In "Silicon Analysis of Anthrax Attack Spores: New Answers Leave More Questions Unanswered", I referred to data recently published in Science, where it was found that the anthrax spores used in the attacks of 2001 contained an unexpectedly high concentration of silicon inside them, as a component of the internal spore coat. I also discussed data from a paper by researchers in Japan who demonstrated that they could produce spores with high silicon content using a closely related bacterium by culturing the bacteria in medium containing high concentrations of silicates.
I am deeply indebted to commenter behindthefall (see this comment as just one in the series) in the comments section of the diary linked above for continuing to ask why someone would put a high concentration of silicates in the growth medium. Those persistent "why?" questions kept coming at me, and I finally extended my thinking from just the narrow question of silicates in the medium to think more broadly about any material containing the element silicon which could somehow wind up in the spores. That took me directly to materials called antifoam agents.
Before getting to the silicon content of popular antifoam agents, a brief digression to explain foaming in microbial cultures is necessary. When microbial fermentation is carried out in large fermenters as opposed to small shake flasks, it is common practice to add agents generally classed as antifoams. Microbial growth rate in liquid medium is often limited by the rate of oxygen transfer into the medium. In shake flasks, the flask is filled below the half-way mark and oxygen is supplied simply by swirling the flask with it attached to a moving platform. Oxygen transfer occurs at the liquid-air interface and keeping the liquid circulating in this way allows oxygen to achieve a sufficient concentration in the liquid to support growth. In larger fermenters, on the other hand, the liquid is much "deeper" and so must be both stirred with a mechanical stirrer and aerated through the use of forced air generally introduced at the bottom of the tank, similar to the air pumps commonly used in aquariums.
To appreciate the foam problem that forced aeration induces, consider two different glasses containing a carbonated soft drink. First, consider a highball glass (for you non-drinkers a higball glass ironically has a low profile, just taller than the height of an adult hand and with a similar diameter) filled less than halfway. Swirling this glass gently by hand isn’t going to cause much trouble for containing the liquid. That is the situation seen in shake flask cultures. Now consider a much taller glass tumbler with a narrow diameter and filled to about the three-quarters mark. Imagine that the soft drink is being stirred by a small propeller and you then insert a straw to the bottom of the glass and blow. That is the foamy mess encountered in large fermenters if steps are not taken to control foam.
Antifoam agents work to reduce the surface tension on bubbles, collapsing them.
Although there are multiple types of antifoam agents employed in microbial fermentation, silicone based antifoams are among the most popular. My favorite antifoam agent of all time is Dow Corning Antifoam M (pdf) because in addition to its use in fermentation, it also is used as an antiflatulent.
Here are the typical properties of this material from the Dow website I linked above:

From a biochemical perspective, it seems quite unlikely that the dimeticone itself (polydimethylsiloxane is a large, polymeric molecule with lots of silicon in it) would be able to be taken up by anthrax cells in culture. However, the presence of four to seven percent of the material as silica is quite intriguing, because very small particles of silica carried in the mixture of silicon polymer could be expected to be available for movement into the cells. (In the calculations that follow, I will assume a silica content of 5%.)
That thought prompted a return to the paper from the Japanese researchers to look again at what they had to say about the chemical structure of the silicon they found in spores. It turns out that although they supplied silicon to the cultures in the form of silicates, the silicon inside the spores was most likely present as silica (the "HF" they refer to is hydrofluoric acid, which is a very strong acid that is different from the other "mineral acids" to which the high silicon spores are resistant):
As far as we know, diatoms, plants, and animals accumulate silicate as silica (13). Silica can be dissolved in HF (16). Accordingly, if the Si layer of spores contains silica, it could be removed from the high-Si spores with HF treatment. Approximately 75% of Si that was accumulated in the spores was released as silicate after treatment with 50 mM HF (data not shown). We compared the acid resistance of HF-treated high Si- and low-Si spores (Fig. 7). After HF treatment, the viability of the high-Si spores was no longer higher than that of the low-Si spores. These results indicated that the Si layer mainly contains silica and supports acid resistance.
It seems very likely to me that anthrax grown in the presence of antifoam agents that contain silica would be able to incorporate this silica directly into the spore coat, skipping the step of converting silicates to silica. It appears that typical working concentrations of antifoam agents could achieve silica concentrations in the range at which silicates were incorporated into medium in the experiments in Japan. The silicate concentration in their experiments was 100 micrograms of silicate per milliliter of culture medium. That corresponds to roughly 0.01% of the medium’s total weight in silicates.
Antifoam agents can be effective at very low concentrations. For example, see here for a recommendation for use at 0.005 to 0.02% for the polymer, so for Antifoam M the silica would be only at 0.001% of the weight of the medium, 10-fold lower than the silicate concentration fed in the reported experiments. However, it is common to exceed those low recommended levels. For example, see this publication (pdf) from 1973, where a silicone antifoam was added to a final concentration of 0.5%. In this case, if the agent were Antifoam M, the silica concentration would be 0.025%, well above the 0.01% silicate fed in the experiments in Japan. Also, my own personal experience running a fermentation pilot plant involved many fermentation runs I can recall that added up to a full one percent or more of the total medium volume as polymeric antifoam before the process ended.
If the silicon in the anthrax attack spores does indeed come from the material having been cultured in the presence of a silicone antifoam agent that also had silica present, then the FBI’s conclusion that Bruce Ivins acted alone in the attacks is called into serious doubt. In this diary, I calculated that Ivins would have to have grown 36 of his two liter shake flask cultures to produce the spores used in the attacks. I further quoted pages 26 and 27 of the FBI’s Amerithrax Investigative Summary (pdf):
In 1997, USAMRIID commissioned another Army research facility, Dugway, to prepare large batches of Bacillus anthracis spores for an upcoming series of studies testing the anthrax vaccine, because USAMRIID lacked the capacity to do so. By the fall of 1997, Dr. Ivins received from Dugway seven shipments containing the concentrated product of 12 ten-liter, fermenter-grown lots of Bacillus anthracis – the “Dugway Spores.” By Dr. Ivins’s own account, these spores were not in perfect shape, so he had to “clean them up.” Indeed, he even discarded the seventh shipment because he deemed it to be inadequate. He noted in his lab notebooks the process that he used to clean them, and also sent e-mails to various people noting his frustration that he had to wash them. To the Dugway Spores, Dr. Ivins added concentrates of 22 two-liter batches of spores which he himself prepared with the help of a laboratory technician. He combined his spores with those from Dugway, and put them in two flasks, labeled “GLP [Good Laboratory Practices] Spores.” In addition, he created a Reference Material Receipt record on which he made the following notation: “Dugway Proving Ground + USAMRIID Bact’D – highly purified, 95% unclumped, single refractile spores.” Finally, in his laboratory notebook 4010, page 074, he described the end-product of these efforts as “RMR-1029: :99% refractile spores;
The alternative explanation to Ivins growing 36 two liter cultures is one fermenter run of approximately 70 liters or more. Note that the FBI investigative summary informs us that Dugway was engaged for the 1997 work precisely because Ivins did not have access to large scale culture equipment. The fact that the RMR-1029 spores themselves did not have a high silicon content could be explained by the use an antifoam agent that did not have silica present for those particular fermenter runs at Dugway, since silica is not uniformly found in all antifoam agents. However, the presence of high silicon in the attack spores strongly suggests that they could have been grown in the presence of an antifoam agent that did contain silica. If Ivins had grown the spores in his shake flask equipment, he would have had no reason to include any sort of antifoam agent, much less one containing silica, because antifoam is just not used in shake flasks. It also seems unlikely that Ivins would have changed his culture process to produce the attack material. If he did not introduce silicon in his early shake flask cultures (and we know he didn’t from the silicon analysis of the RMR-1029 material), it seems unlikely he would have done so with shake flasks for the attack material.
Note also from the Science report that the only other elevated (but not as high as the attack spores) silicon content spores analyzed came from Dugway, where we know that fermenters are available.
In conclusion, the finding of high silicon in the spores used in the anthrax attacks suggests that these spores were grown in a large fermenter that used an antifoam agent containing silica. Since Bruce Ivins did not have access to a large fermenter, fermenter growth would suggest that he could not have acted alone in the attacks.
This hypothesis could be tested easily in a series of experiments where B. anthracis or B. cereus is grown in media with a range of concentrations of antifoam agents with and without silica present in them. followed by analysis of the silica content of the spores. From an investigation standpoint, it would not be difficult to determine if Ivins or someone in his laboratory ever purchased an antifoam agent containing silica that could have inexplicably been used in shake flasks.
Update: Due to the ongoing conversation in the comments below, it is useful to see the analysis of silicon locations in the high silicon spores in the Japanese study cited above. In the illustration below, CX stands for cortex, CT for coat, SX for particles containing silicon, EX for exosporium and UC for undercoat:

To my eye, this silicon coating of the spore coat looks just as contiguous as that in the electron micrographs of the attack spores in the previous diary.



138 Comments







Jim
Absolutely great work here!
Does the presence of such high concentration suggest the possibility of someone with much less direct experience working with anthrax working on this? That is, someone who had the skills, but not necessarily day to day work with anthrax? I know you say that it’s not uncommon to use higher concentrations of anti-foaming agent, but why would someone do that, particularly if they were concerned with maintaining purity?
I think high amounts of antifoam could have been used because the process needed it. One of the primary reasons foam builds up in a process is when proteins are in the growth medium. The pathogenic effect of anthrax is from an excreted protein toxin, so the early phase of growth of the culture, when vegetative cells are being grown, would be expected to produce a lot of protein, which would produce a lot of foam. In many systems, antifoam is added in as foam levels reach an electronic probe at a pre-set height above the liquid level, so it would be easy for the system to pump in a lot of antifoam.
It looks like the concept of silicon from antifoam agents has been suggested before. In the comment thread on the previous diary, Watchmaker just put up a comment that included this quote from this Nature article:
That quote goes on to suggest that the resulting silicon content would be low, but I think the calculations in this diary, coupled with the results from Japan, argue against that.
Where would the Si in antifoaming agents wind up in the spores? Commenter Watchmaker (previous thread) says that organosilane monomers added postsporulation take up positions just outside the spore coat and polymerize there. I gather that this is the location of the green line in the pictures in that post. Would Si from agents present during growth end up in the same place?
It’s the difference, it seems to me, between a physical/chemical mechanism and a biological one. The former seems to be known. Is a biological mechanism known, too?
The Japanese paper provides the details nailing down exactly where the silica winds up on the outer edge of the coat. I’m still waiting for a link from Watchmaker giving us hard data that the post-growth polymerization actually has been done and does result in encapsulating the spore coat as suggested, as opposed to this being a theory based on the permeability of the exosporium and the known polymerizing properties of organosilane monomers.
I’ll take a look. Thanks.
Jim, I don’t have library privileges any more. Can the body of the J.Bact. article be “liberated” somehow? The abstract’s pretty sketchy.
Unfortunately, I don’t think I have rights to do that.
Rats.
But you’re sure that the Si in antifoam went to the green-line?
I wonder what bright fellow said to himself, “Oh, look! A two-fer! I get rid of foaming in the fermenter, and later I have anti-cling spores!”
The Japanese researchers tried an experiment to compare high silicon spores to low silicon spores in terms of dispersion in air, but didn’t see a difference:
However, as I noted in an aside in the previous diary, I’m not convinced that this experiment would be a direct comparison to the attack spores since I’m pretty sure they didn’t remove debris (dead vegetative cells and “junk” from the growth medium) before carrying out the experiment.
They’re really talking about a prep that came from a lyophilizer, aren’t they, not a spray dryer?
I’ve concluded that using a spray dryer puts you in an entirely different ballgame, one that you cannot reach by grinding a lyophilized prep. I’m not surprized at a high settling rate, + or – Si. You just can’t get there from here.
Blindthefall asked for a full copy of the J Bact paper that demonstrates that even large molecules easily penetrate the exosporium.
The full paper can be seen here:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC279245/pdf/jbacter00474-0150.pdf
Scratch that.
I’ve never grown sporulating bacteria, and I mentally had the timing off. Yeah; spore formation during late phase in the culture, Si adsorbed onto spores, but penetrating the exosporium and being blocked by the spore coat. I’d just want to know for certain that the Si from the antifoaming agent took up the position of the green line.
Sorry.
Great discussion on the antifoam. I’m still not sure that the antifoam would give a SiOx continuous coating on the spore coat – especially at the huge percentages of silicon observed in the attack materials.
I think a better explanation is organosilane monomer treatment.
Finally – it seems Dugway did not use a silicon antifoam treatment in the fermneter they used for making most of RMR-1029. They used Dow 204 which is all organic and does not contain silicon. That’s if they used the same procedures they describe here for their ten liter fermenter:
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/168090__790515467.pdf
Dried BaS spores were produced as follows: Ten liter (L) fermentation
vessels were seeded (5% V/V) with overnight nutrient
broth cultures of BaS. Spores were grown inGmedium that consists
of: yeast extract, 2.0 g L−1; NH4SO4, 2.0 g L−1; Dow antifoam
204, 0.3mLL−1;MgSO4·7H2O, 0.2 gL−1;MnSO4·H2O,
0.038 g L−1; ZnSO4·7H2O, 0.005 g L−1; CuSO4·5H2O, 0.005
g L−1; FeSO4·7H2O, 0.005 g L−1; CaCl2·2H2O, 0.25 g L−1;
K2HPO4, 0.500 g L−1; glucose, 1.0 g L−1. The pH was adjusted
to 7.0 ± 0.1 and the glucose was added separately as a sterile
solution after autoclaving.
