
FBI photos of the material in the letter sent to Senator Pat Leahy (left) and to the New York Post (right), from the report.
It seems very likely to me that had Bruce Ivins not died, the analysis carried out by a panel from the National Academy of Sciences in assessing the scientific evidence tying Ivins to the 2001 anthrax attacks would have led to reasonable doubt on whether Ivins carried out the attacks. For this post, let us concentrate only on the NAS response to FBI claims on the spores used in the attack, especially with regard to how the spores were prepared.
What we do know from the report is that the spores used in the attacks did not come directly from Bruce Ivins’ RMR-1029 flask, but had to undergo a culturing step if RMR-1029 was even the source. Also, the spore material in different individual mailings differed in purity and particle size. Silicon was present in the spores, but was not added as a step to “weaponize” the spores. Instead, the silicon was incorporated into the coating of the spores themselves. Finally, the NAS panel did not feel there was sufficient evidence to support the FBI claim that a highly skilled person had prepared the material.
Overall, the importance of the primary conclusion of the NAS report cannot be overstated (p. 4 of the report as marked, all references will use internal page numbers, not pdf numbers from my pre-publication copy):
It is not possible to reach a definitive conclusion about the origins of the B. anthracis in the mailings based on the available scientific evidence alone.
A good defense attorney probably would need no more than that conclusion to establish reasonable doubt in a trial. But the details on how the panel reached that conclusion are important.
In this post, I discussed whether Ivins could have produced all of the material used in the attacks with the equipment he had available and without drawing attention to himself. That post opened with a discussion of how many spores were known to have been present in the attacks. I looked at what was in the FBI’s report, filled in some gaps with my experience in microbiology and came to the conclusion that somewhere between four and seventy liters of liquid culture could have produced the attack material. The NAS report comes to a similar conclusion on page 62:
Thus, cultivation in the range of 2.8 to 53 liters of liquid medium would have been required to produce the spores required for the letters (see Table 4.2).
Interestingly, the panel also calculated that it would have required between 463 and 1250 agar plates if the attack material had been produced on solid medium. It seems highly unlikely Ivins could have cultured this many extra Petri dishes without someone in the lab taking note and reporting it to the FBI once the investigation began.
The photo above shows how dramatically different the highly purified material in the letter sent to Senator Patrick Leahy’s office was when compared to the material mailed to the New York Post.
There had been much speculation early on in the press that the material sent to Senator Leahy’s office had been “weaponized” by the addition of materials including silicates to make tiny particles remain suspended in the air so that they could be inhaled. The report documents that although silicon is found in the spores used in the attacks, the silicon is localized in the spore coats. This point is driven home very clearly in this photo, where the silicon can be seen “lighting up” within the outer lining of the spores:
Many experiments were carried out in an attempt to match the silicon content, the particle size distribution and the degree to which the final material would remain suspended in air. I will rely here on the entire summary the panel provided on the issue of silicon in the spores (page 71):
The substantial effort devoted to the characterization of silicon in Bacillus spore coats resulted in new fundamental insight into microbial processes and the development of new or enhanced analytical measurement technology. (Table 4.4 presents a summary of the analytical results.) Elemental analysis of the letter samples showed that 1) the silicon content was high, 2) most of the silicon was incorporated in the spore coat, 3) the majority of spores in the samples contained silicon in the coat, and 4) no silicon was detected in the form of a dispersant in the exosporium.
The bulk silicon content in the Leahy letter could be completely explained by the amount of silicon incorporated in the spores during growth. (Not enough material was available to make this comparison for the Daschle letter.) In contrast, the New York Post letter had significant bulk silicon content, far exceeding that contained in the spores.
No studies have considered the effect of the chemical form of silicon (e.g., silicate impurity versus polydimethylsiloxane antifoam agent) on uptake. The inability of laboratory experiments to reproduce the silicon characteristics of the letter samples is not surprising given the complexity of the uptake mechanism.
A few spores analyzed from RMR-1030 contained silicon in the coat, but none of the spores analyzed from RMR-1029 contained silicon in the coat. Therefore, the letter samples could not have been taken directly from the flasks—a separate growth preparation would have been required.
