finding the puppet masters who financed murder. Saudi Arabia’s Prince Bandar was financing at least some of the 9-11 terrorists using the CIA front, the Rigg’s Bank owned by the neo-con Allbritton family.

Snell also protected the AQ double agent, Ali Mohamed. Ali was part of the first WTC attack in 1993, and the African Embassy Bombings. For years he trained AQ terrorists, and helped move Bin Laden around from country to country. Ali did this while working for the Green Berets and FBI.

PETER LANCE: Because he is a one-man 9/11 commission. Ali Mohamed, if he ever told the full truth under oath, would expose all the years of negligence by the Southern District. Amy, look, Patrick Fitzgerald and the Southern District prosecutors have had an almost unblemished reputation for years as being the primary, you know, terror-busters. You know, Vanity Fair did this glowing article on him, in which they described him as the bin Laden brain, scary smart intelligence.

No one has ever, ever gone back and audited Patrick Fitzgerald in the Southern District. The 9/11 Commission didn’t, because Dietrich Snell was a co-prosecutor with Fitzgerald, is the one who wrote Staff Statement 16 on the origin of the plot. And he literally pushed the plot, the 9/11 plot forward from Manila, the Philippines, with Yousef and Khalid Shaikh. He moved it to 1996, claiming that Khalid Shaikh wasn’t even a member of al-Qaeda at the time.

Fast forward to Christmas, 2009. Underwear sets his pants on fire, but other passengers heroically save Flight 253 from sabotage. Immediately, President Obama was called soft on terrorism, and accused of almost murdering hundreds of people. There was outrage that Underwear be tortured instead of being treated as a mere criminal. But it is reported that Underwear immediately started singing like Fiona Apple, without being tortured.

The suspect in the Northwest Airlines attack told FBI agents he lived with the al Qaeda leader in Yemen for about a month and was not allowed to leave as he was trained in what to do and how to do it, authorities said.

At some point, according to the account, Abdulmutallab said he was joined by a Saudi citizen whom he described as an al Qaeda bomb maker.

The device intended to blow up the Northwest flight was made at the location in Yemen, according to Abdulmutallab, and consisted of a six-inch packet of powder and a syringe with a liquid. Both were sewn into the student’s underwear so they would be near his testicles and unlikely to be detected, he told agents.

Was the handler who took Underwear to airport security, the Saudi Arabian bombmaker who made the underwear bomb?

WI’s national security reporter may correctly claim AQ is redundant and simultaneous. But it is incorrect to say Madrid was an AQ operation. The narrative of WI about Madrid is not valid but most other news sources repeat the same propaganda. The Christmas Bombing did not occur as it was planned because witnesses objected and told the truth. Underwear did not act alone. He was assisted by US intelligence officials.

First, al-Qaeda’s signatures are redundance and simultaneity. Think 9/11, Madrid, London: all used multiple operatives focused on multiple targets, acting in unison. That’s to ensure something blows up if and when something goes wrong. But here Abdulmutallab acted alone.

The Madrid Train bombing was not part of AQ signatures because it was not AQ. The bombings were carried out by Islamic extremists, INSPIRED by AQ.

Not assisted or directed or instructed. It was also a False Flag Operation, although it is not obvious who the Spanish secret services were trying to blame. Hundreds of pounds of explosives were provided to the bombers by a Spanish police informer. The informer had the telephone number of a high ranking officer, in charge of investigating bombings. The informer and several Islamic "extremists" were convicted. Many of the bombers were also police informers, and had been under surveillance.

Speaking of False Flag Ops, Dr. Philip Zelikow is an expert in terrorism, secret intelligence, the State Department, propaganda, government coverups, pre-emptive war against Irak, and also torture. But his leadership of the 9-11 Commission and 9-11 REPORT was a very incompetent coverup. He did have to take orders from Karl Rove. The WI cheered the bipartisan, authoritative history by wise men.

The 9/11 Commission was not without its flaws, but it demonstrated that a group of wise men can avoid rancor, maintain the good faith of both political parties, display independence, yield an authoritative history of an American trauma and do this all in an election year.

There is a story about a 9-11 hero, not in the REPORT. It should be but it conflicts with Zelikow’s false narrative. The story of Adam Arias does not seem to be widely know. His sister, Lorraine Arias-Beliveau, has campaigned against a civilian trial for the terrorist KSM who was the supposed mastermind of Planes-as-missiles. She described Adam Arias heroic actions in the South Tower that saved lives before WTC 2 was hit at 9:03 am on 9-11-2001. Flight 175 struck the floors 77 through 85. Arias’ office was on the 84th floor.