Note the above paper is especially interesting. The workers here were deliberately simulating the Daschle powder being opened – and they had to do a lot of engineering tricks to make that powder. To make a powder with similar dispersal properties to the Daschle powder they did the following:
Spores were collected by simple centrifugation
to remove spent media. The pelleted material was dried by
a proprietary azeotropic method. Ten percent (by weight) of an
amorphous silica-based flow enhancer was added to the dried
spores. The dried material was milled using an exclusionary
ball mill. In this process the material passed through a series
of stages separated by increasingly finer mesh screens. In each
stage 0.01 m diameter steel balls forced the product through the
screen separators. A pneumatic vibrator actuated the entire mill.
Thanks for the confirmation of a non-silicon antifoam in the original Dugway cultures.
My editing window for the diary isn’t closed yet, so I will add a photo from the Japanese study showing the continuous layer of silicon on the spore coat.
Jim: there does not exist a hard link that describes treating spores with organosilane monomers. That would all be classified material.
But there is certainly similar work out there on related processes. Organosialnes are used to treat wood to stop it from rotting. The organosilae monomers penetrate the cell walls of the wood and polymerize in situ.
Google, for example “Detection and distribution analysis of organosilicon compounds in wood by means of SEM-EDX and micro-CT”
You’ll see some nice micrographs of the SiO2 polymer that has penetrated the cell wall of the wood.
I should probably add that the idea that a polymerized glass was coating the spores is not simply speculation without basis. The FBI themselves leaked this story to CNN, Newsweek and Washington Post in April 2002. Here the polymerized glass was simply called an “unusual chemical”.
It was later on that the “unusual chemical” was revealed to be polymerized glass at an FBI briefing to bioweapon personnel from NATO countries.
The question is – where are the lab reports today and why did the FBI change it’s story?
See links below detailing all of this:
http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/sophisticatedstrainanthrax.html
Source: Newsweek, April 8, 2002.
INVESTIGATIONS
A Sophisticated Strain of Anthrax
by Mark Hosenball, John Barry and Daniel Klaidman
Government sources tell NEWSWEEK that the secret new analysis shows anthrax found in a letter addressed to Senate Judiciary Committee chairman Patrick Leahy was ground to a microscopic fineness not achieved by U.S. biological-weapons experts. The Leahy anthrax — mailed in an envelope that was recovered unopened from a Washington post office last November — also was coated with a chemical compound unknown to experts who have worked in the field for years; the coating matches no known anthrax samples ever recovered from biological-weapons producers anywhere in the world, including Iraq and the former Soviet Union. The combination of the intense milling of the bacteria and the unusual coating produced an anthrax powder so fine and fluffy that individually coated anthrax spores were found in the Leahy envelope, something that U.S. bioweapons experts had never seen.
http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/anthraxpowdernotroutine.html
Source: Washington Post, April 9, 2002.
Powder Used in Anthrax Attacks ‘Was Not Routine’
By Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer
Whoever concocted the wispy white powder used in last fall’s anthrax attacks followed a recipe markedly different from the ones commonly used by scientists in the United States or any other country known to have biological weapons, law enforcement sources said yesterday.
Extensive lab tests of the anthrax powder have revealed new details about how the powder was made, including the identity of a chemical used to coat the trillions of microscopic spores to keep them from clumping together. Sources close to the investigation declined to name the chemical but said its presence was something of a surprise.
The powder’s formulation “was not routine,” said one law enforcement official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “Somebody had to have special knowledge and experience to do this,” the official said.
http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/unusualcoating.html
Source: CNN, April 11, 2002.
Official: Unusual coating in anthrax mailings
From Kelli Arena, CNN Washington Bureau
Washington (CNN) — Scientists have found a new chemical in the coating on the anthrax spores mailed to journalists and politicians last fall, a high-ranking government official said Wednesday.
The discovery of the unnamed chemical, something scientists are familiar with, was surprising, the official said.
Previously, officials had reported that the coating on the anthrax included silica, which helped the spores not to clump.
http://www.opednews.com/articles/World-s-Top-Anthrax-Expert-by-George-Washington-080909-527.html
“Apparently, the spores were coated with a polyglass which tightly bound hydrophilic silica to each particle. That’s what was briefed (according to one of my former weapons inspectors at the United Nations Special Commission) by the FBI to the German Foreign Ministry at the time.
Jim, thank you for this series of fantastically educational posts.
Thanks, also, to behindthefall, Watchmaker, and others for extending that education through your comments and amazing conversation.
DW
Thanks, Jim, for the lucid and sound discussion also.
Note that Dr. Ivins at one point forwarded the abstract of article to the FBI — in 2004 — that addressed silicon in the spore coat (that someone at USAMRIID had just provided him). It would be interesting to know what article he forwarded.
Here is a slide show on Amerithrax, silicon in the culture medium, Dugway, Flask 1029, Ivins emails etc. based on the FBI documents.
http://docs.google.com/present/view?id=df7mn8s4_0ffkjfwhn&interval=5&autoStart=true
reply
Great work, Jim. Absolutely great. Thank you.
Blindthefall wrote:
“They’re really talking about a prep that came from a lyophilizer, aren’t they, not a spray dryer?
I’ve concluded that using a spray dryer puts you in an entirely different ballgame, one that you cannot reach by grinding a lyophilized prep. I’m not surprized at a high settling rate, + or – Si. You just can’t get there from here.”
Absolutely correct. Grinding a pellet with a mortar and pestel is only going to produce large particles. It may look like a powder to the eye, but when you look at under an electron microscope your going to see chunks of thousands of spores glued together.
Even if you added silica to the preparation you still wouldn’t get a dispersable powder. Making a dispersable powder is an engineering job. The Japanese dried their spores in a lypholizer – that’s going to produce a hard dry pellet.
Dugway dry their simulants using a proprietary azeotropic drying technique – that invloves transferring the dispersed slurry of spores in water into a phase of another solvent – like acetone for example. Even after that Dugway had to process the sample through a mill filter.
Other ways to do this are using a “jet mill” in which the fine powder particles collide with one another – or spray drying.
All of these methods would need to use at least a B3 room – since live dry virulent agents are extremely dangerous and simply cannot be contained.
This is why most folks on the know understand that Bruce Ivins could not have made the attack powder at Detrick.
Asides from the fact that at least 10 g of dry powder was placed in the all the envelopes and it would have taken Ivins months to make such an amount.
So, yes, it isn’t rocket science, but it isn’t a no-brainer, either, and it’s not something that you do in your garage or during afterhours in your standard micro lab. It’s pretty dirty, finicky, big, and dangerous.
Aloha, Jim…! OT… Apparently the bunker-busters were originally headed to Israel, but, were diverted to Diego Garcia…!
The plot thickens…!
Thanks. That’s very interesting. It explains the nervousness I was hearing about.
Thanks for this. Disturbing.
thanks jim and all the other amazing contributors for breaking down a complex issue into more easily understood pieces.
these articles will be invaluable in hitting back against the “but it’s just too complicated for you mere citizens to understand!” rhetoric the Gov’t uses to try to shut down debate on the anthrax attacks.
This is invaluable informed detective work, Jim. It’s a real treat to read. It feels like you’re hot on the trail of important and highly-significant clues, step by careful step, that only someone with your sort of scientific background (and those of commenters like behindthefall and Watchmaker) could or would have the experience to deduce or surmise and unearth, as your recent series of posts have demonstrated, while carefully “showing your work” for scientists and non-scientists alike to review.
It never occurred to me, provided the spores weren’t in fact “weaponized,” that the silicon in the attack spores might be (or could be) anything other than a happenstance of the particular culture medium in which they were grown (not having noted, or understood if I had, the potential significance of Popov’s earlier speculations in Nature). But here you’ve logically and carefully traced the known evidence to a linkage with an absolutely conventional practice in such work, and thus provided another compelling reason (in addition to the amount of time it would’ve taken Ivins to grow the spore quantities used in the attacks, using only his available flasks) to assume that it was someone or someones using a large fermenter, rather than small flasks, who grew those attack spores…
Fascinating reading.
It’s when one starts to think about how to go from spore-in-sloppy-vat-of-liquid to really-clean-and-separate-spores-in-powder that my head, for one, starts to explode.
What about trace elements in the antifoaming agents? Assuming some trace elements gets into the foaming agents maybe a look at various anthrax fed various foaming agents could tell us which antifoaming agent was used?
Then we cross check who bought those antifoming agents before the anthrax attack. Maybe an electron microscope would work?
This is really not my area but I’m guessing every factory that makes antifoaming agents has its own unique trace element contaminate problem.
Also as different chemicals and equipment are used this unique fingerprint should change over time. If we had antifoaming agent samples from the time of the attacks we might be able to determine when they were bought.
If nothing matches then the anti foaming agents were bought way before the anthrax attacks. Then we just hope we can find a match with an older batch.
ew wrote a post referencing this info that the “attack spores” contained tin, and quoted this supposition from the linked article:
While we’re musing about how Si got into the spores, what thoughts does anyone have on Sn? Personally, I’ve never seen a lab that used anything but deionized or distilled (sometimes both, sequentially) water to make up culture medium. If it’s in the medium, the person growing the bugs wanted it there, has been my experience.
So, why would you want tin and/or iron in the medium?
Or, on the other hand, are we looking at the signature from “tiny” particles of metal from the purifying machinery?
Well, you want Fe, of course; cells need it, AFAIK. But Sn?
Patent US4690713 describes an antifoam composition comprising a hydrocarbon oil, an organosilicon compound, silica, and an organo-tin catalyst (dibutyltin diacetate, dibutyltin dilaurate, dioctyltin dilaurate, dibutyltin dioctoate, or tin caprylate): http://www.freepatentsonline.com/4690713.html.
Said silicon-containing, tin-containing antifoams are purported to have superior defoaming properties.
Said silicon-containing, tin-containing antifoams could be commerically available. (Since compositions of most commercially available antifoams are trade secrets, this is difficult to assess.) Alternatively, said silicon-containing, tin-containing antifoams could be prepared from readily obtained reagents using the procedures in patent US4690713.
The iron/tin contaminants are quite fascinating even though the iron (Fe) and tin (Sn) levels are 1 – 3 orders of magnitude smaller than the total amount of elemental silicon (Si).
It shouldn’t be too surprising to find a little iron (Fe) – since iron is typically deliberately added as a sulfate (FeSo4) to spore media:
—————————————————————
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/168090__790515467.pdf
Dried BaS spores were produced as follows: Ten liter (L) fermentation
vessels were seeded (5% V/V) with overnight nutrient
broth cultures of BaS. Spores were grown inGmedium that consists
of: yeast extract, 2.0 g L−1; NH4SO4, 2.0 g L−1; Dow antifoam
204, 0.3mLL−1;MgSO4·7H2O, 0.2 gL−1;MnSO4·H2O,
0.038 g L−1; ZnSO4·7H2O, 0.005 g L−1; CuSO4·5H2O, 0.005
g L−1; FeSO4·7H2O, 0.005 g L−1; CaCl2·2H2O, 0.25 g L−1;
K2HPO4, 0.500 g L−1; glucose, 1.0 g L−1. The pH was adjusted
to 7.0 ± 0.1 and the glucose was added separately as a sterile
solution after autoclaving.
Spores were collected by simple centrifugation
to remove spent media. The pelleted material was dried by
a proprietary azeotropic method. Ten percent (by weight) of an
amorphous silica-based flow enhancer was added to the dried
spores. The dried material was milled using an exclusionary
ball mill. In this process the material passed through a series
of stages separated by increasingly finer mesh screens. In each
stage 0.01 m diameter steel balls forced the product through the
screen separators. A pneumatic vibrator actuated the entire mill.
——————————————————
But finding tin is very strange. One speculative suggestion is that the mesh sieves used by Dugway to engineer dry powder simulants are made of phosphor bronze. Phosphor bronze commonly contains 3-10% tin. Thus only anthrax spores that Dugway turned into a dry powder would have been exposed to this – they would not have been exposed if they were just at the wet slurry stage. The spores could have picked up tin contamination when passing through these very fine mesh sieves.
See info on phosphor bronze mesh sieves here:
http://www.wirecloth-mesh.com/wire-mesh/test-sieves.htm
Finally, I’d like to again stress that converting a wet slurry of spores into a aerosol quality dry powder has got very little to do with microbiology and everything to do with chemistry, materials science and aerosol physics.
For some very detailed discussion of this see this document here published by Edgewood/Battelle on creating dry powder simulants.
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npptl/researchprojects/pdfs/CR-085Gardner.pdf
In this paper a different technique than the mesh sieves used by Dugway is used to create a powder. The picture of the jet mill is on slide 168. Note the exploded view of the actual jet mill – imagine the particles of powder whizzing around the hollow race track for hours colliding with each other and “self milling” into single spores.
Afterwards Edgewood add fumed silica as standard (as did Dugway in the former link).
Bronze. I didn’t think of that, and I should have. And so the Sn ought to be particulate — micro- or nano-filings.
Yes; that is the extraordinarily curious part. Screens, mills, jets, hot gas, vacuum, shake, stir, squeeze … design, fabricate, operate … You have to wonder if one person could figure it all out on paper, never mind actually do it alone. (Well, it’s pretty clear that one person working alone couldn’t; it’s the product of a talented, well-funded team, IMHO.)
No mention of bronze there that I noticed (brass, yes), but it’s a Chinese firm. Did I want to know that?!? ;-)
OK. This is a good description of what it takes to get from chunks from the inside of a flask that had been attached to a lyophilizer for 6 days down to a aerosolizable powder. The joke, though, is that here they were dealing with bacteriophage suspended in reconstituted skim milk, which they froze. They can mill to their hearts’ content, because ‘phage are far smaller than the particles resulting from the milling — no danger of breaking them. With spores, though, you are trying to make an aerosolizable powder out of particles that are themselves the size needed for the aerosol, and so the boundaries of the original particles (spores) and the powder particles have to coincide, which is to say, don’t break the spores.
Quite a problem.
Phosphor bronze is mentioned in the main text:
Made from first class stainless steel sheet, brass sheet and precise stainless steel wire mesh and phosphor bronze wire mesh.
