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The Five Worst Reasons Why the National Debt Should Matter To You: Part Four, The Three Real Reasons

2:15 pm in Uncategorized by letsgetitdone

This is the concluding post in a four part series on the “Top” reasons why the national debt should matter. In Part One, I considered “Fix the Debt’s” claim that high levels of debt cause high unemployment and argued that this is a false claim. In Part Two, I followed with a review of the historical record from 1930 to the present and showed that it refutes this claim throughout this period, and that there is not even one Administration where the evidence doesn’t contradict “Fix the Debt’s” theory. In Part Three I showed that the other four reasons advanced by “Fix the Debt” also had very little going for them. In this part, I’ll give reasons why the national debt does matter, and why we should fix it without breaking America, or causing people to suffer. Read the rest of this entry →

The Five Worst Reasons Why the National Debt Should Matter To You: Part Three, The Other Four Worst Reasons

3:06 pm in Uncategorized by letsgetitdone

In Part One of this series, I considered “Fix the Debt’s” claim that high levels of debt cause high unemployment and gave a few reasons why this is a false claim. In Part Two, I followed with a review of the historical record from 1930 to the present and showed that it refutes this claim throughout this period, and that there is not even one Administration where the evidence doesn’t contradict “Fix the Debts” theory. In this part I’ll continue my examination of the other four “top reasons” why “Fix the Debt” insists that the National Debt should matter to you.

2. Debt means more expensive consumer credit: home, auto, student loans, as well as credit cards.

Growing federal debt can drive up interest rates throughout the American economy. That means higher interest rates for people across the country who may be taking out loans for a home, a new car or truck, to pay down credit card cards or for education costs. Higher interest costs mean they will all be more expensive, resulting in higher monthly payments.

Response: This is a proverbial red herring. Interest rates in the United States aren’t determined by private markets, they’re determined primarily by the Federal Reserve, or by the Fed in collaboration with the Treasury. That is not to say that markets can’t drive up interest rates if the Fed does nothing about it. But if the Fed chooses to take counteraction, then it can determine the term structure of interest rates across the Board.

3. Delaying action on the national debt means it will be much more difficult to protect Medicare and Social Security from abrupt, severe, and widespread cuts in the future on all beneficiaries.

Social Security’s disability program will exhaust its assets in 2016, the overall Social Security trust funds will be exhausted in 2033, and the Medicare Trust Fund will run out in 2026. Some of those dates may seem like a long time away, but if we want to protect beneficiaries who rely on these programs from severe and abrupt cuts – especially the elderly who have used up all their savings and other vulnerable groups – we need to start taking gradual steps now.

Response: All of this is false. It assumes that we will fund safety net programs in the way we do today, by continuing to issue debt, and it also assumes that continuing to issue debt and having higher levels of debt are problems for a fiat sovereign. They’re not! Fiat sovereigns can continue to deficit spend regardless of their debt or debt-to-GDP ratio levels. And if we want to get rid of or reduce debt for political reasons, then Congress needs to guarantee annual funding for these programs in perpetuity and for the Executive to ensure that funds are there by using Platinum Coin Seigniorage (PCS), to supply the reserves to cover appropriated deficit spending.

Even if these alternatives aren’t available right now, however, it still makes no sense to cut safety net programs now, based on some long-range projections that may never come to pass. If people really will have to suffer later, because Congress and the Executive are refusing to use their power to remove the need for any suffering at all, then why should we, the people just accept that?

Much better to get ourselves a new Congress and a new President who will do what’s needed to remove any need for suffering at all. We certainly should not let today’s politicians rob us now, so we can plan ahead for poverty, when we have as much as 25 years to replace this crew of reprobates with people who will vote in the interests of most of the people, most of the time, and who will take back the gains of the 1% extracted from the economy and the Government through political influence and outright fraud.

4. If we do not address the debt now, federal investments in education, infrastructure, and research will decline.

We currently spend nearly $225 billion each year in interest payments alone on the national debt. And that number will only continue to rise. These payments – which have to be made – reduce our ability to fund critical investments in areas such as education, infrastructure, and research that are vital parts of a strong economy. In addition, the mindless sequester continued to cut spending throughout many of these programs, without making any decisions on where to target the savings and without focusing on the most unsustainable areas of the budget: increasingly-costly entitlement spending and an outdated, inefficient tax code.

Response: Yet another fairy tale for the gullible. Yes, interest payments are at $225 Billion per year. That’s about 1.5% of GDP. During the 1980s that figure was more than 5% of GDP. Why did it go down?