The material in the Daschle and Leahy letters was reported to have “a high level of purity” and to have electrostatic properties that caused it to disperse readily upon opening of the letters. These properties should be regarded as qualitative observations since they were not based on quantitative physical measurements. The committee received testimony (Martin, 2010) stating that some Dugway preparations, particularly those utilizing lyophilization but no dispersant, gave products with similar appearance and electrostatic dispersibility as the letter samples, suggesting that these properties were not necessarily connected to an intentional effort to increase dispersibility through addition of a dispersant. Exogenous silicon and bentonite, which enhance the dispersibility of spore preparations, were not found in the Leahy and Daschle letters.
Note that this analysis provides the strongest evidence to date that the spores used in the attacks did not come directly from the RMR-1029 flask, because the spores in the flask do not have the silicon content as those in the attack material. Note also that growth in the presence of polydimethylsiloxane-containing antifoam agents is seen as one route that needs to be investigated for how silicon can be incorporated at elevated concentration in the spores, just as I suggested in this post.
It is also worth noting that highly purified spores produced at Dugway did have the aerosolizing quality of the attack material. No additional treatments besides purification were needed for these spores to disperse in air, so I suspect that is one of the primary reasons that the NAS panel could not support the FBI claim that someone with a very high level of expertise must have prepared the material used in the attacks.



29 Comments

Another example proving “All governments lie”.
(1) My comments in the previous thread were based on reviewing the summary material as I didn’t have time to read the entire report. I didn’t see a reference to the Dugway lab in the Summary. Did you?
(2) The NAS concluded that “It was not possible to identify the location where the spores were prepared. (Finding 4.5)” This leads me to suspect that they didn’t consider the possibility that the spores in the letters were manufactured at Dugway. For example, if they had considered that possibility, they might have said that they couldn’t exclude it.
(3) This makes me wonder if the FBI declined to inform the NAS about the Dugway lab.
(4) They did, however, inform them about a lab outside the country. For example, the NAS Report said, “At the end of this study, the committee was provided limited information for the first time about the analysis of environmental samples for B anthracis Ames from an undisclosed overseas site at which a terrorist group’s anthrax program was allegedly located. This site was investigated by the FBI and other federal partners as part of the anthrax letter investigation. The investigation indicates that there was inconsistent evidence of Ames strain DNA in some of the samples, but no culturable B anthracis. The committee believes that the complete set of data and conclusions concerning these samples, including all relevant classified documents, deserves a more thorough scientific review.”
(5) Why did the FBI wait until the end of the study to mention this lab outside the country “at which a terrorist group’s anthrax program was allegedly located?” That seems awfully late in the game to be coming up with a lab that would have been high on the list of possible sources to check out early in the investigation. Makes me wonder if the FBI was steering the NAS committee away from looking at Dugway, assuming the FBI never mentioned the Dugway possibility.
(6) Assuming for the sake of argument that the FBI never mentioned the Dugway possibility to the committee, why would it have done that unless it knew something and for some as yet unknown reason was covering it up?
What do you think, Jim?
I should add that I have a very low opinion of the FBI Crime Lab based on cases that I’ve handled and know about, including Supervisory Special Agent Frederic Whitehurst’s shocking whistleblowing disclosures about improper practices and procedures in the crime lab.
In your opinion, how skilled did the people producing the attack material need to be? I.e. what is the fundamental size of the suspect pool?
“Interestingly, the panel also calculated that it would have required between 463 and 1250 agar plates if the attack material had been produced on solid medium. It seems highly unlikely Ivins could have cultured this many extra Petri dishes without someone in the lab taking note and reporting it to the FBI once the investigation began.”
Didn’t Ivins have an oven or a microwave at home?
An oven is not an incubator — you need better control over conditions and for a longer period. Also, it would have required more equipment in order to prevent the anthrax from spreading and either killing him or leaving traceable evidence.