Not saying that Dugway’s mesh sieves were made of phosphor bronze, but could have been. Usually the phosphor bronze is used for the final sieves – the ones with the smallest holes. The idea is that the each sieve has ever increasing smaller holes and they are all stacked together. You put your coarse powder in the top and out comes the finely dispersed powder at the bottom stage.
But imagine the mess it makes – that powder gets everywhere and dispesres all around the room. Not only did Detrick not have such an apparatus (or any special equipment such as a jet mill) – but they never detected any spores in their hot suite air filters. The air filters would be swabbed weekly and the swabs cultured as part of regular checks for leaks of dangerous pathogens.
Of course, the FBI conveniently leave that little observation out of their narrative. After all, that would spoil their story that Ivins did it all alone over a few evenings when he was scheduled to enter the B3 hot suite at 8pm for 6 nights in a row and then 8 nights in a row for the pre-scheduled evening animal check. Since the animals had been exposed to anthrax spores for a vaccine test being performed that month at Detrick the animals had to be ion the hot suite and had to be checked 3 times a day.
But to the FBI (who refuse to release his lab notebooks detailing these nightly animal checks) – this can only mean the multi-tasking Dr Ivins was brewing 100 liters of anthrax spores and converting them into a dry powder, in between checking the scores of guinea pigs and mice used in the study.
The FBI called his evening entries into the Hot Suite “unexplained”. They forgot to mention that his calendar (which can actually be seen in the FBI’s 3,000 page release of documents) – actually show he was scheduled to work on the precise evenings they called “unexplained”.
To compare Dr Ivins’ work schedule to the FBI affidavit that his entries into B3 in the evenings “unexplained”, see the following links:
Compare pages 8 and 9 of the affidavit for search warrant here:
http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/anthrax/SearchWarrant-08-431M-05.pdf
To pages 123 and 124 of http://foia.fbi.gov/amerithrax/847447.PDF
The first document ominously (almost with drum rolling) states on page 9:
“Beginning on September 28, Dr Ivins worked eight consecutive nights which consisted of the following times in Building 1425 with time spent in Suite B3″:
Friday September 28
Saturday September 29
Sunday September 30
Monday October 1
Tuesday October 2
Wednesday October 3
Thursday October 4
Friday October 5
After October 5, Dr Ivins did not enter Suite B3 in the evening again until October 9, for 15 minutes, and then October 14, for 1 hour and 26 minutes.
But then look at his calendar on pages 123 and 124 at http://foia.fbi.gov/amerithrax/847447.PDF !!!
That’s precisely what his calendar called on him to do – work these very eight consecutive nights checking on the animals. Good statistics need to be obtained to see exactly when animals died in order to properly analyze the effectiveness of vaccines – hence he did it at the same time every evening.
The affidavit is therefore deliberately misleading and does not mention that his work schedule was followed to the letter.
At this rate, you may just get his good name back for him.
How many people here could make anthrax spores if they wanted to? Between Jim and the commentors here I’m wondering why you all are not handling the investigation.
Not I…
however, I’m trying to follow these posts religiously, since I doubt anyone else will be writing about this case as well, or as simply.
Still, I don’t understand all of it, but I’m getting enough to get the gist of it.
There was probably some real monkey-business in that Ivins anthrax investigation.
Just about anyone with access to B. anthracis endospores and the kind of equipment found in a college microbiology laboratory could grow anthrax. Weaponizing the spores, however, is a totally different subject. Industrial spray driers, ball mills, and the other equipment needed to weaponize the spores don’t come cheap. BL3 suites are incredibly expensive. We are talking millions of dollars worth of equipment to do this. This wasn’t some disgruntled scientist in his garage.
Also, most biotech facilities don’t have fermenters AND milling equipment. Milling and spray drying equipment is used mostly for inhaled and oral products. Biotech products are mostly injected.
One question though: is it possible the weaponized spores could have come from someplace other than Dugway? That might explain the discrepancy between the Dugway use of DC204 antifoam and the presence of high amounts of silicone in the spore coat. Also, could the silicates have been deliberately added to increase the chemical resistance of the spore coat? They are already adding MnSO4, MgSO4, and CaCl2, which are known to increase the spore resistance to heat.
Very good questions ones I can’t answer. Ask Jim
Battelle comes to mind.
I’ll be interested to read more about this case… it boggles the mind.
probably was accidentally caught in the filters — maybe a word within a word kinda thing
On page 40 of slide show below, the first entry relating to Dr. Ivins research on March 17, 1998 says
“microscopic examination – encapsulation study.” It further states “See pages 73-78 of Lab Notebook 4010.”
http://docs.google.com/present/view?id=df7mn8s4_0ffkjfwhn&interval=5&autoStart=true
What was that study about?
It seems controlled experiments in adding silicon antifoam to spore preparations has already taken place – but the results got no where near the amount of silicon present in the attack spores.
Weber from Livermore mentions this in his presentation to the National Academy of Science (NAS).
This can be heard in Part 2 of the link here:
http://www.nationalacademies.org/newsroom/nalerts/20090925.html
* Day 2: Friday, Sept. 25 – Listen to the meeting
Part 1
Part 2
It’s also important to note that for Ames anthrax Livermore’s Weber was only able to incorporate from 0.01% – 0.1% silicon by weight. Whilst the Leahy powder contained 1.45% silicon by weight.
See slide 13 from Weber’s Powerpoint presentation here:
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2009/09/30/weber-powerpoint/
Finally note that FBI lab director Chris Hassell makes a very questionable scientific statement to the NAS committee which can read at this link:
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/fbi-assistant-director-hassell-statement-to-nas-7-30-09.pdf
“There has been a great deal written regarding the presence of silicon in the samples and the location of that silicon. The FBI Laboratory used Inductively Coupled Plasma-Optical Emission Spectroscopy (ICP-OES) to quantify silicon, as well as other elements, in the Leahy letter spore powder. The results indicated the Leahy spores contained 1.45% by weight. The New York Post letter spore powder was qualitatively analyzed using ICP-OES and was found to have Silicon present in the sample. However, the limited quantity of recovered material precluded a reliable numerical measurement of any elements present within this powder. Insufficient quantities of both the Daschle and Brokaw letters spore powders precluded the analysis of these samples using this elemental analysis technique.”
Ironically, in his presentation to NAS, Dr Hassell acknowledged the involvement of Pacific Northwest National Labs.
This can be seen in slide 14 here:
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2010/02/01/fbi-slides-d-christian-hassell-%EF%BB%BFscientific-approaches-to-the-2001-anthrax-letters-investigation/
He should then be well aware that Pacific Northwest Labs demonstrated in 2005 that accurate quantitative Elemental Analysis can be performed on bacillus spores with samples as small as one nanogram (one nanogram is one thousandth of one millionth of a gram). The Pacific Northwest paper on this technique can be seen here:
Differentiation of Spores of Bacillus subtilis Grown in Different Media by Elemental Characterization Using Time-of-Flight Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry, John B. Cliff, Kristin H. Jarman, Nancy B. Valentine, Steven L. Golledge, Daniel J. Gaspar, David S. Wunschel, and Karen L. Wahl, Applied and Environmental Microbiology, November 2005, p. 6524-6530, Vol. 71, No. 11
http://aem.asm.org/cgi/content/full/71/11/6524?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=subtilis&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=630&resourcetype=HWFIG
The quantities of silicon in the ALL the recovered powders should have been known by the FBI within days of receiving them. The fact that it took seven years for the FBI to give ONE piece of data on the Leahy powder can only lead to speculation that there is something about these silicon concentrations that make them extremely uncomfortable. If there is nothing to hide, why not just reveal the numbers? As the Pacific Northwest results show – it can be done easily. These quantities of silicon are perhaps the single most important piece of forensic evidence needed to solve the case. It is no excuse to say “there was not enough sample” – when clearly there was and is.
Thanks for the link to the meeting audio. That’s going to take some time to slog through.
From the slide show, the work on incorporating Si in growth media is worthless. They only used 40 ppm. That’s way below the silica concentration present in the antifoam calculations I did.
I may have made an error and it wasn’t Weber that said the antifoam agents had been used in reverse engineering experiments – but Joe Michael at Sandia (who presented immediately before Weber).
Fortunately a blogger has helpfully transcribed this complete presentation.
It can be read here:
———————————————–
http://biopreparat-mknaomi.blogspot.com/2010/03/complete-transcript-of-dr-joseph.html
QUESTION: Joseph, you mentioned in passing anti-foam agents that were used. Could silicon-based…
I believe they are silicon-based…
QUESTION: What kind of materials are those and what kind of molecular weights… do you know what they are?
You’ll have to ask someone that grows bacteria.
QUESTION: Yeah, we got a few of those… We used them long ago but we don’t use them now but I don’t remember what the form of the silicon is…. Could be a silane of some sort…. But there are small molecules, silicon based materials that… If you’re shaking large cultures of bacteria, you tend to get foam building up… Especially in fermenters, where like, you’re bubbling air through… It could be a surfactant like material… Yes, that’s an interesting point. It suggest that growing them -[inaudible]-
I think we looked at a lot of samples, with various preparations – and sometimes they mentioned they used anti-foams and sometimes not – and it wasn’t – we couldn’t correlate this sort of appearance with the use or not use of the anti-foam.
—————————————————–
Sandia have previously said that out of 200 samples the FBI had revers engineered, none matched the silicon signature of the attack spores:
http://www.nae.edu/nae/pubundcom.nsf/weblinks/NKAL-7M9KTU?OpenDocument
Paul Kotula: We looked at over 200 samples in our lab that were various attempts to reverse-engineer the process under which these powders were made and did not find a match.
Thanks. It sounds like they didn’t get systematic about the antifoams. In just skimming the specs on the Dow silicon antifoams, I saw one that was as high as 30% silica (but it wasn’t marked as designated for fermentation, as if that would stop someone who’s fighting a sudden foaming problem and grabs something off a shelf…), so the particular agents they tried would be key. If they didn’t try one with a significant silica content, then my suggested experiments still need to be done.
[And thanks so much for the transcription; I'm hoping that when I have time to mine that I can get some answers on the population genetics questions that I still have.]
Here is also an interesting observation.
If you were a forensic analysts and had a sample you suspected might contain artificially added polymerized glass – but you wanted to know if it really was a polymerized glass rather than pure SiO2 what would you do? You couldn’t use a technique like STEM (Sandia) or NanoSIMS (Livermore) – these could not distinguish a polymer consisting of SiOxCx from SiO2. Instead, you’d use FTIR spectroscopy and also possibly Raman spectroscopy. This is described below:
—————————————————-
http://spectroscopyonline.findanalytichem.com/spectroscopy/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=618829&sk=&date=&pageID=2
FT-IR–Raman Combination: The Perfect Analytical Solution for Vibrational Spectroscopists
Figure 2: Raman (top) and FT-IR (bottom) spectra of polydimethylsiloxane.
————————————————–
It’s a very low cost test (much less $’s than Sandia or Livermore’s multimillion $ machines).
And it would very quickly tell the difference between SiO2 and polydimethylsiloxane.
Surely FTIR spectroscopy was performed on the attack powders – it would be almost unthinkable if it wasn’t.
So why haven’t we seen the results?
And what exactly was it that led the FBI to conclude that polydimethylsiloxane (polymerized glass) was present back in April 2002 (see post #14)?
And why did they apparently change their minds six years later?
From the linked article:
The FBI’s units certainly must have brushed up against the technique at some point. Good question as to why they didn’t settle the Si ambiguity.
Yes, the reason they only used 40ppm is because they were asked by the FBI to see how much they could incorporate by using silicon that could be conceived to be “plausibly accidental”. Silica is only sparingly soluble in water, so 40ppm was about as much as they could incorporate.
Silicon Antifoam is not exactly accidental, but it would be added not to make the spores behave in any particular way but to simply stop the foam forming.
Of course, post treatment with an organosilane goes way beyond plausibly accidental and has a definite purpose in engineering the spores – either to protect against aging, protect them from UV radiation (sunlight), make them hydrophobic and more dispersable, or all three of these.
Finally, note that in the Pacific Northwest paper linked to above, about a dozen elements were detected in the spores they used. They did find a small silicon signal but rejected it as being part of the spores since the silicon signal in their graphite substrate was just as strong. Of course, this was 4-5 orders of magnitude smaller than the silicon in the Leahy spores – in other words 0.0001 – 0.001% silicon.
Who benefited from the Anthrax attacks? This was an inside job. If it ever comes to light will the U.S. public even care? Republicans will just spin the story the way they spin the science on global warming and corporate medial let’s them get away with it.
The attacks were aimed at the Senators who were most vociferous in opposing the Patriot Act, which was then passed with their assent…
Whichever theory is true, the fact is that they were a hit orchestrated by the office of Cheney.
Thank you for that wonderful analysis. I know a little bit more about biochemical engineering and can say truthfully that I learned something new today. It’s a poor day and a wasted one when you don’t learn something new.
I have always thought that those attacks were a Cheney “hit” and were a really lame attempt to link Iraq with terrorism. Maybe if the attacks hadn’t been so ideological in their targets, they would have been more successful in that aim. Unfortunately, as we now know, they were entirely unnecessary in the effort to wage an aggressive war.
Jim, can you answer one question? The Washington Post article you cited in your previous post characterized the “silica coating” of the spores as a weaponization tactic, and quoted people speculating on fuming methods for producing it, and therefore on the sophistication and the fact that it indicated against a “loner” theory. This evidence you are bringing out now indicates that it isn’t that sophisticated. In fact, regardless of the stirring method used (shaker flask vs. stirred fermenter with oxygen bubbled through), in order to produce this “weaponized” coating, all that is needed is to introduce an antifoam agent during the fermenting process. In the fermenter, this is a foregone conclusion, as you are saying. In the shaker flask, there is no reason to do so to complete the fermenting step per se, but if it’s a component of the weaponization process, then the antifoam can be used to do the “coating” step, even in a shaker flask. No?