Not because our national debt got smaller; but because the Federal Reserve drove interest rates down, allowing the Treasury to sell securities at lower interest rates. Again, the Fed can drive down interest rates to virtually zero if it wishes to, and can keep the interest bill of the United States as low as it wishes, ensuring that interest on the national debt will never be a threat to the rest of the budget. So, forget about this. Interest payments on Treasuries can never be a threat to the solvency of the United States as long we maintain the present fiat currency system we’ve had since 1971.

But, of course, apart from such action by the Fed, the option of PCS is always open to the Treasury. It can pay back whatever portion of the debt it likes and refrain from issuing any more debt. So, over time, the Treasury can lower its interest costs as low as it wishes if it believes interest payments are becoming either a financial or a political problem.

5. Taking steps to address our deficit now would mean a more robust economy and significant job growth over the next 10 years.

A Congressional Budget Office analysis indicates that $2 trillion in deficit reduction over ten years could grow our economy by nearly an additional 1 percent by 2023. A healthy, growing economy means more good jobs and higher wages for hardworking Americans.

Response: The CBO projections about deficit reduction growing our economy are wrong. First, because CBO projections are mostly wrong. They’re even wrong four months out. For example, compare CBO projections on the anticipated 2013 deficit published in January and May of 2013. CBO failed to project the four years of Clinton Administration surpluses. It failed to project the recession at the end of the Clinton Administration at the beginning of the year 2000. It failed to project the crash of 2008 in early 2008, and even a few months before the crash.

Then it failed to project the seriousness of the recession in January of 2009. It failed to project the Clinton recovery in 1993, or the boom in Clinton’s second term. All these were relatively short-term errors. But, forecasting errors due to false models accumulate drastically over time. So, CBO has nil capacity to project over a period of ten or more years. All one can really count on is that CBO (and all the other well-known projectionistas will be wrong.

CBO’s projections do not take into account the macroeconomic sectoral financial balances. So, it doesn’t even recognize that long-term proactive deficit reduction means reducing Government additions of Net Financial Assets (NFAs) into the private economy. Of course, lower NFA additions over a decade, due to deficit reduction, do not guarantee a contracting economy and high unemployment in 2023. But, in the absence of a private credit bubble, which will bring another crash sooner or later, they make it much more likely that CBO’s projection will prove false.

In short, the idea that $2 Trillion in deficit reduction now will produce a healthier, more robust economy is false. We might have a more rapidly growing economy in 2023, even with deficit reduction, if the private sector, supported by the Fed, blows that big credit bubble. But that growth will not mean a healthy, robust economy. It will mean a sick one on the point of a huge deflationary collapse produced by another debt crisis. And while the new class of Peterson plutocrats might greatly desire such a result so that they can extract most of the rest of the financial resources of the 99%, I think the rest of us would prefer to base our future expansions on the actual additions to private NFAs produced by Government spending that is not offset by tax revenue.

So, we’ve now seen that “Fix the Debt’s” five top reasons why the national debt should matter to you, are actually the five worst reasons why it should matter. However, there are at least three REAL reasons why the national debt should matter, and why we should fix it without breaking America, or causing people to suffer. In the concluding, Part Four of this series, I’ll give these reasons.

(Cross-posted from New Economic Perspectives.)

The Five Worst Reasons Why the National Debt Should Matter To You: Part Two, the Record Since 1930

1:25 pm in Uncategorized by letsgetitdone

In Part One, of a critique of the most important of “Fix the Debt’s” reasons for “Why the National Debt Should Matter To You,” I asserted that high debt levels haven’t caused high unemployment in the United States, and that, if anything causation was in the other direction. I didn’t want to disturb the flow of the argument there with a relatively lengthy survey of some of the numbers in the historical record since the 1930s. But let’s test the idea that High debt causes fewer jobs and lower wages in the United States by looking at that record now.

Hoover, FDR, and Truman

During the early 1930s, in the presidency of Herbert Hoover, unemployment spiked up first; then the deficits, funded by debt issuance, followed. In fiscal 1933, which began in July 1932, unemployment peaked at 24.9%, while the debt-to-GDP ratio reached 39.1%, up from a low of 14.9% in 1929.

During FDR’s first two terms, the increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio level off. But, unemployment declines steadily to 9.9% in 1941, with an exception coming in 1938, the year following his misguided attempt to cut the debt. During WW II, the public debt skyrockets, but unemployment declines to a historically low level of 1.2%, another contradiction to the idea that high debt levels cause fewer jobs and lower wages.

