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Why is there “a free lunch” in Congress? Why are there 180 Republican Amendments for the House Health care Reform legislation, but no guaranteed Republican votes? Why should members be able to get amendments to bills proposed in committee accepted without any commitment from themselves? What kind of negotiation process is that? Why doesn’t the majority party require a guarantee that the amender vote for the bill? Then we might see some “bipartisanship,” or at least a better partisan bill.
Just sayin . . .
11 Comments
Excellent, most excellent point.
From way over here in the Midwest, it appears as if Beltway culture has capitulated so completely to Republican bullying that even when they are out of power people are terrified of the Republicans. (Probably afraid of their names being on a list after the putsch.)
I thought Ed Schultz had a good point when he said prosecuting Bush/Cheney war crimes would be a good way to delegitimize the Republicans and undercut the credibility that nobody inside the Beltway seems ready to challenge.
Thanks. I agree that would be something that would de-legitimize the Republicans. But I also think that Democrats passing some good legislation would also de-legitimze them. Passing health care legislation that works without Republican support would hurt the Republicans for a generation, since Democrats could run against them of grounds that it is dangerous to vote for them because they try to repeal the health care reform. A good jobs bill would also de-legitimize them, since they’ll oppose it every step of the way. A financial system reform that prevented excessive compensation, for example setting total top executive compensation at 40 times the lowest total compensation in the organization would certainly de-legitimize the Republicans. New regulations for the financial system that got rid of CDOs and CDSs would also de-legitimize the Republicans. Forcing the Banks to lend to business on pain of nationalization would de-legitimize the Republicans. Getting the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the FDA working again would de-legitimize the Republicans. Re-building New Orleans would de-legitimize the Republicans. I could go on and on. My point, of course, is that to de-legitimize the Republicans, Democratic law makers need to act like real Democrats and not like corporatists; they need to do what the public needs done. Only then will the Republicans really be de-legitimized.
How can you guarantee to vote for a bill containing your amendment when you don’t know what else might be added or changed after your change?
Because that’s how the process works. You ask, “What do you need to see to support the bill?”
“I need free boob jobs for strippers,” says Senator XXX.
You say, “Okay, I can get that.” And you get that, with Senator XXX’s vote for his amendment.
The deal is then that Senator XXX votes for the final bill, or has a damned good reason for not doing so.
The R’s are stomping all over this log-rolling and need to be punished for it.
Then the next amendment says that all newly-enhanced strippers may only perform in venues where lobbyists can’t pay for your lap dance and you’re photographed on the way in.
Next, some wild-eyed zealot sticks on a provision for single-payer insurance and if you vote for what was a sweet little bill, there aint gonna be no money for the next race.
A person can’t be making promises if he’s got to keep ‘em, guaranteed, like this post’s author wants.
Guarantee to vote at the time of the Amendment with the understanding that the committee Chair will ask you at the time of reporting out of the final bill, whether you will still vote for it, and that if you have changed your mind by that time, your amendment will be struck from the bill. Of course, the member involved could break an agreement like this. But then the Chairperson would guarantee no other amendments offered by that member on any subject would be accepted as long as the Chairperson served in that position. Don’t you think a scheme like this would work?
It sounds like a perfectly fine idea, unless between the time your amendment was adopted and the time the Committee Chair poses the question, something of substance has been done to the bill that can reasonably be seen to free you from obligation.
I thought I covered that by specifying that you were free to withdraw from your obligation, but in that case your amendment would be struck. Why should the rest of the committee have an obligation to stick with your amendment, if you choose to withdraw just prior to the final committee vote?
I thought that you meant that withdrawal would result in both having your amendment struck and losing the privilege of offering future amendments. If I misunderstood about the sanctioning consequent to reasonable change resulting from failure to support an altered bill, then you’ve got my vote.
Thanks. the sanctioning is there in case people, in response to the warning before the final committee vote say that they are still want their amendment and therefore will still abide by the agreement and will vote for the bill, and then when the committee vote or final floor vote occurs they break that agreement. Sanctioning is the punishment after the fact for breaking one’s final commitment. I can think of an exception to this scheme, however. In case amendments are introduced after the committee phase on the floor, I think an event like that should free up the members to vote against the bill, despite their earlier commitments. In most cases, however, the majority party ought to be able to prevent the success of such amendments. I hope this is solid now, but, if not, please let me know.