The problem comes down to whether the silicon is actually part of a weaponization step and to someone knowing they could get silicon incorporated in this way. If they knew silicon was important and that it conferred useful properties, then yes, it’s possible they used this as a way to get it incorporated. After all the anlysis, I still haven’t been convinced on how the final dry powder was produced. Watchmaker has presented some very interesting scenarios on the drying steps and there is the information from Meselson suggesting (but not proving) that no special treatment other than cleaning and drying is needed to confer the properties found. So we are still left with whether the silicon is an incidental signature of a fermentation process or an intentional weaponization that could have been incorporated either during or after culture.
But the Sn, is much more clearly an identifier, then, right? Especially if its presence is because, like you say, of using phosphor-bronze sieves at one particular location, and it has no purposeful use.
That seems like a much more promising bread crumb, now that you’ve identified the very likely source of the silica. Thanks.
That reference was from Watchmaker.
The very latest interview of Meselson by Eric Nadler (who produced and directed “Anthrax Wars”) is especially interesting.
Nadler asked Meselson to respond to the fact that the UN’s Kay Mereish had published a letter rebutting FBI’s scientist Douglas Beecher’s unsupported statement that there were no additives present in the spores.
Below are the letter written by Dr Mereish and Dr Meselson’s interview.
——————————————————————
http://aem.asm.org/cgi/content/full/73/15/5074?view=long&pmid=17660313
Applied and Environmental Microbiology, August 2007, p. 5074, Vol. 73, No. 15
LETTER TO THE EDITOR
Unsupported Conclusions on the Bacillus anthracis Spores
Douglas J. Beecher reported on the methodology that a U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation laboratory used to identify an intentionally anthrax-contaminated letter(s) among mail collected from a Congressional building or postal facility that serves the U.S. Congress after the incident of contamination that occurred on 15 October 2001 (1). The described sampling strategy and initial screening and analysis methodology using direct plating were reported to be efficient and safe. However, the data supplied in the paper could not be used as evidence for judging the quality of the spores or to support or dismiss conceptions about the presence or absence of spore additives or about the production engineering used to prepare the spores. Furthermore, the type of sampling and analysis data presented in the paper could not be used for extrapolation of ideas concerning spore quality or the method of production. It is possible that Dr. Beecher’s laboratory has performed additional analysis and obtained data that might support such conclusions but that were not included in the paper; if that is the case, it would be more scientifically appropriate to add “unpublished data” in parentheses next to the conclusions he offered concerning the apparent lack of additives, spore quality as reflected in particle size distribution, and the production engineering. In a meeting I attended in September 2006, a presentation was made by a scientist who had worked on samples of anthrax collected from letters involved in the same incident in October 2001; that scientist described the anthrax spore as uncoated but said that it contained an additive that affected the spore’s electrical charges (D. Small, CBRN Counter-Proliferation and Response, Paris, France, 18-20 September 2006; organized by SMi [www.smi-online.co.uk]).
It would be of importance for Dr. Beecher to submit data in support of his conclusions in another paper to establish a sound scientific basis for his arguments.
arrow
REFERENCE
Top
LETTER
REFERENCE
1. 1 Beecher, D. J. 2006. Forensic application of microbiological culture analysis to identify mail intentionally contaminated with Bacillus anthracis spores. Appl. Environ. Microbiol. 72:5304-5310.[Abstract/Free Full Text]
Kay A. Mereish
United Nations
866 UN Plaza
New York, New York 10017
Phone: (212) 963-4094
Fax: (967) 367-2130
E-mail: mereish@un.org
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Excerpt from Nadler and Coen’s book “Anthrax Wars”
“The journalists pressed him on the finding of the AFIP that did find silica in the samples. Meselson said he couldn’t really comment because “they haven’t released their data for independent verification.” The release, he noted, was prevented by the ongoing Amerithrax probe. Nadler then brought up the letter of a UN representative named Kay Mereish that was published in the August 2007 issue of Applied and Environmental Microbiology. Merish’s letter noted a recent speech in Paris by an unnamed scientist US scientist [Editor's note: the scientist was in fact named and cited] who had examined the attack powder and concluded it contained an additive that made it a more effective weapon. At that Meselson rose and extracted a document from a folder nearby. “I can show you this,” he said, “but you can’t make a copy.” Nadler read what he took to be an internal FBI memo, which suggested that the forensic expert who had given that speech [Editor: cited by KM as Smalls] may have violated security statutes and could face investigation.”
“These are very sensitive areas,” said Meselson. “One should be very careful here.” (p.36)
——————————————————–
Note that the AFIP data – the data that prompted AFIP to announce that silica has been deliberately added to the spores has STILL not been released to this day.
————————————————————–
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/841229/posts
Detecting Environmental Terrorism (ANTHRAX Sleuths)
Armed Sources Institute of Pathology ^ | October 31st, 2002 | Christopher C. Kelley
When US Army investigators at Ft Detrick, Md, examined anthrax found in a letter sent to Sen. Thomas Daschle last fall, they discovered that the highly refined spores floated in the air, making them much easier for potential victims to inhale. What made this anthrax so easily aerosolized? A series of sophisticated tests revealed some clues, but the presence of another unidentifiable substance left the investigation incomplete. That’s when Ft Detrick contacted AFIP’s Department of Environmental and Toxicologic Pathology for assistance.
“Ft Detrick sought our assistance to determine the specific components of the anthrax found in the Daschle letter,” said Florabel G. Mullick, MD, ScD, SES, AFIP Principal Deputy Director and department chair. AFIP experts utilized an energy dispersive X-ray spectrometer (an instrument used to detect the presence of otherwise-unseen chemicals through characteristic wavelengths of X-ray light) to confirm the previously unidentifiable substance as silica. “This was a key component,” Mullick said. “Silica prevents the anthrax from aggregating, making it easier to aerosolize.
To piggyback odelette @ 52…
How different would a weaponization tactic be from a vaccine preparation?
BTW thank you for another great post.
The former Zawahiri associate working alongside Bruce Ivins with virulent Ames was co-founder of a small company that received $50 million in investment from Perseus, a DC venture firm, $30 million while headed by Richard Holbrooke, now in charge at DOS of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The company’s decontamination agent was tested at the Capitol and its hand cream pitched to postal workers.
The scientist and I have a mutual acquaintance. His lifelong friend was recruited into the Egyptian Islamic Jihad by Ayman Zawahiri in a room set aside for the purpose at the medical school. He has published the account of his recruitment in INSIDE JIHAD, which was published May 2008. He now consults for US intelligence community.
The scientist’s patents, in addition to thanking Bruce Ivins for supplying the Ames and his accusers (Former Colleague #1 and Former Colleague #2) for providing technical assistance, discuss silicone oils as an antifoam in connection with the company’s nanoemulsions. After the work with virulent Ames supplied by Bruce Ivins, the company, for example, tested its product at Dugway using an anthrax aerosol simulant.
The Senators were the ones most associated with the detention and alleged mistreatment of prisoners. The “Leahy Law” permitted continued appropriations to security units of Egypt and other countries despite evidence of torture. This had been the subject of islamist press in late August 2001. As Chairman of a key subcommittee, Senator Leahy had the key role for appropriations to Egypt and Israel.
The Egyptian Islamic Jihad leaders had threatened that mailed anthrax would be used if #2 of the Vanguards of Conquest was denied (upon an announcement of the bail hearing in January 2001). See early February 2001 CIA PDB to President Bush. His bail was denied on October 5, 2001 and then the “real deal” was sent. Ayman Zawahiri’s intention to use mailed anthrax to retaliate for the rendering and mistreatment of prisoners was first publicly announced in March 1999 by both detained members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad shura and the blind sheik’s attorney Montasser Al-Zayat.
Letters to newspapers in DC and NYC and people in symbolic positions relating to the detention of WTC plotters was not merely the modus operandi of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad/Vanguards of Conquest, but was its signature (see the Al Hayat letter bombs for which there is a $5 million reward).
Sources: graphics based on official documents including 20+ pages recently uploaded by the DOJ.
http://docs.google.com/present/view?id=df7mn8s4_0ffkjfwhn&interval=5&autoStart=true
Surprized no one’s commented on this comment. Is it true? Wouldn’t this make a huge **CLICK**ing sound?
Sorry, fail. Anti-foam residue does not PROVE the bacteria were grown in a fermenter. I grow bacteria in a molecular biology research lab for a living, and it can be useful to add anti-foam to shake flasks. I do it almost every week. (I use Sigma 204, nominally at 0.01%, but the stuff is so viscous that it’s hard to measure accurately, so that concentration is not exact.)
Aerobic cultures grow better (both faster and to a higher final cell concentration) in baffled flasks, which have 3 or 4 triangular dents molded into the bottom edge of the flask. As the medium swirls around, these dents form vastly more turbulence than would occur in an unbaffled flask, incorporating air bubbles into the medium for better gas transfer. In rich media without anti-foam, particularly at higher cell densities, this leads to a thick blanket of foam on top of the medium, which prevents the incorporation of FRESH air into the bubbles, and so thwarts the goal of better oxygenation. Adding anti-foam to the flask solves this problem and gives better growth of aerobic cells. It never occurred to me to take a picture of my flasks, but I could post a YouTube video showing this in a day or two, if it made a difference to anyone.
I haven’t had much problem with foaming in unbaffled flasks, but that doesn’t mean it couldn’t happen in certain media. What types of flasks were allegedly used?
My experience is limited to E. coli, but anthrax and coli are both facultative anaerobes (able to grow with or without oxygen), so I’d expect anthrax cultures to benefit from better aeration, too. If I wanted to maximize the number of bacteria I grew, I’d definitely try adding anti-foam to my flasks.
Why not run a series of flasks with increasing amounts of antifoam and see how much Si you can jam into spores? (Just don’t use B. anth. ;-)!)
For the fun of it, see if you can hit on a way to get the spores clean and separate using what you have lying around the lab. There’s this idea that a layer of Si outside the spore coat assists in dispersion. Maybe you can get a charge onto the spores so that they are mutually repulsive.
Can you estimate how many flasks it’ll take to produce, say, 500g of final spore prep?
Why not top five list:
5. I don’t have any sporulating bacteria.
4. I don’t have equipment or experience making spore powder.
3. I don’t have equipment or experience or time or desire to do the measurements.
2. Using a different species of bacteria would probably affect the results.
And the number one reason for not doing this experiment is…
1. I don’t care how much Si is incorporated. The OP spent a lot of time on the incorrect assertion that anti-foam is NEVER used in shake flasks (and therefore the accused could not be the maker of the anthrax), and my ONLY point is that anti-foam IS SOMETIMES useful in shake flasks. You can’t exonerate someone using a flask culture based solely on the detection of anti-foam residue. Try something else, if that’s your mission.
Why not this is like finding size 12 shoe tracks and the suspect wore a size 7. Sure the suspect might have put on size 12 shoes but its very unlikely.
Still can the FBI prove he ever bought size 12 shoes/anti foaming agents I assume all such sales are regulated.
isn’t mylanta available over the counter?
.
As Jim acknowledges @ 72, he doesn’t disagree with your bolded point. Furthermore, he made clear in the post that he’s not basing his suspicions about the FBI case against Ivins “solely” on this antifoaming agent discussion/supposition.
In Jim’s earlier posts, he’s quite convincingly demonstrated that Ivins did not have enough off-hours hot-suite time or the equipment needed to grow the quantity of Anthrax spores used in the attack letters at USAMRIID in Fort Detrick, Maryland, never mind the silicon/antifoaming agent issue outlined in this post, or the intricate and dangerous processing/drying work that had to follow once the growth medium stage was finished. [And as Watchmaker has now pointed out in this thread @ 36, for the first time in anything I've read, some of the released FBI documents show that Ivins's own calendar had him scheduled to check on animal test subjects in the hot-suite at the very times he in fact did so on consecutive evenings - 'suspiciously' according to the FBI, who never bothered to mention those animals, as far as I know, before their recent dump of documents under the Freedom of Information Act.] Just to point to one of many other questions and leads resulting from the inexcusably-delayed release last month of the FBI’s Investigative Summary, that initiated Jim’s impressive recent series of analytical posts about the FBI investigation (or, at least, about what little we’ve been permitted to learn about that investigation).
Powwow wrote:
“In Jim’s earlier posts, he’s quite convincingly demonstrated that Ivins did not have the time or the equipment needed to grow the quantity of Anthrax spores used in the attack letters, at USAMRIID at Fort Detrick,”
That is absolutely correct. Bruce Ivins himself calculated that it would take Detrick ONE YEAR to make the 30g of spores that were contained in the original 1 liter flask of RMR-1029. That’s why they contracted Dugway to do the work – and it took seven production runs in Dugway’s fermenter.
Think about the total amount of spores used in the attacks. There was 0.871g of spores RECOVERED from the Leahy envelope alone. Bear in mind – that means RECOVERED. That was what a person working in a glove box managed to scoop off the letter with a spatula and place in a pre-weighed bottle and then weigh. How much simply floated away when he did this? Have you ever worked with a very fine powder before? How much got trapped in the pores of the paper? How much got lost going through the mail? How much got lost when the perpetrator used a spatula to transfer the powder to the envelope in the first place?
What were the yield losses in converting spores in a slurry to a dry powder?
When you take all this into consideration it becomes clear that 0.871g of dry powder recovered from the Leahy letter likely started it’s life as perhaps as much as 3g of spores in a wet slurry.
Taking all the letters together the perpetrator would need to brew as much as possibly 30g of spores in slurry.
An utterly impossible task for one person to undertake covertly.
The FBI just gloss all these glaring discrepancies over with “he could do it in 3 days easily” with absolutely nothing to back it up.
It’s no wonder they are trying to block a Congressional investigation of the anthrax case.