Nor are the Truman Administrations any kinder to this first “fix the debt” myth. During these eight years the debt-to-GDP ratio declines steadily from 112.7% to 60.2% with one exception in fiscal 1949. Meanwhile, unemployment rises until driven down by Korean War spending beginning in Fiscal 1951.

Eisenhower and Kennedy-Johnson

How about the Eisenhower and Kennedy-Johnson Administrations? Again, all the evidence contradicts the “Fix the Debt” myth. Levels of the debt-to-GDP ratio continue to fall while unemployment rates vary cyclically, but generally average a full point higher than in the Truman Administration, and more than three points higher than at the height of wartime full employment. In short, decreasing levels of the debt-to-GDP ratio do not appear to cause more jobs and higher wages than the higher debt-to-GDP ratio levels during WWII and the Truman period.

In 1969, the debt-to-GDP ratio falls to 28.5%, a drop of nearly 3 points from the year before. The budget surplus is 0.3% up from a deficit of -2.9 in 1968. Unemployment is down to 3.5%, a low water mark for the Kennedy-Johnson period. But in FY 1970, unemployment spikes up to 4.9% and continues “high” for the rest of the Nixon-Ford Administration, reaching 8.5% in FY 1975, even as the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio declines to 24.6% in 1974, and then goes up to 28.1% in 1976 before resuming its downward track for a few years.

Nixon – Ford and Carter

The Nixon-Ford Administration, marks a break in the currency system, since in August of 1971 Nixon withdrew from the Bretton-Woods agreement and both ended the convertibility of dollars to gold on the international exchange, and allowed the value of the dollar to float freely on the international exchanges. Since then, the US has had a fiat currency system, rather than a commodity-based system. However, the US has continued to act domestically as if it was still on the gold standard, continuing to issue public debt even though the rationale for borrowing back money created under its authority, and which can be created in unlimited amounts, at will, is based on the idea of a Government Budgetary Constraint (GBC) that no longer exists; and also on the need to “sterilize” excess reserves produced by deficit spending, because these are falsely assumed to be more inflationary than new securities would be.

In spite of the change in the currency system, and the change in political party control of the White House, the Carter Administration was not able to break the pattern of economic stagnation that characterized the Nixon-Ford Administrations, probably because it received bad advice from economists, who did not understand the significance of the shift to a fiat currency system. The general levels of unemployment remained similar over the two administrations.

The mean annual employment rate during the Nixon – Ford period is 6.3%. During the Carter Administration, it increases to 6.65%. We’ve already seen that the decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio reached 24.6% and then increased slightly. The Carter Administration began to reduce it again, but never reached the Nixon low point, and ended at 26.3%.

There’s no noticeable relation here between high debt levels and unemployment. The debt-to-GDP ratio hit a low level and was varying slightly higher than that level after 1974 through 1981. Unemployment, on the other hand, varied cyclically, but was trending upward, with apparently no direct relationship to high debt levels.

Reagan-Bush

The Reagan-Bush years are remembered as prosperous years. But the mean unemployment rate was 7.1%, a half point higher than under Carter and 0.8% higher than in the Nixon-Ford years, and the period ended at 6.9%. So, many people weren’t prospering.

On the other hand, the Reagan-Bush years saw a substantial rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio which increased from 26.3% at the end of Carter’s Administration’s to 49.5% at the end of Bush 41′s. A level that high had last occurred 35 years before in 1958, during a period when unemployment had averaged 4.9%. Comparing the two, note 1) the level is nowhere near the historic high of 112.7% and 2) the level of the ratio is apparently compatible with both relatively low and relatively high unemployment levels, again refuting the idea that “high debt levels = fewer jobs and lower wages.”

Clinton and Goldilocks

The period of the Clinton Administration has been characterized as the period of “the Goldilocks Economy,” and is also considered by many as a time of “fiscal responsibility.” The economy grew at the most rapid rate since the 1960s, but did so in the presence of trade deficits, and decreasing budget deficits, finally ending in Government surpluses.

With GDP growing rapidly and public debt growing slowly, and actually shrinking through four consecutive years, of surpluses, the debt-to-GDP ratio fell throughout the period FY 1994 – 2001, declining from 49.5% to 32.5% in 2001. This happened simultaneously with steadily declining unemployment rates, reaching 4.0% in 2000, before increasing again to 4.7% in 2001, when a new recession, in reaction to the surpluses and the credit bubble of the 1990s began to bite. The unemployment rate over the whole goldilocks period averages 4.93%, the lowest average since the Kennedy-Johnson and Eisenhower Administrations.

