On June 29, 2009, in Ricci v. Stefano, the Supreme Court in another 5-4 decision with Kennedy writing the majority opinion and backed by the Court’s radical conservatives ruled that, under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, New Haven, Connecticut could not throw out the results of a lieutenant and captain exam for firefighters because whites had done substantially better on it than African Americans and Hispanics. The city of New Haven had argued that keeping the test results would open it up to litigation under the “disparate impacts” principle of Title VII. That is whether the test was meant to be discriminatory or not, the impact, or effect, of the test was to create a “whiter” and less racially representative fire department. White fire fighters and one Hispanic sued citing a different Title VII principle “disparate treatment”. They argued that it was a legitimate test. They had done better on it, and so they should receive the promotions. Any other resolution would mean they were not being treated the same as their minority colleagues. The district and appeals courts agreed with the city’s argument but the Supreme Court reversed.
Kennedy reasoned that the city of New Haven had not intended to discriminate but that a discriminatory result was allowable under Title VII if it was “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” Kennedy goes on to say,
We hold only that, under Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.
The key word here is “liability”. It was likely that New Haven was going to be sued by someone over this test: minorities if the results were kept, whites if they were thrown out, but Kennedy held the test was fair and job related, and therefore New Haven had no liability for its results. Consequently, the disparate impact on minorities did not hold. Rather New Haven had treated the white firefighters in a disparate manner based solely on their race, and this was prohibited by Title VII. Kennedy even helpfully points out that his Supreme Court decision can be used to fight a “disparate impacts” lawsuit filed by minority test takers:
If, after it certifies the test results, the City faces a disparate-impact suit, then in light of our holding today it should be clear that the City would avoid disparate-impact liability based on the strong basis in evidence that, had it not certified the results, it would have been subject to disparate treatment liability.
Now this almost might sound plausible, except that, as Justice Ginsburg notes in her dissent, it completely turns history and Title VII on its head. The 1964 Civil Rights Act and Title VII were enacted because of the prevalence of racial discrimination both in government and private enterprise. This discrimination could be seen both in the disparate impacts and treatment minorities suffered under. As a result of the Act, the most obvious and overt regulations and practices that intentionally discriminated against minorities were re-written or eliminated. This still left the enduring impact of previous discrimination in place. For these, a variety of remedial actions, including affirmative action, desegregation in school and housing, etc., were undertaken to greater or lesser effect.
From almost the beginning, however, conservatives have adopted the language of the civil rights movement and the Act to argue against any form of remediation. Their argument, disingenuous as it is, is that discrimination was outlawed and from here on out the law should be color-blind. Now this would be a reasonable position to take if education, income levels, and other measures were comparable between the majority and minorities, but even in 2009 vast discrepancies remain. One has only to look at the incarceration rate of young black males, for example, to see that our society is far from color-blind. So the residue of discrimination does linger, despite an African American in the White House.
This takes us back to the Ricci case. In the beginning, disparate impacts and treatment were two tests in Title VII which were meant to work together to end discrimination against minorities. What Kennedy and the radical conservatives have done is to make the disparate treatment argument available to the majority and to set the two principles of impacts and treatment against each other, indeed to make disparate treatment the dominant of the two. This is all part of an effort by the Court’s radical conservatives to roll back civil rights laws, in general, and Title VII, in particular. We saw this most recently in the June 18, 2009, 5-4 decision in Gross v. FBL, where the ostensible target was the Age Discrimination in Employment law (ADEA) but most of the Court’s ire was directed against the Price Waterhouse case (1989) which had strengthened Title VII. The wider agenda can be seen in the June 28, 2007, 5-4 decision, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 where voluntary programs in Seattle, Washington and Louisville, Kentucky to avoid racial segregation in schools were overturned on the basis that racial classification in school selection violated the equal protection 14th Amendment rights of white children. With Kennedy onboard, we should expect to see more anti-civil rights decisions and more attacks on Title VII in the future.



5 Comments







Kennedy’s opinion holds that if there was a substantial basis in the evidence for New Haven to believe it could be held liable for disparate impact, it could do what it did — engage in disparate treatment — at least insofar as Title VII is concerned.
Scalia (I know he’s disliked here) points out that if such case ever reaches the Court, the Court will have to decide whether the disparate impact prong of Title VII (added in 1991) can withstand an Equal Protection challenge.
Such a case would dwarf Ricci in importance.
I have always had mixed feeling about affirmative action. Justifying special preference on the basis of historical discrimination or social necessity has never sat right with me, even though I recognize the policy’s benefits during my lifetime.
In this case, though, what I find astonishing is the assumption that the type of test in question is, indeed, a measure of professional competency. As a rationalist, I have to ask why a true test of ability should produce a discriminatory result. Surely, we would expect that, given a large enough sample, the results would not correlate with race at all.
I assume that this presumed lack of correlation was the reasoning behind Title VII?
Be that as it may, the court majority seems to assume that race is, in fact, meaningfully related to competence and, therefore, that disproportionate promotion of pale-skinned persons is what one would expect of a fair test.
This recalls the early history of IQ tests, as documented in Stephen Jay Gould’s “Mismeasure of Man”. Laborers were rated of low intelligence based on an inability to answer questions about the right way to cut a cigar.
Given consistently prejudicial results in particular kinds of tests, we do not even need to raise the subject of historical prejudice or social disadvantage. Common sense alone tells us that the court majority in this case is made up of racists, fools, or both.
What the Ricci case is principally about for me is shifting the burden of proof in inappropriate ways. In the Price Waterhouse case cited in Gross, under Title VII once a finding is made that discrimination played a role in a job action, it is up to the employer to show that the action would have been taken regardless of the discriminatory component. Since the suit in Gross was filed under a different act the ADEA, the radical conservatives felt free to hold that even when discrimination is part of an employment decision the burden of proof remains with the aggrieved employee to prove that the company would not have taken its action except for discriminatory purposes.
In Ricci, two things are going on. First, you have the bizarre situation where entities which seek to be proactive are put in the position of proving that they acted intentionally to create a discriminatory situation. Well if their action was intentional how likely is it that they will move to incuplate themselves? What SCOTUS has done is effectively bar entities voluntarily moving to redress racial imbalances which are the product of the residuum of racial discrimination in the larger society. Second, if minority firefighters, or any minority group in a similar action, seek to contest a discriminatory outcome, the burden of proof is on them to show that this discrimination would not have occurred except as a specific and intentional act directed against them.
Hugh,
Do you think that it should be OK for a city to try to reduce racial imbalance in the officer ranks of its firefighters by race-conscious hiring alone?
That’s a false choice. A community can simply take race as one factor among other factors into account for purposes of fostering diversity in both its hiring and promotions.