Can you think of any reason someone would add Sn to growth medium for B. anthracis? (Presuming that the Sn found in the preps is not in the form of “filings”.) Is there any way that particulate tin or bronze could find its way into a spore prep in your (for instance) lab?
Good point how did the Sn get there such a trace element is a finger print to the real killer.
Prove he had flasks like that or had a glass blower make them to order and I’ll change my mind. Prove from witnesses they saw him use flasks like that then I might change my mind.
Well, I’ve grown a lot of shake cultures in baffled Fernbachs without adding antifoam, but I guess I could see someone using it in a shake flask, especially if they are growing a bacterium that produces a lot of excreted protein. But it is still very far from normal and I would expect it to be common only for people doing scale-up work on process development or protein production, neither of which describes Ivins. Note that I did still mention at the end of the post that it would be a simple matter for investigators to determine if an antifoam with significant silica content had ever been purchased at USAMRIID.
Jim, heckuva thought provoking piece. The discussion thread is also enlightening. So the silicon “coating” may simply have been a by-product of the use of an anti-foaming agent? And the fundamental issue still remains the mechanical processes involved in turning an anthrax slurry into an aerosolable (is that even a word?) powder?
Interesting thread. I’m still trying to understand the adsorption vs. incorporation idea. It sounds like the former is the working hypothesis here.
When I first read the Si idea, I was immediately reminded of the studies in the 1980′s that linked aluminum to alzheimer’s plaques. It turned out that the fixation/staining solutions used to prep the samples for for AA spectroscopy were simply contaminated.
So… has anyone checked to see that the amount of Si detected by the Japanese method is within a reasonable range, considering the amount of anti-foam likely to be used in a given fermentation reaction?
I guess this is sort of a mass balance question: Assuming random Si distribution in each spore/cell, is there adequate mass of anti-foam in the entire culture to generate the signal detected by the Japanese (on a per-cell or per spore basis)?
Without satisfaction of that minimum stoichiometric condition, it seems to me that the the anti-foam hypothesis is toast. A good place to start is probably to understand the limit of detection of the analytical methods they used in the Science paper. Please forgive me for not trying this calculation myself, I took industrial micro in 1986, and am a bit rusty.
P.S., Is simethicone even catabolized as a carbon source in nutrient-rich cultures?
Here are some of Dr. ivins’ emails I’ve previously posted on the subject of antifoam.
From: Ivins, Bruce E Dr USAMRIID
To:
Bcc:
Subject: RE: Spores and Foaming
Date: Tuesday, June 05, 2001 7:29:36 AM
When we mix the spores at that concentration, we don’t vortex. I should have said that. I think the
reason that it may foam is that the spore suspension is so pure. In the Vollum 1B spore suspension from
1965 which is about 4 – 5 X 10^10 per ml, and MUCH dirtier, there is no foaming upon vortexing. The
spores you have were twice purified with Hypaque gradient centrifugation. The spores are very
hydrophobic, I believe. I suppose you could try to add a little Tween 80 to the spores to see if that
helps. I’ve heard that in the “OLD DAYS” back in the 50s and 60s here at Detrick, they would soemtimes
add a little Tween 80 to the spores to be aerosolized. We haven’t added any because we didn’t want to introduce another variable into the challenge. If you add something else to the spores being aerosolized,
you may have to be able to demonstrate that the “anti-foam” has no effect on spore LD50, the infection
process, or the specific immune response to the infection. As I said, when we mix the spores at that
concentration, we just rock back and forth or gently swirl. If you want to add something to the spores
before challenge, I think you should first run it by the IPT for their comments.
- Bruce
—–Original Message—–
From:
Sent: Monday, June 04, 2001 5:06 PM
To: ‘Bruce.Ivins@DET.AMEDD.ARMY.MIL’
Subject: Spores and Foaming
Bruce,
thought it would be easier if I contacted you directly. With regard to
the foaming issue. When I go back to the original suspension you sent in
the 50 ml conical tube and vortex it the same foaming phenomenon occurs. So
I do not believe it is a glassware problem or washing problem. If you
will/could go back to one of your 10E10 stocks of the same spore prep. and
also make a 10E9 dilution and vortex it to see if you get the same thing.
As described before, it’s like whipped cream on top of the water and
will not go back into suspension unless it sits for a day or more. When I
enumerate the suspension under the whipped cream it is 0.5-1 log lower than
what is expected (i.e. what should be 10E9 is 5 x 10E8 to 1 x 10E8). In the
mean time do you have any ideas on a defoaming agent?
From: Ivins, Bruce E Dr USAMRIID
To:
Bcc:
Subject: RE: Spores and Foaming
Date: Tuesday, June 05, 2001 9:04:29 AM
, these spores are exactly the same spores used for the other rabbits for BioPort. We do get some
foaming, but still get a high dose with 3 X 10^9 per ml. Would it help to use more suspension in your
container? We’ve used these spores for quite awhile with success. As I said, maybe it’s because they
are so clean that they clump. If there were some cell material stuck to the outside, perhaps they would
perform a little more like the old Vollum 1B spore suspension or like some of the less pure Ames spore
suspensions we have used in the past.
- Bruce
—–Original Message—–
From:
Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2001 8:24 AM
To: ‘Ivins, Bruce E Dr USAMRIID’
Cc:
Subject: RE: Spores and Foaming
Bruce,
One other question. Is were the spores that you sent to us prepared the
same way as the ones RIID used on the BioPort rabbit studies or the same
spore prep.? Or did you use different AMES spores? Looks like even though
I’m a log low on the AGIs than expected I can still hit the targeted LD50
range and will use These spores and mix by inversion. Thanks for answering
my questions
From: Ivins, Bruce E Dr USAMRIID
To:
Bcc:
Subject: RE: Spores and Foaming
Date: Tuesday, June 05, 2001 9:20:04 AM
,
We usually spray at a concentration of 3 X 10^9 per ml. That gives us an aerosol inhaled dose of about
100- 200 LD50s in a 10-minute spray. You can try a test run with some Tween 80 and see if that helps.
I seem to recall they used some concentration between 0.01% and 1%, but I don’t remember exactly,
since it was given to me by word-of-mouth. I still recommend getting the IPT’s opinion. If there’s no
other way to aerosolize than using anti-foam, you may have to do so, but I would hesitate to do it
unless absolutely necessary.
- Bruce
—–Original Message—–
From:
Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2001 8:02 AM
To: ‘Ivins, Bruce E Dr USAMRIID’
Subject: RE: Spores and Foaming
True but when I nebulize a 10E9 conc. the foaming happens. Do you not
nebulize that high of a conc.? Also even at lower dilutions my AGI
enumerations are approx. 1 log lower than what I expect. Thus I appears
that even al low conc. they foam out of suspension and I’ll have to add some
type of defoaming agent.
From:
Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2001 9:32 AM
To: ‘
Cc: ‘bruce.ivins@det.amedd.army.mil’
Subject: RE: Spores and Foaming
: I believe we are resolving our questions regarding the foaming and
we won’t be vortexing anymore. Bruce has helped us out immensely (see
below). Could you please provide information regarding the anti-foam
formulation that your staff uses – if any – for these high concentration
anthrax aerosols.
Thanks
—–Original Message—–
From:
Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2001 9:22 AM
To:
Subject: FW: Spores and Foaming
—–Original Message—–
From: Ivins, Bruce E Dr USAMRIID [mailto:Bruce.Ivins@DET.AMEDD.ARMY.MIL]
Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2001 9:20 AM
To: ‘
Subject: RE: Spores and Foaming
We usually spray at a concentration of 3 X 10^9 per ml. That gives us an
aerosol inhaled dose of about 100- 200 LD50s in a 10-minute spray. You can
try a test run with some Tween 80 and see if that helps. I seem to recall
they used some concentration between 0.01% and 1%, but I don’t remember
exactly, since it was given to me by word-of-mouth. I still recommend
getting the IPT’s opinion. If there’s no other way to aerosolize than using
anti-foam, you may have to do so, but I would hesitate to do it unless
absolutely necessary.
- Bruce
—–Original Message—–
From:
Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2001 8:02 AM
To: ‘Ivins, Bruce E Dr USAMRIID’
Subject: RE: Spores and Foaming
True but when I nebulize a 10E9 conc. the foaming happens. Do you not
nebulize that high of a conc.? Also even at lower dilutions my AGI
enumerations are approx. 1 log lower than what I expect. Thus I appears
that even al low conc. they foam out of suspension and I’ll have to add some
type of defoaming agent.
From: Ivins, Bruce E Dr USAMRIID
To:
Subject: RE: Spray factor data
Date: Wednesday, June 06, 2001 12:54:43 PM
- Does this mean that you and perhaps others (me? ? etc.?)are headed to Battelle to work on
the spore/aersol/foaming/clean or dirty glassware problem? Let us know!
- Bruce
—–Original Message—–
From:
Sent: Friday, June 15, 2001 12:22 PM
To: ‘Ivins, Bruce E Dr USAMRIID’
Subject: RE: Spores and Foaming
Thanks! I’ll let you know what happens next week.
—–Original Message—–
From: Ivins, Bruce E Dr USAMRIID [mailto:Bruce.Ivins@DET.AMEDD.ARMY.MIL]
Sent: Friday, June 15, 2001 12:26 PM
To: ‘
Subject: RE: Spores and Foaming
We shock the dilution that we are going to spray.
- Bruce
From:
Sent: Friday, June 15, 2001 1:01 PM
To: ‘Ivins, Bruce E Dr USAMRIID’
Subject: Spores and counting
Dr. Ivins,
A question on how you enumerate. Our SOPs say a plate should contain from
25-250 spores per plate (we do 5 plates per dilution). Do you have criteria
for rejecting low or high numbers? Say I get a plate that has 12 colonies
and all remaining plates are within the 25-250 range. Do you reject that
plate and average the 4 remaining, use all 5 and average, reject all 5 and
re-enumerate with 5 more etc. I ask this, because it could potentially be a
GLP issue. I apologize if this is any SOP that you have sent but
I have not seen them yet.
-
Tween 80 is unrelated to silicone-based agents.
The USAMRIID anthrax group has multiple US patents on fermenter production of Bacillus anthracis in media containing Dow antifoam C (which comprises polydimethylsiloxane and methylated silica;
http://www2.dowcorning.com/DataFiles/090007b280b4df6a.pdfs).
For example:
United States Patent 6387665 (http://www.freepatentsonline.com/6387665.html)
Inventors:
Ivins, Bruce (Frederick, MD)
Worsham, Patricia (Jefferson, MD)
Friedlander, Arthur M. (Gaithersburg, MD)
Farchaus, Joseph W. (Frederick, MD)
Welkos, Susan L. (Frederick, MD)
“Fermentation conditions: The fermentations described here were carried out using a New Brunswick Bio-Flo 3000 equipped with a 5.0 liter working volume glass vessel and stainless steel headplate and hemispherical bottom cooling dish. Four liters of FA medium were added to the vessel, which had been previously completely disassembled, scrubbed in a dilute Envirochem solution and autoclaved for 15 min after the addition of 4 liters of H2O. The polarographic DO 2 probe (Ingold) and pH probes (either liquid or gel filled, Ingold) were also inserted and all addition and sampling ports were sealed or clamped and wrapped in aluminum foil. Addition lines consisted of
surgical grade autoclavable Tygon tubing (Thomas Scientific) and all lines were sealed with the exception of the condenser, which was left open to permit pressure release, but covered with aluminum foil. The vessel was autoclaved using a 10 min exposure time at 121° C. and removed from the autoclave as soon as sufficient cooling had occurred to allow opening of the autoclave. The vessel was then immediately connected to the fermentor unit and the condenser line was connected to a sterile liquid trap and 0.2? capsule filter to avoid the introduction of contaminants during the cooling
process. The vessel was then cooled to 37° C. using the fermentor driven temperature control and positive pressure was provided using compressed sterile filtered air. Once the vessel had cooled to 37° C. sterile filtered kanamycin was added to a final concentration of 40 ?g/ml. The agitation was activated at 150 rpm and aeration was adjusted to 1-1.2 volume/volume/min (vvm) and ***antifoam C (DOW)***, that had been diluted 10-fold into H 2 O and autoclaved, was added to a final concentration of 200 ppm.
United States Patent 6316006 (http://www.freepatentsonline.com/6316006.html)
Inventors:
Worsham, Patricia (Jefferson, MD)
Friedlander, Arthur M. (Gaithersburg, MD)
Ivins, Bruce (Frederick, MD)
“Fermentation conditions: The fermentations described here were carried out using a New Brunswick Bio-Flo 3000 equipped with a 5.0 liter working volume glass vessel and stainless steel headplate and hemispherical bottom cooling dish. Four liters of FA medium were added to the vessel, which had been previously completely disassembled, scrubbed in a dilute Envirochem solution and autoclaved for 15 min after the addition of 4 liters of H 2 O. The polarographic DO 2 probe (Ingold) and pH probes (either liquid or gel filled, Ingold) were also inserted and all addition and sampling ports were sealed or clamped and wrapped in aluminum foil. Addition lines consisted of surgical grade autoclavable Tygon tubing (Thomas Scientific) and all lines were sealed with the exception of the condenser, which was left open to permit pressure release, but covered with aluminum foil. The vessel was autoclaved using a 10 min exposure time at 121° C. and removed from the autoclave as soon as sufficient cooling had occurred to allow opening of the autoclave. The vessel was then immediately connected to the fermentor unit and the condenser line was connected to a sterile liquid trap and 0.2 ?capsule filter to avoid the introduction of contaminants during the cooling process. The vessel was then cooled to 37° C. using the fermentor driven temperature control and positive pressure was provided using compressed sterile filtered air. Once the vessel had cooled to 37° C. sterile filtered kanamycin was added to a final concentration of 40 ?g/ml. The agitation was activated at 150 rpm and aeration was adjusted to 1-1.2 volume/volume/min (vvm) and ***antifoam C (DOW)***, that had been diluted 10-fold into H 2 O and autoclaved, was added to a final concentration of 200 ppm.