Why isn’t the Clinton Administration a confirmation of the claim that high debt causes fewer jobs and lower wages? Well first, the data show the debt-to-GDP ratio falling, along with unemployment, not the ratio rising while unemployment increases. But even if one wants to claim that a falling debt-to-GDP ratio increases employment and wage levels, the data show unemployment falling much faster than the debt-to-GDP ratio, which doesn’t begin declining appreciably until the unemployment rate has declined from 6.9% in 1993 to 4.9% in 1997.

Also, when unemployment rises again in 2001 to 4.7% from 4.0%, the fall in the debt-to-GDP ratio continues, suggesting a lag relationship between unemployment and a falling debt-to-GDP ratio. What would explain this? The answer is the automatic stabilizers. When people go back to work, they cease to draw as much, or at all on the safety net, and they also pay taxes. So, tax revenues increase, government deficits decrease, and GDP increases, meaning that the debt-to-GDP ratio falls.

But a mystery remains, why did the goldilocks economy appear? Why did it create an apparently strong recovery with decreasing unemployment and higher wages, without the assistance of large government deficits, and with the disadvantage of increasingly substantial trade deficits. The answer is that the goldilocks economy was driven by the Fed’s decision to maintain low interest rates, and easy bank credit, and by the increasing willingness of the private sector to run a deficit, and run down its net financial assets, accommodating the Government’s desire to run a surplus.

The private sector balance went into deficit in 1997 when the Government’s deficit declined to -0.3%. Then the four years of Government surplus: 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001, were all years of aggregate private sector deficit in which the private sector, looked at as an aggregate, lost net financial assets. While this was going on, the “dot com” bubble was bursting and the economy fell into recession, accompanied by the increase in the unemployment rate in 2001, followed by the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio, as the automatic stabilizers, along with the beginning of post 9/11 homeland security deficit spending, kicked in with a return to deficits in 2002.

So, it turns out that the primary causal factor in the Goldilocks economy and its increasingly low unemployment rate wasn’t deficit reduction, as claimed by many Clinton partisans, and debt hawks, but the credit bubble blown by the Federal Reserve, the banks, Wall Street, and an increasingly optimistic private sector. The economy boomed in spite of deficit reduction, and was itself the primary cause of deficit reduction, and not vice versa. This is another refutation of the narrative behind the theory that high debt levels cause high unemployment and low wages, because the boom was due to a credit bubble that drained net financial assets from the private sector and then burst at the end of the period.

Later, the blowing of another bubble under Bush 43, restored a modicum of prosperity, but only increased the chances for a more serious crash in 2008. Had the expansion of the 1990s been based on much larger government deficits, the recession at the end of the Clinton-Gore period would have been avoided, because the expansion would have been based on a permanent transfer of new net financial assets to the private sector, and not on bubble-generated paper assets that are gone with the wind when the inevitable collapse of a credit bubble occurs.

Bush 43

That brings us to the Bush 43 Administration. In 2002, the Government went back to deficit spending. But the Government deficit was small enough that, given the size of the demand leakage due to the trade deficit, it kept the private sector in deficit. Deficit spending increased in 2003, along with war spending, but since the trade deficit was rising to 5% it wasn’t large enough at – 3.4% to compensate for the trade deficit. Over the next two years, the private sector balance varied around zero, sometimes in deficit, sometimes showing a small surplus.

But beginning in 2005, as the trade deficit rose eventually to 6%, and the Government deficit again was lowered first to -2.6, and then to -1.9 and -1.2% in 2007, the private sector was again in substantial deficit for three consecutive years. Altogether, beginning in 1997 under Clinton and ending in 2007 under Bush, the private sector went through 11 years without ever having a substantial private sector surplus, and for 6 of those years the private sector lost more than 2 – 4 % of GDP in net financial assets, because private sector activity was funded by private sector credit bubbles rather than by government deficits that were high enough to compensate for the Trade deficit.

In other words Government deficit spending wasn’t too high under the Bush 43 Administration, as we hear in conventional economic and political analysis. But rather, it was far too low to sustain a decent level of economic activity without relying on the credit bubble-fueled housing bubble that burst in 2007, and led to the crash of 2008.

