This is part of a series of posts analyzing how Mitt Romney’s 2012 coalition has changed from his 2008 coalition. Hopefully such analysis will provide clues as to Romney’s performance in the general election. A previous post, which I will refer to multiple times, looked at Iowa. This post will analyze New Hampshire.

New Hampshire

To do that, this post will examine exit polls of the New Hampshire primary in 2008 and exit polls of the New Hampshire primary in 2012.

We should also note, as has been stated before many times, that these exit polls should be taken with two heavy grains of salt. Exit polls consistently fail when it comes down to something as simple as predicting who will win the election. This fact should always be taken into account when using exit polls to examine much more complex relationships (such as the relationship between income and support for Romney). Only when a pattern appears again and again in multiple exit polls should it be possibly noted as valid.

With that said, let’s begin:

Not much of interest here. Romney’s strength amongst males and females is virtually identical, as it was in Iowa.

Let’s take a look at age:

Romney does considerably better amongst elderly voters, which is something that occurred in the Iowa exit polls as well. Interestingly, however, the age gap has narrowed since 2008. The opposite occurred in the Iowa exit polls.

Education next:

Education is something that the Iowa exit polls didn’t look at. In general, Romney seems to perform slightly better amongst more educated voters. On the other hand, the relationship isn’t very clear. It could very well be sampling error. For what it’s worth, the education gap seems also to have narrowed in 2012.

Next is marital status:

This is something else which the Iowa post didn’t look at. Romney does slightly better amongst married individuals. Not very surprising, considering his strong family record. Interestingly, the difference in support he draws between married and unmarried individuals is completely unchanged.

Income:

As was the case in Iowa’s exit polls, Romney does substantially better amongst higher-income families. The income gap has also widened since 2012. Something to watch for the general eleciton.

Here is the polling on party affiliation:

Romney does better amongst Republicans than Independents, and the gap has widened since 2008. This is something that also occurred in Iowa.

Here is a similar question on political registration:

The difference here is that this question asks what party people are actually registered with, while the previous question asks what party people mentally identify with. This question is less accurate; for instance, many people registered decades ago as Democrats but now vote consistently Republican. They merely have been too lazy to change their registration, which is why conservative states like Kentucky or North Carolina still have massive Democratic registration advantages.

Anyways, we see basically the same thing as before. Romney does better with Republicans than Independents, and the gap has widened since 2008.

Next is political philosophy:

In 2008, the more conservative the voter, the better Romney’s performance. This had a lot to do with John McCain’s candidacy (the same pattern didn’t exist in Iowa). However, in 2012 Romney’s support crests amongst somewhat conservative voters. This is different from Iowa, where he did best in 2012 amongst moderate voters.

Let’s take a look at born-again evangelical Christians:

Non-evangelicals, as in Iowa, are more likely to support Romney. The evangelical versus non-evangelical support gap has slightly widened, again as happened in Iowa. However, New Hampshire’s evangelical versus non-evangelical support gap is substantially narrower compared with Iowa.

The next question is very interesting, and it wasn’t asked in Iowa:

There’s pretty substantial variation on Romney’s support depending on one’s religion (this recalls the elections of the nineteenth century, when religious affiliation was a powerful indicator of one’s political party). Atheists dislike Romney the most, Protestants are lukewarm, and Catholics are fans.

It should be noted that this same pattern occurred in 2008. However, in later primaries (such as California), the exit polls showed Romney doing better amongst Protestants (even white Protestants) than Catholics. One should be cautious about concluding that Protestants like Romney less.

Here’s a question which tells a lot about the 2012 campaign:

On voters who find issues more important, Romney’s doing about the same as in 2008. However, he jumps double-digits ahead amongst those voting based on personal qualities.

Next is another question on income:

Romney’s doing better amongst those who are getting ahead. The support gap has also widened. Both are unsurprising considering how much more this year Romney has been attacked on class. It bodes poorly for him for the general election, however.