It’s possible to turn an oven into an incubator, of course — I have an oven at home that I kitted out with a PID controller for electronics work, and the same technique could be used to create an incubator. It did, however, leave a trail of evidence, not the least of which is the non-trivial modifications I made to the oven in order to splice in the controller.
I just don’t believe any of it. Just look at who received the letters…and when..it was obvious, to me, and to some others, that the attacks were designed to target, threaten, kill or injure people who may have been opposed to the “GWOT” and all that came along with it. Some guy in a lab? Come on.
And of course the timing of that was to get passage of the PATRIOT Act.
And in other news, guess what is being voted on tonight in the Senate? Yup, a PATRIOT Act extension:
http://news.firedoglake.com/2011/02/15/patriot-act-extension-whittled-down-to-three-months-senate-to-vote-tonight/
That’s exactly correct.
A common petri dish is 4 inches in diameter. 460 to 1250 of these would be a little bit obvious.
The anthrax has to be prepared in a clean box, the kind seen with the rubber gloves affixed to the glass, otherwise the probability of inhaling some is about 100%.
What they are describing is an anthrax production line. That’s 460 to 1,250 successful cultures. I suspect that an anthrax production line or agar plates has only some percentage of success, in the 60-80% range.
There also is the question of clean up. Those agar plates or petri dishes were cleaned up and disposed of somewhere.
..and it passed, of course…
It was a joke.
I worked in cytogenetic research briefly. We grew white blood cells in tissue culture. And while that was in a test tube, not an agar dish, I know what the latter are.
The question in my mind is what is actually required to produce the attack material, and whether an unknown group outside of a government agency could have performed the work without attracting investigative attention.
I doubt that that quality of product could be produced outside a weapons lab.
Having a private production line is like having a successful Intel Processor making plant in your garage.
The capital investment is too high, compared with the 911 terrorist budget ran to flying lessons, airline tickets, and box cutters.
If there was such a production line, where are the subsequent attacks.
Occam’s razor applies.
What are the specific elements of the attack material and/or require equipment that would put it out of the reach of independent actors? Glove boxes, bioreactors, incubators, petri dishes, driers, and incinerators are reasonably easy to come by through devout attention to surplus auctions.
I don’t think that the lack of subsequent attacks necessarily excludes independent actors. Perhaps their operation is extremely slow, and the attack material was the result of many years of work. Perhaps they were disrupted by outside events without being detected — for instance, a key person was jailed for another crime or they lost their source for a key material and have been unable to replace it. Perhaps they decided that the ROI of that particular attack method was too low and they abandoned it.
I am not saying it was private actors; I’m just not convinced that the preponderance of the evidence excludes them. I’m open being convinced.
I want to know who – at Ft. Detrick – told ABC news that the anthrax has signs that it was from Saddam.
Of course, if ABC news were journalists instead of jackasses, they might want to know also.
Having worked in law enforcement for 20+ years, my opinion of the FBI was and is low. So far their anthrax investigation’s main achievement is the destruction of Steven Hatfill’s career and Mr. Ivin’s life and career.
This whole episode has the same stink as the investigation into JFK’s assassination.
None other than the infamous Judy Miller had an article addressing your question. It was published exactly one week prior to 9/11: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/04/world/next-to-old-rec-hall-a-germ-making-plant.html?scp=2&sq=Judith+Miller&st=nyt
It showed that they could put together a perfectly believable, essentially undetectable bioweapons lab for about $1 million then. My gut feel is that someone with this kind of budget and about five years of everyday laboratory experience including both work with pathogens and with spore-forming bacteria could pull this off.
Of course, the defense departments spooks already had this facility up and running at exactly the time the attack material was produced, so this is where Occam’s razor becomes coated in tinfoil…
The reports about Ivins’ himself and the strange ways that he was behaving scared the crap out of me. They let a borderline insane person play with mankind killing germs? The little creeps that do this research don’t give a damn about plain common sense and they play with germs that can wipe out mankind with apparently no supervision or restrictions.