No wonder the Bush 43 period had the highest average unemployment rate (5.83%) since the Bush 41 Administration (6.7%). Neither Government deficit spending, nor the private credit bubble were large enough to drive unemployment down to the levels seen in the Clinton period, and unemployment was mostly over 5% hitting 5.8% in 2008, and then in the transition 2009 fiscal year, between the Bush 43 and Obama Administrations, rising to 9.3%. Meanwhile, the debt-to-GDP ratio slowly rose nearly 4% from 32.5% between 2001 and 2007, and then jumped sharply to 40.5% in 2008 and to 54.0% in 2009, as unemployment was rising and safety net spending accelerated.

So, during Bush 43, we see a sharp rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio in 2008 and 2009. But, it’s not this rise in debt levels that causes unemployment, because the sharp increases in unemployment were a result of the financial crash caused by the lengthy attempt over two administrations to fuel economic expansion through increasing private sector debt facilitated by the Fed, the banks, and Wall Street. That attempt led us back to the boom-bust cycles that were prevalent prior to the New Deal and the reform of the banking system — reforms that were largely repealed in the Clinton and Bush Administrations.

The sudden growth in debt in 2008 and 2009 appeared because the rise in unemployment caused by the Great Crash, led to increases in Federal deficit spending resulting from the automatic stabilizers, and the beginning of the economic stimulus provided by the American Recovery and Re-investment Act of 2009. So, once again, job loss came first, and was then followed by higher debt levels, rather than vice versa, another contradiction with the theory that high debt levels cause higher unemployment and lower wages.

The Obama Administration

From 2009 until the present, the results of the sharp spike in the unemployment rate on the debt-to-GDP ratio are apparent. The ratio has increased by nearly 20 points in 2010, 2011, and 2012 to 72.6%, while the unemployment rate has declined from 9.3% to the present 7.4%. So, increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio are inversely correlated with the unemployment rate, yet another contradiction of the austerian theory. Meanwhile, the reduction in unemployment and the increase in both GDP and tax revenues is driving the 2013 deficit toward 4% of GDP, down from 10.1% in 2009.

This result, while touted as good news by the Obama Administration, and nearly everyone else in sight, resulting in a veritable Versailles happy dance, is bad for the economy. While the trade deficit is down to close to 2.5% now, a projected Government deficit of 4% for 2013 is too small to provide for more than a 1.5% of GDP surplus in private sector net financial assets. Most of this is likely to go to continue to repair private sector balance sheets that were damaged so much during the 11 year debt binge over the Clinton and Bush Administrations.

That means there won’t be new private sector financial assets sufficient to support increasing aggregate demand. And this, in turn means that the economy will continue to stagnate or heal only very slowly, or perhaps even turn back to recession, provided there’s no substantial private sector credit expansion to fuel demand. But, so far at least, one can’t see such an expansion getting under way, and without it there’s no substitute for the Government deficit spending that the Administration and Congress are so intent on reducing.

Where’s the Evidence?

It’s astonishing how people just make up stories to support policies they favor. Even though I have the background to use rigorous modeling or statistical analysis methods, and have used them many times in past years, my look at the record hasn’t involved them, because, this is, after all, a blog post meant to be read more widely than a statistical study, and I think the raw numbers since 1930 continuously and conclusively refute the causal theory advanced by the “Fix the Debt” group that high debt or debt-to-GDP levels increase unemployment rates.

Falsification of any theory can never be certain, but the evidence in this case never contradicts the idea that high unemployment comes first, and high debt levels come afterward as an effect of high unemployment, assuming, of course, that deficit spending is accompanied by debt issuance. Given the data, I think one has to reasonably conclude that High debt levels ≠ fewer jobs and lower wages, as the “Fix the Debt” group claims.

If the “Fix the Debt” group disagrees, and thinks that I’ve interpreted the data incorrectly, or that more rigorous analysis expanding the set of variables and using more sophisticated techniques shows that the evidence doesn’t refute their theory, then I challenge them or others in the Peter G. Peterson Foundation-funded network of organizations to produce such an analysis. Until they do, I think we have to continue to ask “Where’s the evidence”?

And we also have to ask whether a theory amounting to no more than a plausible narrative about what causes unemployment, contradicted by many other plausible causal narratives can serve as the basis for a Federal fiscal policy of deficit reduction that will hurt many millions of American citizens for generations? I think not! I think the very idea is ludicrous, and that it’s time to laugh the “Fix the Debt” campaign off the public stage.

In Part Three, I’ll cover the other four “worst reasons” why the national debt should matter.