I heard over the radio about the second tower being hit. I had that terrible feeling because my brother worked in that building! The phone lines were down, I could not call anyone, so I drove to my parent’s house a few blocks away to tell them not to go out. 

I heard later that Adam had been seen running all over his office urging and pleading his co-workers to get out of the building and get as far away as possible. Our other brother, Lt. Col Don Arias who worked for the Air Force, had called Adam, VP of Operations for Euro Brokers on the 84th floor, and told him “get out, it is a hijacking!” 

There were reports that he even forced some people out to safety, and many people today credit Adam with saving their lives. Reports say he was last seen outside the towers helping the firefighters leading people to safety. Adam stayed to the very last minute, trying to get as many people out as he could, but he did not make it away from the towers before they collapsed. We were notified on the 8th day that Adam’s remains had been found.

After AA Flight 11 hit the North Tower at 8:46, New York City Fire Fighters were heroically fighting the fire and saving lives. Adam Arias was saving lives in the South Tower before and after 9:03 and was killed when the South Tower collapsed.

This story was reported a few weeks later. Donald Arias was Air Force information officer whose job was to make a public statement about hijacked Flight 77. Maj. Arias was informed about 8:46 about the first hijacking, and was watching CNN. He may or may not have been told about the second hijacking. This call to his brother, is estimated about 8:52.

Don Arias, public affairs officer for the 1st Air Force, was in his Tyndall office when hijacked airliners crashed into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon.

"I have CNN on all the time in the office," he said, so he saw that a plane had hit Tower 1.
Don Arias had been notified that a hijacked plane was heading for New York.

"I knew my brother was working in Tower 2, so I called right away.

Was Adam told about a second hijacking?

"He said, ‘You wouldn’t believe what we’re seeing: people falling out of the building next door, bodies flying through the air.’ 
"I said, ‘That’s no accident. Get out of there. Go home.’
"He said, ‘I gotta go. I’ll see ya.’ That was the last I talked to him."

The reports indicate that Adam Arias got out and then returned to help others escape.

"He chased everyone out," his brother said, "and then he went back in when he heard there were people still in the office."
Some of the survivors reported seeing him on the 50th floor, heading down. Others saw him on the street, helping firefighters direct people away from the buildings.

Much later, there were more details to this story.

Maj. Don Arias of the First Air Force at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida was on the phone to his brother, who worked on the 84th floor of the World Trade Center, Tower 2. He was learning about a commercial jetliner that had just flown into Tower 1 and of the smoke and horror and people jumping to their deaths…

This account says Maj. Arias did not know the South Tower might be hit by the second hijacked plane, United Flight 175. But he did warn his brother to leave.

Arias, a New York Air Guardsman in public affairs with the First Air Force in Florida and NORAD’s U.S. region that oversees the western sector, had an inkling that a hijacked jet report out of Boston that morning was the jet his brother could see had rammed the adjoining tower.

"My last words to him were ‘Go home,’ " Arias recalls.
Arias, who sports a metal wristband to the memory of his brother, Adam, had no such sense that another jet was about to ram the second tower. Adam Arias, vice president of operations for Eurobank, already was getting people out of the office. He made it out of the tower but died in the building’s collapse.

Major Arias, who was a member of New York Fire Department Ladder Company 36 and Engine Company 239 before going on active duty, recalls those unit’s losses and notes: "I lost 343 colleagues (from the fire companies) that day as well as my brother."

NEADS, Northeast Air Defense Sector, was at the center of the action. NEADS’s job was to alert everyone who should know and even "scramble" jet fighters when commercial airliners are hijacked. Minutes counted for them and NEADS reacted quickly. But there was an unusual amount of confusion that day.

Sept. 11 was Day II of "Vigilant Guardian," an exercise that would pose an imaginary crisis to North American Air Defense outposts nationwide. The simulation would run all week, and Deskins, starting her 12-hour shift in the Operations Center as the NORAD unit’s airborne control and warning officer, might find herself on the spot.

Day I of the simulation had moved slowly. She hoped the exercise gathered steam. It made a long day go faster.