Simple Google searches on “Ivins fermenter” or “Ivins antifoam” yield these patents as top hits. Other simple Google searhes yield other patents in which the USAMRIID anthrax group describes fermenter production of B. anthracis on tens-of-liter volume scales. In view of the fact that this information is so easy to locate, and in view of the fact that this information has been known for some time, it is bizarre that persons continue to argue, risibly, that the presence of silicon in the attack material rules out the possibility that the attack material could have been prepared at USAMRIID.
(One would hope that persons would at least perform a Google search before posting analyses of technical capabilities…but apparently this is par for the course for the blogosphere. Blogger Jim White proposes that the “Most Likely” source of silicon is antifoam, even naming a specific brand of antifoam, Dow, and then goes on to assert that this exonerates USAMRIID and Ivins…apparently without having performed simple Google searches that would have yielded USAMRIID and Ivins patents specifying use of antifoam, indeed the same specific brand of antifoam, Dow, in fermenter preparation of B. anthracis. Incredible.)
RHE
Hi RHE. Using a Bio-Flo 3000, with a working volume of 4 L, Ivins would have to have made about 18 runs in the fermenter to produce the amount of spores used in the attacks. How do we account for that? I would imagine the FBI would have made that a central feature of their report if they could tie him to so much time in this tiny fermenter, and such heavy use of it would be essentially impossible to hide.
So now we do have Antifoam C at USAMRIID. From what I now understand to have been available to Ivins, he put that antifoam into 36 two liter shake flasks or 18 four liter fermenter runs. Do you have any 75 L or larger fermenters you can tie him to so that it only takes one surreptitious run?
Antifoam C looks to have a silica content (if the Simethicone here has the same ratio of free silica as it does in Antifoam M, the properties page here is less exact but does refer to silica being present) that is probably about a third that of the Antifoam M I discussed in the post, so it could probably account for sufficient silica uptake. (I don’t see a reference to methylated silica. I see Simethicone which, as in the Antifoam M, has a bit of silica in it, but in the case of Antifoam A, the Simethicone is present only at 30% as an emulsion in methylcellulose, which is very different from methlyated silica).
The FBI documents do not list model numbers and capacities of fermenters available to the USAMRIID anthrax group other than the 3.5 L Bio Flo III (“FERMENTOR SYSTEM, New Brunswick Model Bio Flo III. value: $ 27,352″; BEI Section 4, PDF pp 8-10).
However, published patents and papers by the USAMRIID anthrax group report preparation of B. anthracis in 5 L fermenters and in 20 L fermenters (http://www.freepatentsonline.com/6387665.html; http://www.freepatentsonline.com/6316006.html; http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC106355/).
RHE
The Material Safety Data Sheet for Dow Antifoam C lists components as follows (http://www3.dowcorning.com/DataFiles/090007b280b4df6a.pdf):
CAS 7732-18-5; >60.0% Water
CAS 63148-62-9; 15.0-40.0%; Polydimethylsiloxane
CAS 67762-90-7 1.0-5.0% Methylated silica
CAS 9004-67-5 1.0-5.0% Methylcellulose
RHE
Thanks, I was only looking at Dow’s product sheets, not the MSDS.
RHE,
Hi!
Good to have the benefit of your expertise.
And, of course, the best searches of the word “fermenter” one can do are in the 2700 pages of record.
RHE, as an expert that I’ve regularly consulted and whose expertise I’ve credited now for the better part of the past decade, before we consider the details of the fermenter — for example, whether its motor was seized in 2001 — let’s consider previous recent online discussion of this patent.
And then let’s consider what the record shows on the dates that the DOJ speculates, without basis, that he was making powderized anthrax.
Two weeks ago, Old Atlantic on the CaseClosed blog said
March 7, 2010 at 11:31 pm
“Bruce Ivins et al applied for a patent in 2000 which was granted in 2002. This patent describes in detail the actual growing of anthrax by Bruce Ivins using the New Brunswick Bio-Flo 3000 that the FBI 302 report indicated was the fermentor at Ft. Detrick. The patent also describes use of the speed-vac. The patent gives a table with the yield in mg of anthracis using the 5 Liter fermentor after growth of several days.”
http://www.freepatentsonline.com/6387665.html
***
“TABLE 1
Summary of Aerobic ΔSterne-1(pPA102)CR4 Fermentations
Final
Final Final Yield Doubling
Conc. Yield (mg Specific Time
Fermentation (μg PA83/ (mg PA83/g Growth T D
Conditions ml PA83) DCW) Rate (min)
Aerobic, Batch 51 235 8.10 0.0132 min −1 53
Aerobic, Batch 64 301 10.7 0.0136 min −1 51
Aerobic, Batch 45 225 7.40 0.0136 min −1 51
pH constant
Aerobic, 68 360 ND 0.0116 min −1 60
Fed-Batch
(non-
continuous)
DCW = dry cell weight ”
The final yields ranged from 235mg to 360 mg. This was based on using the actual fermentor at Ft. Detrick in growth runs of 5 days as indicated in detail in the Example 1 quote.
You can search at the above link.
“For each O.D.600 determination, two appropriate dilutions were made and results were considered acceptable only when both dilutions yielded a linear response. DCWs were determined starting with a 2 hr point by centrifuging 10 mls of fermentation liquor at 11,953×g for 10 min, resuspending the cell pellet in 10 mls of sterile PBS and pelleting the cells again under the same conditions. The cell pellet was resuspended in a minimal volume of PBS and transferred quantitatively to a preweighted Eppendorf centrifuge tube and centrifuged at 14,000 rpm for 5 min. Excess PBS was removed and the cell pellet was dried in a speed-vac for 72 hrs under vacuum and a medium heat setting. A final analysis of the dry weight versus O.D. 600nm revealed that the relationship between the two parameters was adequately fit with a linear function. ”
The speed vac appears to be have been used for a small sample. This appears to be on a mLs sample, ie 10 milli liters.
This appears to settle it. Ivins could not produce the anthrax at Ft. Detrick using even the fermentor and the speed-vac. It would take 5 days, and produce yields of under 360 mg. The Senate anthrax contained 871mg per letter at least.
The speed vac was used on a small sample of 10 milliliters. This is too small just as Ms. Ulrich indicated.
This patent was applied for in 2000. Ivins knew from this data that it would be impossible for him to produce the anthrax at his lab and convert it into high quality powder in the amounts in the Senate letters. The speed-vac could not process this volume. Ivins knew that. He is the principal person on the patent and is listed first out of alphabetical order. The patent also cites Ivins own papers.”
rossg–I have two comments regarding estimates of minimum amounts of time for drying samples:
(1) There is no basis to assume that the attack material was dried using a Speed-Vac.
The FBI files document the availability of the following much-higher-throughput drying equipment (BEI Section 4; PDF pp 8-10; http://foia.fbi.gov/foiaindex/amerithrax.htm):
LYOPHILIZER 3 shelf, Freeze Unitop. VIRTIS HL 600 value $ 8,076 put in service 9307 [Jul1993]
LYOPHILIZER Vacuum Condenser Trap Freeze Mobile VIRTIS 12XL value $ 8,076 put in service 9308 [Aug1993]
This equipment would enable processing of 6-12 L per 24-hour period.
(2) There is no basis to assume that preparation of the attack material was started only after 9/11/2001.
Either of the above points suffices to refute assertions that throughput and time constraints rule out the possibility that the attack material could have been prepared at USAMRIID. Taken together, the above points leave such assertions in shreds.
RHE
I don’t see shreds. DOJ itself tried to make a big deal of Ivins’ extra lab time immediately preceding the attacks. I still think that the huge number of shake flask or tiny fermenter runs would have generated attention to Ivins’ activities. Where are the reports of him hogging the fermenter or shaker space?
Be careful with those yield numbers. The yield cited in the table in the patent is for the protein they were harvesting to use as a vaccine. The strain of anthrax grown in the experiments described in the patents was non-sporulating, so although the patent establishes Ivins growing anthrax in a tiny fermenter, it doesn’t establish him producing anthrax spores in a fermenter.
Dr. Bruce Ivins had group therapy meetings scheduled on 9/17 and 10/8, the dates that the DOJ speculates, without any basis, that he was making powderized anthrax.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/aaa_therapy.jpg
Didn’t Dr. Bruce Ivins then attend his regular Red Cross meeting on 9/17, one of the days the FBI says he was mailing anthrax letters in Princeton?
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/917redcrossmeeting.jpg
The Bioport rabbit challenge was scheduled for 10/4/2001. Emails show his schedule in that regard for September 10-13, October 8-10.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/23_aaa_rabbit-bleed_draft.jpg
Shouldn’t the DOJ provide an unredacted copy of the lab notebook page with the handwritten note dated 10/3/2001, when DOJ speculates Ivins was preparing the powderized anthrax to mail?
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/ivins-blank-notebook.png
Here is an email dated October 5, 2001 describing results 3 days after challenge.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/aaa_302-interviews_revised_revised.jpg
Here is Dr. Ivins calendar for September and October 2001. Why hasn’t the DOJ produced the pages of handwritten lab notes that Dr. Ivins made on 5 nights that the DOJ speculates, without basis, Dr. Ivins was making powderized anthrax?
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/aaa_ivins-calendar1.jpg
The United States relied upon the fact that Dr. Ivins did not work lots of overtime in the B3 until after the country had been attacked and then did not work comparable hours in B3 until after the country had been attacked and then did not work comparable hours in 2002 onward — without disclosing that a “two-person rule” was implemented in 2002 that prohibited an individual working alone. Nor did the DOJ disclose that Ivins was asked by the government to work overtime in the Fall of 2001 for Operation Noble Eagle.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/twopersonrule.jpg
The case against Dr. Ivins from the August 2008 onward has been a compilation of false characterization of the documentary evidence. For example, the United States falsely alleged that the Federal Eagle Stamp was uniquely sold at Dr. Bruce Ivins’ Post Office and then that ran as an AP headline. In fact, the envelopes with the printing defects are known to have been sold throughout Maryland and Virginia post offices.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/postofficeissuegraphic.jpg
The same former Zawahiri associate who worked at Ft. Detrick with Bruce Ivins worked at Dugway.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/aaa_dugway.jpg
Bruce Ivins emails specifically noted his concern that samples were missing but he was told to shut up and that everything was under control.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/aaa_ivinsemails.jpg
The planned/threatened attack on the US was openly discussed dating to 1999.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/holybiowar.jpg
But the infiltration of US biodefense was suppressed because it was politically embarrassing to the Bush Administration.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/anthraxandalqaeda_discoveryhall.jpg
RHE, just as the DOJ knows that Ivins could not have used the fermenter, the DOJ knows that the xerox it alleges was available to him was used is EXCLUDED by the forensic report on the toner that they are withholding.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/copier.jpg
A laptop containing anthrax spray-drying documents was discovered at the home of Pakistan bacteriologist Abdul Qadoos Khan residence. The documents at the Qadoos home reveal that Al Qaeda had a feasible production plan for anthrax. Confronted with scanned handwritten notes on the computer, Mohammed reportedly began to talk about Al Qaeda’s anthrax production program. KSM says it was the computer of Mustafa Hawsawi, who was captured at the home the same day. In 2001, before departing for the UAE, Al-Hawsawi had worked in the Al Qaeda media center Al Sahab (Clouds) in Kandahar. Hawsawi worked as a financial manager for Bin Laden when he was in Sudan. He was associated with Egyptian Islamic Jihad shura leader Mahjoub, who was Bin Laden’s farm manager in Sudan. Mahjoub was the subject of the anthrax threat in January 2001 in Canada, upon announcement of his bail hearing. The day after Mahjoub’s bail was denied on October 5, 2001, the potent stuff was sent to US Senators Daschle and Leahy. Moussaoui unsuccessfully tried to call KSM and Hawsawi as witnessses. Microbiologist Ali Al-Timimi had spoken with Bin Laden’s sheik about helping with Moussaoui’s defense.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/aaa_laptop.jpg
In April 2007, lead AUSA Kenneth Kohl, of Blackwater fame, advised Dr. Ivins that he was not a target.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/aaa_ausa.jpg
The DOJ should disclose the 2004 article provided by Dr. Bruce Ivins to the FBI regarding silica and Bacillus spore suspensions.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/aaa_silicon-sig.jpg
Step out for the afternoon and the thread turns into The Mother of All Threads. This is going to take a while to read!
The FBI expert agrees that the DOJ’s code theory is specious.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/theory-of-the-code.jpg
Instead, this is the code used in the letters.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/aaa_code_rev_rev_rev.jpg
This document seized in Afghanistan has always pointed to infiltration of US biodefense.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/aaa_kuwaiti_revised_horiz.jpg
I first publicly identified the scientist from Pakistan based on Ayman Zawahiri’s correspondence with him. See Wash Po A1 “Suspect and Setback” story.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/aaa_raufahmad.jpg
And for years have tried to lay out Ayman’s recruiting network for his anthrax planning and the announcement of his plans in March 1999
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/anthraxandalqaeda_voc_31.jpg
To understand the big picture, it helps to know the know the history. The DOJ failed to disclose that Jdey was detained at the same time As Moussaoui, with biology textbooks, and then released.
After authorities found a letter signed by Yazid Sufaat purporting to authorize Zacarias Moussaoui as its marketing representative, authorities went looking for Sufaat, who was Al Qaeda’s lead anthrax lab technician in Afghanistan. The DOJ did not disclose that Abderraouf Jdey was detained at same time as Moussaoui. Moussaoui had cropdusting manuals. Jdey had biology textbooks. Jdey was released. Jdey was part of the “planes operation” and his martyrdom video was found in the home of Atef, to whom Ayman Zawahiri reported his anthrax planning. Jdey’s whereabouts have been unknown since the time of the anthrax mailings.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/aaa_jdey-released.jpg
The hijackers leg lesion attributed to anthrax (by the current Homeland security head) relates not directly to Amerithrax but to a parallel cell operation by Zawahiri — one based in Kandahar at the lab Sufaat set up in a hospital.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/leglesiongraphic.jpg
In the United States, Dr. Bruce Ivins hosted one Egyptian visitor in the B3 who was the lifelong friend of a former Egyptian Islamic Jihad member, a schoolmate, recruited by Ayman Zawahiri.