Data Sources:

Budget deficits/surpluses, 1940 – 2018.

Unemployment rates, annual averages, 1923 -1942.

Unemployment rates, annual averages, 1940 – 2008.

Unemployment Rates, annual averages, 1947 – 2012.

Sectoral Financial Balances.

(Cross-posted from New Economic Perspectives.)

The Five Worst Reasons Why the National Debt Should Matter To You: Part One, High Debt Levels and Jobs

10:34 am in Uncategorized by letsgetitdone

Your Social Security, My Pocket

I came across a post from the “Fix the Debt” campaign last month called “The Top Five Worst Reasons Why the National Debt Should Matter to You.” It’s a post full of debt/deficit lies that cry out for correction. That’s what I’ll provide in this series.

1. High debt levels = fewer jobs and lower wages

In times of fiscal and economic uncertainty, consumers and businesses reduce investment and delay projects because investment is costly to reverse. Higher government borrowing can also drive up interest rates once the economy recovers, reducing the access and affordability of funds for consumers and businesses to borrow and invest in new ventures and ideas. This can hold back the economy, resulting in fewer jobs and lower wages down the road.

Response: What’s with the colloquial use of the ‘equals sign’ in this statement? Is the “Fix the Debt” campaign trying to say that there’s an identity between high debt levels and fewer jobs/lower wages? Is it trying to say that fewer jobs/lower wages cause high debt? Are they trying to say that there’s mutual causation between the two over time? Or are they trying to say something more complex than these things?

The summary statement after the headline indicates that the “equals” is an ambiguous way of making the straightforward claim that high debt levels trigger a causal chain ending with fewer jobs and lower wages. Here are two ways of addressing this claim: is it true, or even likely, given the data; and even if it is true, then so what?

Addressing “truth” first, it’s not! There’s plenty of evidence (See Part Two) refuting the idea that high public debt levels cause fewer jobs and lower wages in nations like the United States that use a non-convertible fiat currency, a floating exchange rate, and have no debts in currencies they do not issue.

In fact, even before 1971, when the United States closed the gold window allowing convertibility to gold on international exchanges and arrived at our current fiat currency system, the data still refute this claimed identity and suggest, that, if anything, the causation is reversed. In Part Two I’ve added a historical addendum dating from 1930 to the present showing that the evidence refutes this theory about the causes of higher unemployment.

Read it and see what’s happened for yourself; but the upshot is that this theory is pure fiction. Its narrative hasn’t happened once in the United States since 1930.

Now, on to “so what.” Let’s, for the sake of argument, say that high debt or debt-to-GDP levels did cause high unemployment, and that Government debt is a problem. The “Fix the Debt” campaign wants to respond to this by cutting Government deficit spending, raising taxes and following a long-term deficit reduction program featuring cuts to social safety net programs.

But why follow that unnecessarily painful economy-contracting, middle-class depriving strategy? The United States is a fiat currency sovereign. It doesn’t have to borrow back its own currency and reserves from people who are holding those.

It doesn’t have to sell any more debt instruments, providing unearned profits primarily to wealthy individuals and foreign nations. Congress can either provide the Treasury Department with the authority to create whatever money it needs to repay the debt as it falls due and to perform whatever deficit spending chooses to appropriate; or the Executive branch can use existing Platinum Coin Seigniorage (PCS) authority to fill the public purse with all the dollar reserves needed to do both of these things.

I’ve outlined how this works in numerous posts at this site and others, also in my kindle e-book. The process is very straightforward, will not cause inflation, and is legal under current law. So, if the “Fix the Debt” campaign is really worried about high unemployment and fixing the debt, then I challenge “Fix the Debt” to support my petition for the President to order the Secretary to mint a $60 T platinum coin immediately to accomplish this without in any way compromising the safety net or hurting the economy.

I don’t think “Fix the Debt” will support this proposal however. The reason why is that “Fix the Debt” is a front group for a very long-term effort by Peter G. Peterson to gut the social safety net and privatize Social Security. Peterson and the various front groups he funds through the Peter G. Peterson Foundation aren’t really interested in fixing the debt. They understand that the public debt is no danger to a fiat sovereign like the US, and doesn’t cause high unemployment.

What they are really interested in is persuading the public that patriotism demands crippling the safety net in the name of fiscal responsibility. If they were not, and they really think that “teh debt” is a cause of high unemployment, then they would join me in supporting one of the two proposals I advanced earlier for “Fixing the Debt.” Read the rest of this entry →