Who could have anticipated that AQ would simultaneously hijack four airliners. Who could have guessed they would choose a day, when the Air Force "exercise", or war game, "Vigilant Guardian" was planned. This was a simulation of terrorists hijacking airliners. At times no one knew which was which.

Newhouse News reported that NEADS learned about the first hijacking at 8:40 and the second about 8:43. NEADS should have been told 27 minutes sooner according to protocols.

At 8:40, Deskins noticed senior technician Jeremy Powell waving his hand. Boston Center was on the line, he said. It had a hijacked airplane.

"It must be part of the exercise," Deskins thought.

At first, everybody did. Then Deskins saw the glowing direct phone line to the Federal Aviation Administration.

On the phone she heard the voice of a military liaison for the FAA’s Boston Center.

"I have a hijacked aircraft," he told her.

American Airlines Flight 11, headed to Los Angeles, had veered off course, apparently toward New York. The liaison said to get "some F-16s or something" airborne.

Forty-one minutes earlier, Flight 11 had left Logan Airport with 81 passengers. For the last 27 minutes, it had not responded to ground control.

NEADS learned about hijacked United Flight 175 at 8:43 heading toward New York by listening to Boston air traffic controllers.

At 8:43 a.m., Dooley’s technicians, their headsets linked to Boston Center, heard of a second plane, United Flight 175, that also was not responding. It, too, was moving to New York.

At about 8:46 two F:15 fighters were launched from Otis Air Base, in Falmouth Mass., and Col. Dawne Deskins made a phone call to Adam Arias’ brother. About this time WTC 1 was hit.

Deskins ran to a nearby office and phoned 1st Air Force Chief Public Affairs Officer Major Don Arias in Florida. She said NEADS had a hijacked plane — no, not the simulation — likely heading for JFK.

Several minutes later, NEADS learned Flight 11 had hit the North Tower. Deskins called Arias again who called his brother. Did Deskins tell Arias about the second hijacked plane? The REPORT says NEADS did not know about the second plane until 9:03. Adam Arias acted as if he knew.

Several minutes passed before Boston Center said Flight 11 had hit the Trade Center.

"I had a feeling of helplessness," Dooley said. "I think everybody did. We were doing everything in our power."

Again, Deskins phoned Maj. Arias in Florida. "We think the aircraft that just hit the World Trade Center was American Airlines Flight 11," she reported.

To this day, Arias says he cannot recall his reply, such was his state of mind.

Deskins can’t forget it.

"Oh, God," he told her. "My brother works in the World Trade Center."

Then Maj. Arias possibly violated military regulations and made a call to his brother. Perhaps, he should have called OEM, the Office of Emergency Management, responsible for New York emergencies, located in WTC 7. But NEADS likely did, certainly if they believed there was a second plane-as-missle heading toward the World Trade Center. There is no record about who told OEM. Somebody did.

After Deskins’ call, Arias phoned his brother in Tower II to say that the crash next door was a hijacking, and he should get out. Adam P. Arias roused people throughout the 84th floor, exhorting them to leave. Several credit him with saving their lives.

His body was one of the first found in the wreckage.

The REPORT says that about 8:49, someone over the South Tower loudspeaker, presumably security, told employees to return to work. Unnamed "security officials" on the ground floor told employees to return to work. About the same time OEM Director Richard Sheirer was evacuating himself along with WTC 7 before the South Tower was hit. Adam Arias may not have known another hijacked plane was heading toward New York, but Sheirer believed hijacked airliners were heading toward the WTC. Sheirer abandoned the OEM emergency center when it was needed most.

Without evidence Zelikow slanders the New York Fire Department. The REPORT claims FDNY made the announcement telling people to return to work. Some employees who did return were killed. The fire safety directors, who were accused by Zelikow of making the announcement, were killed. They did their duty and did not abandon their posts as Sheirer did. If more planes were heading toward the WTC, who did Sheirer warn?

The 9-11 Commission apparently did not question OEM, Securacom or other "security officials" about who made the announcement. Sheirer testified that he ordered WTC 7 evacuated about the same time that WTC 2 employees were told to return to work. But he had been warned about three planes.

"Almost instantly after the South Tower had been hit, I contacted the EOC to confirm that air support was on its way to New York. At that time, the EOC informed me that there were still planes unaccounted for that may have been heading for New York. I relayed this information to the command post in the North Tower lobby. At the same time, OEM evacuated the EOC. The rest of 7 World Center had been evacuated earlier, but after the report of a possible third plane, we had to get our people out of the building."