There should have been a total sacking of the entire group that knew or supervised Ivins. They should have been terminated with a letter of reference stating clearly that these people are never to be employed in any capacity with any government, college, university or any of the Merchants of Death that receive government funds.
The guy was crackers and everyone just ignores it. If Ivins wasn’t dangerous, no one is.
Yes, this forensic investigation should be the centerpiece in the FBI Crime Lab’s Hall of Shame.
According the NAS Report,
“The committee finds no scientific basis on which to accurately estimate the amount of time or the specific skill set needed to prepare the spore material contained in the letters. The time might vary from as little as 2-3 days to as much as several months. Given uncertainty about the methods for preparation of the spore material, the committee could reach no specific conclusions regarding the skill set of the perpetrator. (Finding 4.1)”
The Dugway lab is located within the Dugway Proving Ground, 85 miles southwest of Salt Lake City. It’s a secure biological warfare facility located in the middle of a desert in an isolated area ringed by mountains.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dugway_Proving_Ground
Fort Detrick is a 1200-acre Army base housing a complex of biological laboratories, and communication facilities.
http://ludb.clui.org/ex/i/MD3144/
If the anthrax spore material in the letters was manufactured at the Dugway facility, the laboratory records should indicate who accessed the lab during the relevant time period. I’m just guessing here, but I’ll bet Dr. Ivins is not on that list, since he worked on the other side of the country at Fort Detrick in Frederick, MD.
No one without proper credentials would be admitted to Dugway and they would have to sign in and sign out.
Jim has previously mentioned that Dugway has a fermenter but Fort Detrick does not. A fermenter likely was used to produce the spore material mailed in the letters.
So it cost the DoD $1 million to build it… which means it would probably cost someone concerned about cost $100k-$200k, perhaps less. That’s a relatively small investment, and lab techs have not been too hard for terrorist groups to come by. The extensive scare-mongering about biological and chemical weapons has certainly attracted the notice of terror groups.
However, terrorist attacks with biological and chemical weapons have generally been expensive failures, in terms of the amount of death and terror caused per dollar expended. Aum Shinrikyo, arguably the most technically adept terrorist group in history, couldn’t kill much more than a dozen people with their Sarin attack, and the Tokyo subway was back to normal in a week. Explosives are cheaper, easier to get, and far more effective.
Jim,
The lab you mention above in your comment @ 4:47 am (Judy Miller’s NYT article to which you linked) is in Nevada. Therefore, it’s not the Dugway lab, right?
Suddenly, Scooter Libby’s comment to her after the Plame outing about the roots of aspens running deep at a Colorado conference and the timing of her article a week before 9/11 have me wondering if that lab may have been the source of the anthrax spores.
If I were in charge of this investigation, I’d sure as hell check that out.
Jim,
There also are differences between the spore material mailed to the NY Post and the other NY letters and differences between the stuff mailed to people in the Washington, DC area and the stuff mailed to people in New York.
What do you think might account for those differences? Perhaps a better way to state the question is what avenues of investigation would you pursue at this point to figure out what account for those differences?
I’d go along with the NAS recommendation to DNA sequence the genomic bacterial contaminant found in one of the samples.
What else?
Nonsense.
Dr. Ivins almost certainly was innocent and mere eccentricity is not a crime or a disqualifier from government service.
In addition, we have no way of knowing how eccentric he was because the FBI defamed his character by presenting his actual behavior in a false light and they flat out made stuff up that wasn’t true.
Many of his colleagues are certain that he was innocent.
You absolutely had no idea what you’re talking about when you said, “The guy was crackers and everyone just ignores it. If Ivins wasn’t dangerous, no one is.”
Why do you get off on defaming an innocent dead man who was driven to commit suicide by an off-the-rails FBI investigation desperately trying to play pin the tail on the nearest available donkey?
You should apologize for spewing such cowardly filth.
Yes. I had the same reaction and I seriously doubt that OBL knew or cared to know enough about domestic politics to choose that particular set of intended victims. Why them instead of Bush, Cheney, Powell, Rice, Rumsfeld, and others?
I don’t believe foreign terrorists had anything to do with this.