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The former Zawahiri recruit is an acquaintance of mine and tells me that his medical schoolmate, a childhood friend, who would visit from Khartoum as a child. He called him before 9/11 and he said it was all in the marketing. His decontamination agent was tested at the Capitol and hand cream reportedly pitched to postal workers. The University of Michigan scientist thanked Bruce Ivins for supplying virulent Ames, the Former Colleagues who accuse Ivins for providing technical assistance. He also thanked the scientist who served as the FBI’s genetics consultant in 2002 for providing B3 space at LSU. He was funded by DARPA. Three years from leaving the department with Ayman Zawahiri’s sister, Heba, he was put in charge of the DARPA project. Dr. Ivins did not know he was a US citizen, he tells the FBI, when he arrived at Ft. Detrick but email approval was obtained for access to the B3. His name was spelled wrong on the B3 log. The documents in the record relating to the visit were first obtained by the FBI in 2005!
The threat to use mailed anthrax was described to President Bush by the CIA in a PDB in early February 2001 that is still classified. See 911 Commission Report.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/aaa_pdb-bush-briefing-book.jpg
In January 2001, a bail hearing was announced for the Egyptian Islamic Jihad/Vanguards of Conquest #2. A threat to use anthrax was immediately sent to those responsible for the detention and threatened deportation to Cairo. Bail was denied on October 5 and then the mailer rushed to mail the good stuff.
It was particularly awkward because the Salafi-Jihadi who had infiltrated US biodefense had worked for and been commended by President Bush’s Chief of Staff (and then Al-Timimi was also referenced in the August 6, 2001 PDB about OBL’s plan to attack the US using planes). For all he has written about Dr. Alibek, George Smith today ignores the March 14, 2001 patent application using silica in the culture medium to concentrate anthrax. It was filed by the leading anthrax scientist in the world and the former deputy head of USAMRIID. See FoxNews report regarding what the FBI suspects. They came to be 15 feet away from the man working with the 911 imam and Bin Laden’s sheik. That Salafi-Jihadi (Dr. Al-Timimi) had a high security clearance while working at SRA for the Navy in 1999. The method was not public until long after 9/11. For George Smith as Dick Destiny to write so extensively about Alibek while not noting that Al-Timimi was in the same suite is a major failure in analysis. There are ongoing classified proceedings at which these allegations regarding anthrax are the subject of briefing.
It was embarrassing to the Bush Administration because not only were they given express warning, but it is the former assistant of then White House Chief of Staff who the FBI suspects of accessing the biochemistry information relating to the concentration of anthrax using silica. See filing of defendant’s defense counsel.
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Less-than-half-baked musing: an Egyptian connection. Public acknowledgement of this connection between the attack and one of the few remaining fairly friendly Middle Eastern nations could be felt by some, I suppose, to exact too high a price. Better, they might think, to stick with blaming the attack on a single disgruntled U.S. national than risk losing the goodwill of Americans towards Egypt and vice versa. (Plus who knows what other considerations might be in play there. Black sites. Rendition. Torture. You name it.)
In 2001, Ali Al-Timimi worked alongside researchers at the DARPA-funded Center for Biodefense who invented a process to concentrate using silica in the culture medium which then was removed from the surface of the spore by repeated centrifugation.
The famed MSNBC commentator and First Amendment scholar Jonathan Turley advised the federal court that the FBI considered his client an “anthrax weapons suspect.” Professor Turley wrote: “Al-Timimi is the spiritual adviser to many Muslims across the country. He has worked with the government, including White House chief of staff Andrew Card…”
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Attorney Turley says Anwar Aulaqi is central to the allegations against his client in the alleged sedition conspiracy. This weekend Aulaqi, who was coordinating with Al-Timimi, was the subject of headlines saying that jihad was as American as apple pie. Professor Turley says: “Anwar Al-Aulaqi goes directly to Dr. Al-Timimi’s state of mind and his role in the alleged conspiracy.”
Al-Timimi had briefly been the assistant to Andrew Card, White House Chief of Staff. The Bush Administration was in the awkward position of having it know that the “anthrax weapons suspect” shared a suite with researchers who co-invented a process involving silica in the culture medium. Card’s former assistant was a US citizen whose father worked as a lawyer at the small Iraqi embassy in Washington. Bush would never have won a second term, IMO, if it became known that Card’s former assistant, not Saddam, had access to the most diverse bacteriological repository in the world. The scientist who is currently the FBI’s lead scientist in Amerithrax was the collection scientist for the Bacteriology Division at the American Type Culture Collection, which co-sponsored Al-Timimi’s program.
Alleged illegal NSA wiretapping began of Ali Al-Timimi began on or about October 7, 2001. Only two people at the Department of Justice knew about it.
After an October 2001 bombing raid at a Qaeda camp in Darunta, Afghanistan US forces found 100+ printed, typed, handwritten pages of documents that shed light on Al Qaeda’s early anthrax planning. The Defense Intelligence Agency provided me the documents under the Freedom of Information Act. The documents confirmed that it was Zawahiri’s plan to use established specialists and the cover of universities and charities as cover for weaponizing anthrax. From early on, the evidence suggested that charity is as charity does. 90 of the 100 pages are the photocopies of journal articles and the disease handbook excerpts. It was not clear whether they had yet acquired virulent anthrax or weaponized it, but it was clear that the planning was well along.
Al-Timimi was a computational biologist who came to have an office 15 feet from the leading anthrax scientist and the former deputy commander of USAMRIID. A motion filed in early August 2008 seeking to unseal additional information in federal district court was denied. The ongoing proceedings are highly classified.
Dr. Al-Timimi’s counsel summarizes:
“we know Dr. Al-Timimi:
* was interviewed in 1994 by the FBI and Secret Service regarding his ties to the perpetrators of the first World Trade Center bombing;
* was referenced in the August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Briefing (“Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US”) as one of seventy individuals regarding whom the FBI is conducting full field investigations on a national basis;
* was described to his brother by the FBI within days of the 9-11 attacks as an immediate suspect in the Al Qaeda conspiracy;
* was contacted by the FBI only nine days after 9-11 and asked about the attacks and its perpetrators;
*was considered an anthrax weapons suspect;
[redacted]
* was described during his trial by FBI agent John Wyman as having “extensive ties” with the “broader al-Qaeda network”;
* was described in the indictment and superseding indictment as being associated with terrorists seeking harm to the United States;
* was a participant in dozens of international overseas calls to individuals known to have been under suspicion of Al-Qaeda ties like Al-Hawali; and
* was associated with the long investigation of the Virginia Jihad Group.
***
The conversation with [Bin Laden's sheik] Al-Hawali on September 19, 2001 was central to the indictment and raised at trial. ***
[911 imam] Anwar Al-Aulaqi goes directly to Dr. Al-Timimi’s state of mind and his role in the alleged conspiracy. The 9-11 Report indicates that Special Agent Ammerman interviewed Al-Aulaqi just before or shortly after his October 2002 visit to Dr. Al-Timimi’s home to discuss the attacks and his efforts to reach out to the U.S. government.
[IANA head] Bassem Khafagi was questioned about Dr. Al-Timimi before 9-11 in Jordan, purportedly at the behest of American intelligence. [redacted ] He was specifically asked about Dr. Al-Timimi’s connection to Bin Laden prior to Dr. Al-Timimi’s arrest. He was later interviewed by the FBI about Dr. Al-Timimi. Clearly, such early investigations go directly to the allegations of Dr. Al-Timimi’s connections to terrorists and Bin Laden [redacted]”
The letter attached as an exhibit notes that in March 2002 Al-Timimi spoke with Al-Hawali about assisting Moussaoui in his defense. Al-Hawali was Bin Laden’s sheik who was the subject of OBL’s “Declaration of War.” Moussaoui was the operative sent by Bin Laden to be part of a “second wave” who had been inquiring about crop dusters. The filing and the letter exhibit each copy defense co-counsel, the daughter of the lead prosecutor in Amerithrax. That prosecutor pled the Fifth Amendment concerning all the leaks hyping a “POI” of the other Amerithrax squad, Dr. Steve Hatfill. His daughter withdrew as Al-Timimi’s pro bono counsel on February 27, 2009.
Ayman’s anthrax planning is established by the documentary and does not involve wild speculation unsupported by even a shred of evidence.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/aaa_planning.jpg
Ayman Zawahiri’s use of “school” as code for the sender is established by the documentary evidence — and not wild speculation unsupported by even a shred of evidence.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/aaa_school.jpg
RHE is the science prodigy written up in September 1982 BOYS LIFE that ended with “Start with a first-rate mind, add curiosity, and mix in the will to win for the right reasons. RHE has all these qualities.”
So while I still have to provide the record statements I promised from the 2700 page record about the fermenter, let me quote RHE in MIT Technology Review in March/April 2006:
“’There are now more than 300 U.S. institutions with access to live bioweapons agents and 16,500 individuals approved to handle them,” Ebright told me. While all of those people have undergone some form of background check — to verify, for instance, that they aren’t named on a terrorist watch list and aren’t illegal aliens — it’s also true, Ebright noted, that ‘Mohammed Atta would have passed those tests without difficulty.’ “
***
‘That’s the most significant concern,’ Ebright agreed. ‘If al-Qaeda wished to carry out a bioweapons attack in the U.S., their simplest means of acquiring access to the materials and the knowledge would be to send individuals to train within programs involved in biodefense research.’ Ebright paused. ‘And today, every university and corporate press office is trumpeting its success in securing research funding as part of this biodefense expansion, describing exactly what’s available and where.’”
Jim,
Thanks for the insights on the poster’s recent discussion of the patent. (I did not mean to adopt the post but to pass it on).
I consult with RHE and Watchmaker (and now you) on the science. But I do aim to show you folks– by rereading the record and pulling the quotes — that the DOJ is not suggesting that Ivins used a fermenter.
When people say that 350 had access, that is just at Ft. Detrick — and does not take into account access to the genetically identical isolates downstream.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/aaa_rmr_corrected.jpg
But as to Ft. Detrick, why is there a 100 ml discrepancy in Dr. Ivins’ records?
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A quote from Ivins’ USAMRIID supervisor in an Op-Ed in the Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2010:
Quotes such as this are what led me to the blanket statement Ivins didn’t have access to a fermenter. I would presume that the fermenters cited in the patent work were restricted to use for the non-sporulating strain. Use for sporulating forms of anthrax would have triggered lots of additional safety precautions that would have gotten lots of attention.
Could the electro-static treatment account for the Sn?
“Were the Anthrax Attacks on Congress the act of the U.S. Government?”
http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_f__vyan__070706_were_the_anthrax_att.htm
As some background on the compartmentalization of the cells that Ayman Zawahiri was running, the Sufaat cell reporting to Ayman Zawahiri did not know he was also running the Rauf Ahmad cell.
Suspect and A Setback In Al-Qaeda Anthrax Case
Scientist With Ties To Group Goes Free
By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, October 31, 2006
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/30/AR2006103001250.html
For a 2010 Harvard report by the CIA WMD lead analyst under the Bush Administration up until 2005, see
Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?
A Timeline of Terrorists’ Efforts to Acquire WMD
Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
January 2010
Author: Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19852/al_qaeda_weapons_of_mass_destruction_threat.html
Question: what was the “encapsulation study” that Ivins did on 3/17/1998? All I know about it is that it involved Flask 1029 virulent Ames and microscopic examination. The FBI’s summary of the use of flask 1029 further states “See pages 73-78 of Lab Notebook 4010.”
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“The silicon is probably the most important scientific evidence that would lead anybody to question whether Bruce was capable of making these spores,” says Gerald P. Andrews, Bruce Ivins’ former boss. Andrews and George Mason University professor and former Soviet bioweapons researcher Sergei Popov believe — whatever its function or purpose — the silicon was intentionally added, due to unnaturally high levels of the mineral in the spores.
Kathryn Crockett, Ken Alibek’s assistant — just a couple doors down from Ali Al-Timimi — addressed these issues in her 2006 thesis, “A historical analysis of Bacillus anthracis as a biological weapon and its application to the development of nonproliferation and defense strategies.” She expressed her special thanks to bioweaponeering experts Dr. Ken Alibek and Dr. Bill Patrick. Dr. Patrick consulted with the FBI. Dr. Crockett successfully defended the thesis before a panel that included USAMRIID head and Ames strain researcher Charles Bailey, Ali Al-Timimi’s other Department colleague. In 2001 he said he did not want to discuss silica because he did not want to give terrorists any ideas. Oops! Too late. The scientist coordinating with the 911 imam and Bin Laden’s Sheik was 15 feet away.
Dr. Crockett in her PhD thesis says that scientists who analyzed the powder through viewing micrographs or actual contact are divided over the quality of the powder. (Ivins gave Leahy an “A”, Daschle a “B” and New York Post a “C”). Dr. Crockett cites Gary Matsumoto’s “Science” article in summarizing the debate. She says the FBI has vacillated on silica. The AFIP data, if released, would point to the high level of silica in the first batch of letters.