The REPORT says NEADS only discovered that Flight 175 had been hijacked at 9:03. Adam Arias is not mentioned.

We are supposed to believe a half dozen impossible things happened before Flight 175 hit the South Tower. Only two national guard jets were available for protection against planes-as-missiles during an important Air Force exercise practicing defense against planes-as-missiles. That is weird. Further, an hour after the first hijackings, no jets were protecting Washington DC at 9:38, when Flight 77, or something, hit the Pentagon.

One person was not confused, chaotic maybe, and that was Dick Cheney. The highly publicized Norman Mineta testimony definitely shows Cheney was in charge. Mineta said he arrived at the White House War Room, the PEOC about 9:20 or 9:25. The REPORT put Cheney in the PEOC at 9:58. Cheney was directing air traffic control, or at least Flight 77.

During the time that the airplane was coming into the Pentagon, there was a young man who would come in and say to the Vice President…the plane is 50 miles out…the plane is 30 miles out….and when it got down to the plane is 10 miles out, the young man also said to the vice president “do the orders still stand?” And the Vice President turned and whipped his neck around and said “Of course the orders still stand, have you heard anything to the contrary!?

A distance of 50 miles suggests a time of flight between 5 to 10 minutes. There was some controversy about Cheney, and whether there was a "shoot down" order. As if Cheney would have any trouble shooting something. But the rumors are that Washington DC and the Pentagon have enough anti-aircraft missile defenses to satisfy even Cheney. The anti-air fixed defenses were not used and the Pentagon was hit at 9:38. The REPORT says Flight 77 was not observed heading toward DC until 9:32. But Cheney was observing it.

The REPORT says that NEADS was not aware that Flight 77 had been hijacked. This contradicts the Newhouse News story. Their story says NEADS had identified Flight 77, as hijacked, at the same time Cheney had it in his sights. This is also what NORAD’s press release a week later, confirms.

9:24 A.M.: FLIGHT 77

A third plane, American Airlines Flight 77 from Washington to Los Angeles, changed course and stopped responding.

Instantly, Rome scrambled fighter jets from the nearest air base, Langley in Virginia. Again, Fox dispatched the jets without targets. That would come later.

Now, NEADS was phoning Air Guard commanders across the Northeast, posing questions that hours earlier would have seemed ludicrous. Did the unit have available pilots? Mechanics? Crew chiefs? What could it get airborne in two hours? In 24 hours? In 48?…

Increasingly, attention turned to Flight 77. The FAA’s Washington Center could not find it on radar, the transponder was turned off.

In the Ops Room, radar technicians focused on a blip and watched it closing on Washington.

"NORAD’s Response Times", was a press release from NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, a week after 9-11. It still seems to be available online.

http://standdown.net/noradseptember182001pressrelease.htm

American Airlines Flight 11 – Boston enroute to Los Angeles
FAA Notification to NEADS                       0840*
Fighter Scramble Order (Otis Air National Guard Base, Falmouth, Mass. Two F-15s)           0846**

United Airlines Flight 175 – Boston enroute to Los Angeles
FAA Notification to NEADS                                                                                             0843
Fighter Scramble Order (Otis ANGB, Falmouth, Mass. Same 2 F-15s as Flight 11) 0846

American Flight 77 –Dulles enroute to Los Angeles
FAA Notification to NEADS 0924
 

                                

Perhaps we should expect corporate journalists to be timid. The war profiteering from 9-11 hysteria is immense and requires concealment using the secrecy powers of a police state. The National Security Agency has records of everyone and everything and they use their power to protect the neo-con conspiracies. Journalists who investigate 9-11 are put under surveillance by the "Q" Group of NSA.

WI usually deprecates conspiracy theories. But WI found a Bushie insider, who was the victim of a neo-con conspiracy. It was PHILIP ZELIKOW! To his credit Zelikow opposed torture in 2005 and wrote a memo putting it on the record, the secret record. To his discredit, he did not publicly oppose torture which might have stopped it. Incredibly the memos are GONE and somebody has DESTROYED them. It is a "Campaign of Suppression"! So many suspects. Imagine, neo-cons destroying evidence of their criminal villainy! Oh the ironic irony. Who could have predicted Dr. of Conspiracy Theory Debunking getting PUNKED by the Bushies. Laughing Out Loud, as another warmonger ChickenHawk fails to save a reputation and a career.