The next question almost contradicts the previous one:

In 2008 Romney did steadily better amongst voters less concerned about the economy. In 2012, however, he actually does slightly better amongst those most concerned (unsurprisingly, the number of people not too worried about the economy has declined to basically zero). Apparently a lot of wealthier voters who are getting ahead are still very worried about the economy.

How important are debates?

Not very.

What about when voters decided who to support?

In 2008 there wasn’t much of a relationship. However, this year Romney opens an enormous gap between voters who decided late and those who decided early.

Finally, there’s the rural-urban gap:

Romney does somewhat poorer amongst rural voters. The support gap hasn’t changed much since 2008.

Conclusions

In the 2008 New Hampshire Republican primary Romney did best, out of all these categories, amongst voters older than 65 (44% of the vote) and worst amongst voters describing themselves as somewhat liberal (15% of the vote). In 2012 Romney did best amongst voters deciding whom to vote for before December (56% of the vote) and worst amongst voters aged 18-24 (28% of the vote).

In 2008 the greatest gap in support for Romney was between conservatives and somewhat liberals (a 28% support gap); in 2012 it was between voters who decided before December and voters who decided on election-day whom to support (a 25% support gap).

There are several interesting similarities to the Iowa caucuses here. In 2008 Romney’s weakest Iowa supporters, amongst the categories examined in the Iowa post, were also those who decided whom to support on election-day. In 2012 his weakest supporters were voters aged 18-29. In addition, the greatest gap in support in 2012 occurred between conservatives and moderates.

So it seems so far that Romney is weak amongst young people and people who decide on election-day whom to support, and that Romney’s appeal differs substantially between those of different political philosophies.

A next post will examine the differences between Romney in 2008 and Romney in 2012 with respect to the South Carolina primary.

–inoljg

Mitt Romney has famously been running for president for the past four years. He seems to be having more success this time; at the moment, Romney is the unquestioned frontrunner for the Republican nomination.

A previous post analyzed Romney’s voting coalition based off of exit polls. Given that Romney also ran for president in 2008, there are also a lot of exit polls which provide information of Romney’s coalition in 2008.

Exit polls were conducted in both the 2008 and 2012 Iowa Republican Caucuses; the 2008 exit poll can be found here, and the 2012 exit poll can be found here. This post takes all the questions which the two exit polls had in common and then places them side-by-side. The fact that Romney got 25.2% of the vote in 2008 and 24.5% of the vote in 2012 makes the comparison especially interesting. By examining the exit polls one can get a sense of how Romney’s 2012 supporters are different from his 2008 supporters.

The results are quite revealing.

Let’s start with a pretty basic question:

This is probably the least interesting of the polls. There is essentially no gender gap in Romney’s support. The differences in support are minuscule enough to be a function of sample size error.

Here is the next question, which asks about something much more interesting:

These exit polls indicate that Romney does substantially better amongst evangelicals than amongst non-evangelicals. In fact, in 2008 the gap between evangelical support for Romney and non-evangelical support for Romney was greater than any other divide in the 2008 exit poll questions this post examines.

What is even more revealing is that in 2012 this gap widens. Evangelical support for Romney is even less in 2012; non-evangelical support is even greater in 2012. The 2012 evangelical versus non-evangelical divide in support is also greater than all but one in support amongst the questions examined in this post.

One should be a bit cautious, of course. Saying that Romney is doing worse amongst evangelicals in 2012 than in 2008 is very premature. Exit polls are notoriously unreliable, and to draw firm conclusions from unreliable polls of just one caucus is ill-advised.

The next question also shows something very interesting:

Unlike religion, age has not often been thought of as a factor in whether or not one supports Romney. Yet as these results make clear, there is actually a substantial age gap between support for Romney amongst the elderly and amongst the young. Older voters like Romney more; younger voters are less enthusiastic.