On the issue of encapsulation, Crockett reports that “many experts who examined the powder stated the spores were encapsulated. Encapsulation involves coating bacteria with a polymer which is usually done to protect fragile bacteria from harsh conditions such as extreme heat and pressure that occurs at the time of detonation (if in a bomb), as well as from moisture and ultraviolet light. The process was not originally developed for biological weapons purposes but rather to improve the delivery of various drugs to target organs or systems before they were destroyed by enzymes in the circulatory system” (citing Alibek and Crockett, 2005). “The US and Soviet Union, however, ” she explains, “used this technique in their biological weapons programs for pathogens that were not stable in aerosol form… Since spores have hardy shells that provide the same protection as encapsulation would, there is no need to cover them with a polymer.“ She explains that one “possible explanation is that the spore was in fact encapsulated but not for protective purpose. Encapsulation also reduces the need for milling when producing a dry formulation.” She wrote: “If the perpetrator was knowledgeable of the use of encapsulation for this purpose, then he or she may have employed it because sophisticated equipment was not at his disposal.”
Or as Dr. Michael told National Geographic (using the word “weaponized” to narrowly refer to aiding dispersability) he does not think the silica was used for that purpose of “weaponization”, whether under the historical Dugway method from the 1990s or otherwise. Michael told FOX News, “I don’t think this exonerates (Ivins) at all.” He added, “I don’t think it’s not enough to say that he did it, as well.”
One military scientist who has made anthrax simulants described the GMU patents to me as relating to a silicon encapsulation technique which serves to increase the viability of a wide range of pathogens. More broadly, a DIA analyst once commented to me that the internal debate seemed relatively inconsequential given the circumstantial evidence — overlooked by so many people — that US-based supporters of Al Qaeda are responsible for the mailings. (Most of Dr. Ivins’ colleagues have thought Al Qaeda was responsible.)
“Anonymous Scientist” comments:
“The REAL reason that the NYP analysis is not being provided is because it is massive. The % of silicon is more than 10% – in fact it’s above to 50%. The NYP sample is actually MOSTLY silicon”
The leaked AFIP lab results seem to demonstrate that the silica was massive. Once officially released, it can then be meaningfully addressed by the Sandia scientists. In the past, Sandia was making inferences and conclusions about whether the silica would be useful in making mailed anthrax — and whether it would be highly probative — that go far beyond both their field of expertise and the data apparently available to them. I find Peter Setlow’s commentary on the recent Japanese article about silicon encapsulation to be thoughtful and would have preferred that he address the issue before the NAS. I appreciate that Sandia’s powerpoint and presentation was sound given that it was limited to the narrow issue of the location of the silicon.
I respect the government view, if it is the government’s view, that these are not issues that should be discussed public necessarily. Outsiders, in my opinion, need only enough information to know whether “they got the right guy.” Presently, most people think the FBI did not — and the FBI’s interference with USAMRIID’s FOIA production has only served as Exhibit A in that argument.
From where I sit, for all I know, it is the FBI’s Dr. Bannan, formerly the collections scientist at the American Type Culture Collection (“ATCC”) at GMU which sponsored Al-Timimi’s program, who is supporting the decision to withhold the AFIP data. Given the government assures us that it does not relate to “weaponization,” then it would seem that there is no reason not to release it.
Once it is released, experts like Peter Setlow can consider the source of the reason for the silica such as whether it was putting virulent Ames soil (silica) suspension such as the FBI scientist John Ezzell did in 1996 for DARPA or whether he relates to when (he confirms to me in a telephone conversation) he made dry powdered anthrax at Ft. Detrick. Or we can turn to the “Microdroplet Cell Culture” patent filed by Ali Al-Timimi’s Discovery Hall colleagues at the DARPA-funded Center for Biodefense and see if there is a connection. The silica would be in the culture medium used to concentrate the anthrax and then would be removed by repeated centrifugation.
Or we can explore the other hypotheses relating to the reason for the Silicon Signature.
I’m not a scientist which is why it seems that the data and pictures need to be released so that we can have experts like RHE, the Center for Biodefense’s Sergeui Popov, and the government’s John Kiel review it. If we learned anything from 9/11, it is that there are times that information needs to be shared so that people can connect the dots. This is such a time. Any one with a conflict of interest should recuse himself from the particular aspect of Amerithrax.
As for the defenders of Dr. Ivins, I have to focus their attention again on the record of flask 1029. Who altered the record? If he did, wouldn’t he be indictable as an accessory after the fact and for obstruction of justice? And might alteration be motivated simply by a failure to keep proper records, or record a transfer as required by mid-1997 regulations? He specifically emailed his superior and said that he was concerned that his records would not square up with the inventory. He was told to shut up, not to repeat what he had heard at a party about the FBI’s line of inquiry — that everything was under control. Well, we’re not interested in whether someone with something to hide had everything under control. It certainly proved not to be under control for Dr. Ivins.
So whodunnit? Let’s start with an easy question. Who told Dr. Ivins to shut up about it — that everything was under control? And why was Dr. Ivins concerned that there would be material missing from his inventory — to which his superior advised there would then be reason or justification for the missing Ames.
The Air Force lab head did controlled experiments done in April 2007 using a silanizing solution in the slurry before drying. The same spike — the head of the lab advised me at the time — results as observed with the Leahy/Daschle product. We were noodling on the reason for the Silicon Signature and so the lab, expert at making anthrax aerosol simulants, set about doing controlled experiments.
As for whether Dr. Ivins could have made dry powdered anthrax at Ft. Detrick, the best guide would be to ask the scientist who made dry powdered anthrax at Ft. Detrick — the FBI’s expert — and ask him what equipment he used. Then we can consider whether Dr. Ivins had access to the same equipment. Or more simply, we can just ask that expert. The expert, Dr. Ezzell, now reports secondhand — as to the Leahy and Daschle product
– that Dr. Ivins did NOT … in contrast to a NYT quote. (see Dr. Meryl Nass’ important blog)
I interviewed that USAMRIID scientist serving as the FBI’s key anthrax expert, Dr. Ezzell, on the subject in July 2009. Dr. Ezzell was the FBI’s anthrax specialist who first examined the finely powderized anthrax sent to the United Senators Leahy and Daschle. He explained that he was under a gag order and that the FBI likely was wiretapping his telephone. He had returned my call from moments earlier. When he called, I was on the other line continuing a message on his answering machine. I was saying I knew he was innocent and that the aerosolized Ames he had supplied had been tested to be inactive.
He confirmed that he made dry powdered anthrax at USAMRIID’s Ft. Detrick for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”). Beginning in 1996, he also worked for the FBI’s Hazardous Materials Response Unit. After coming under suspicion, Dr. Bruce Ivins wrote an email to his colleague and friend Patricia Fellows saying that he had heard that the aerosolized anthrax made by Dr. Ezzell for DARPA was the closest match to the anthrax mailed in Fall 2001 that Dr. Ezzell had examined. (Scientists leading the Amerithrax investigation were also in the unit and so they understandably may have taken offense to what they perceived as Dr. Ivins’ casting of blame). Sorry folks, but Ayman Zawahiri is the adversary everyone is going to have to get over their hurt feelings and tend to business.
Dr. Ivins emailed a superior on December 18, 2006 about what he heard about the FBI at a party. Ivins expressed concern that something might have been taken or altered from his B3 stocks. Ivins was told by email from the superior to not talk about it — that the FBI situation was under control.
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But it turned out not to be under control. Dr. Ivins’ colleagues were ordered not to talk to him beginning November 2007. He was removed from the base by armed escort in late July. Bruce Ivins took his life on July 29, 2008. It has now been over 20 months since the FBI said that the crazy, dead guy was the sole suspect in the anthrax mailings. The trail of evidence that should have led Amerithrax investigators to the infiltration of DARPA and US biodefense and withdrawal from Dr. Ivins’ stock dated back to the time of the mailings and was discernable from “open source” intelligence.
To understand the speciousness of the DOJ’s case on weaponization and alibi all you have to do is to obtain a copy of the forensic report on the photocopy toner. The DOJ relies on Dr. Ivins photocopying the anthrax letters on the specified dates even though its forensic report excludes that machine based on the examination of the toner.
Now the former Zawahiri associate working with Bruce Ivins using virulent Ames — we have a common friend who was recruited by Ayman Zawahiri — also thanked various DARPA personnel and the FBI’s genetics consultant (from 2002).
A reporter should put down the stained panties long enough to conduct relevant interviews.
Much significance has been attached to the finding that the attack material was determined to have 1.5% silicon and that this could only be a product of post-harvest treatment of the spores, rather than silicon being incorporated through the culture process. I just went back to the paper from the Japanese researchers and found this, regarding the B. cereus strain they worked with:
While this is not the strain of anthrax used in the attacks, I find it significant that this paper demonstrates that a very high percentage of silicon in spores can be achieved through supplying silicon in a bio-available form in the culture medium.
Jim,
Any suggestion “that this could only be a product of post-harvest treatment of the spores” has long since been disproved.
By way of background, the relevant authorities include Murrell’s Chapter 7 of the Bacterial Composition of the Spore. The highest level (I don’t have it handy) was comparable. 1.4? 1.6? 1.2. I’ve misplaced my copy. Now my good friend Watchmaker would point to Murrell’s article a few years earlier and point out he used anti-foam. The point is that there is a natural tendency of the spore coat to avoid the silicon. Iron in the culture medium increases the uptake.
Now another authority would be the 1980 or so Soimlyo paper. There he speculated that the silicon in the spore coat was either due to silanized glass or perhaps silicon mineral vacuum oil used to keep equipment functioning well.
But here are the take-home points: USAMRIID and the DOJ/FBI need to comply with FOIA and produce the report by the Armed Force Institute of Pathology (AFIP), subject to applicable redactions/exemptions. Then experts can consider the reason for the silicon in the spore coat. There should be no reason to hear more from Dr. Michael of Sandia who is not a microbiologist, who has never made an anthrax aerosol simulant, who not done any controlled studies, and is not qualified to address the function it may serve in an anthrax aerosol. He should have identified the location of the silicon and sat down.
Errata –
Murrell, W. G., Chemical Composition of Spores and Spore Structures Chapter 7, 1969.
Errata –
The point is that there is a natural tendency of the spore coat to incorporate the silicon.
Bear with me. I’m not nearly as lucid as you and unlike RHE, I flunked my astronomy merit badge.
Wouldn’t you be depressed if your friends were ordered not to talk to you?
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/no-contact-with-bruce.jpg
And your two closest friends — the ones thanked by the former Zawahiri associate for providing technical assistance — were coming up with fanciful theories based on contrived codes etc. as to why you were guilty?
Where are the missing investigative documents from 2001-2002? Specifically, what is the DOJ’s justification for failing to provide Dr. Ivins’ responses to the questions asked him in his polygraph examinations? It’s voodoo — I’m not suggesting we be given his physiological reactions as to these polygraphs he passed. I’m saying don’t ask a guy how he spent particular days a half decade after the fact. Give us his answers from late 2001.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/aaa_missing-docs.jpg
rossg, I’ve gone to look at some of your material, and I see lots of graphics, but graphics kind of fog my brain. Do you have your whole case laid out in more or less straightforward text somewhere?
The graphics are gathered at one place at this URL:
http://docs.google.com/present/view?id=df7mn8s4_0ffkjfwhn&interval=5&autoStart=true
440 pages is gathered here at $14.95 free shipping.
http://www.blurb.com/books/1204466
But here’s the movie version.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iSX7LaFtwIU
Thanks.
My opinion of this at the moment is that there have been far too many people playing around with anthrax spores for no reason other than to try to hurt other people. If this is how you are spending your life, just put down your tools and notes and walk away.
As explained by author Peter Lance in Triple Cross, after the 1998 embassy bombings, a ten-member federal team secretly entered the California residence of Ali Mohamed, Zawahiri’s former head of intelligence. They copied Mohamed’s hard drives and removed a series of CD-ROM and floppy disks. A memo titled “Cocktail” appeared to be a draft manual on sleeper cell structure.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/aaa_cocktail_rev.jpg
Anwar Aulaqi, who was coordinating with Ali Al-Timimi, was interviewed on 9/15/2001 by the FBI
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/aaa_aulaqi-interview_rev.jpg
Ah, yes, the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (“AFIP”):
See also:
And:
Too bad, isn’t it, that there isn’t something like an “Armed Services Committee” in the House or Senate charged with oversight of Executive Branch institutions like the “Armed Forces Institute of Pathology”…
Great job making the connections between two separate cover-ups by the same “Institute”. Thanks!
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology is not in involved in any cover-up in connection with Amerithrax. They issued a newsletter on their finding. You don’t get much more transparent than that.
As for the other matter, if someone thinks a (b)(6) or (b)(7) exemption is not warranted under the precedented, there is an appeal process for that. The same person, jpp at USAMEDD oversees both requests. (I expect that under FOIA, the exemption under the circumstances would be affirmed and upheld).
In Amerithrax jpp has had to submit all FOIA productions to review by the DOJ and FBI and he and the FOIA officer have pointed to numerous people adding their two cents. I personally find the slow processing highly objectionable and an indication that the government cannot share or process information efficiently. But FOIA permits suits to be brought for enforcement if the statute is violated.
Here are the resources for the US Army Medical Department FOIA webpage.
FOIA is a wonderful statute and I recommend it to anyone who wants to promote Sunshine in the Government.
https://mrmc-www.army.mil/index.cfm?pageid=foia
There are extensive documents at the “Reading Room” relating to Dr. Ivins. The 7 years of additional emails are being produced at a snail’s pace.
There are lots of bloggers which could turn around the entire stack and put it online overnight. (And that was done by Cryptome with the first batch they provided).
But USAMRIID should have at least put the entire stack in a room and let someone come in for inspection and copying as the law contemplates — without the many months of needless delay. Taking a magic marker to the proper names is easy to do.
Due to the delay, USAMEDD withheld emails mischaracterized in the Amerithrax Investigative Summary (e.g., October 4, October 5, October 8, 2001 emails) until after the initial press on the report.
On the (b)(6) and (b)(7) exemptions, you can see that such redactions have been made for every individual in all of the emails (with the exception of Dr. Ivins himself). As for the FBI’s production, the names of all agents and AUSAs throughout the 2700 pages has been redacted. It might be nice to know that the Special Agent only had been on the job for 18 months or 3 years. But FOIA permits the redaction.