In 2008 the gap is not very wide. Romney’s support does rise slightly with voter age, but the divide is small enough to perhaps be a function of sample error. In 2012 the divide has widened considerably. Romney almost falls into single digits with young voters, while gaining a healthy third of the elderly vote. Much as evangelicals became less likely to vote for Romney in 2012, younger voters – cool to Romney in 2008 – are even less enthusiastic in 2012.

Let’s take a look at income:

There have been considerable attacks on Romney on the basis of class; Romney is one of the richest Americans, and it is fair to say that he has never really experienced hardship. Unsurprisingly, poor voters are not exactly enamored of Romney. As with age, there’s a steady progression of increasing support as income increases.

This was so true in 2008, where the lowest income voters were actually more likely to support Romney than the income tier above them. In 2008 the wealth attack was used much less against Romney (back then the main issue was his flip-flops on social issues). In the 2012 campaign Romney has been criticized much more on the issue of wealth, and unsurprisingly the income divide in support has correspondingly increased.

The next question deals with political philosophy:

In 2008 Romney ran as the conservative religious candidate, attempting to win Iowa by running to the right of all the major candidates. His strategy backfired when Mike Huckabee began rising in the polls, and Romney actually did worst amongst very conservative voters that year. Still, 2008 didn’t really feature a big divide in support for Romney; all three numbers are pretty much within the margin-of-error.

In 2012 Romney ran as something quite different: a moderate, business-oriented Republican. Moderates were thus much more likely to support Romney in 2012. Conservatives, however, were turned off by the similarity of his Massachusetts health care plan to “Obamacare.” Their support, always lukewarm, plummeted. In 2012, the moderate-conservative gap thus tied the evangelical versus non-evangelical gap as the largest divide in support for Romney. Out of all the divides in support for Romney, this divide widened the most between 2008 and 2012.

The next table is a bit puzzling:

Republicans are more likely to support Romney than Independents. Unlike the case with most of the other questions, the gap in support hasn’t really widened since 2012. This is actually a strange result; it seems to contradict the fact that moderate voters are the most enamored of Romney. It also would suggest some weakness in the general election.

The next questions involves depth of support:

Romney’s share of voters who strongly favor their candidate and his share of voters who favor their candidate with some reservations was essentially the same in 2008. In 2012 the gap has widened somewhat (a pattern that’s coming up again and again). This is perhaps not so surprising considering the many attacks that Romney has received since 2008.

Finally, another question of some utility:

This table indicates that Romney generally does best amongst those who make their decisions earliest. This is one of two categories in which the gap between Romney’s strongest and weakest supporters in 2008 narrowed (the other being gender).

Conclusions

The differences between Romney’s 2008 coalition in Iowa and Romney’s 2012 coalition in Iowa can be revealed just by examining his strongest and weakest supporters out of all these categories. In 2008, out of these nine categories, Romney’s strongest supporters were non-evangelicals; he got 33% of their vote. His weakest supporters were people who decided whom to support on election day; Romney got 18% of them. The greatest gap between Romney supporters and opponents was the 14% gap between evangelicals and non-evangelicals.

In 2012 things were somewhat different and similar at the same time. This time, out of these nine exit polls questions, Romney’s strongest support was with non-evangelicals and moderates. The candidate took 38% of their vote. On the other hand, his weakest supporters were voters aged 18-29; Romney won a mere 13% of them. The greatest divide was amongst evangelicals versus non-evangelicals and very conservative voters versus moderate voters. In both, there was a 24% gap.

Consider these statistics in light of the fact that Romney got essentially the exact same share of the vote in both caucuses.

Nevertheless, his coalition has changed in several interesting ways. In general, Romney is doing better with the voters who supported him the most in 2008. On the other hand, he is doing worse with the voters who were most lukewarm towards him in 2008. His coalition has become less broad but more deep.

Of course, it should be noted that one should hesitate before drawing firm conclusions. This is, after all, an analysis of a form of surveying which has proven to be flawed in the past, which has very high margins of error, and an analysis of only one caucus.

A next post will examine the differences between Romney in 2008 and Romney in 2012 with respect to the New Hampshire primary.

–inoljg