The bailout bill requires the Treasury to obtain warrants or stock from all financial institutions from which Treasury buys troubled assets. This is, I think, what some here are referring to as the stock injection program. And for those who don’t already know this, a warrant is a right to purchase stock at a fixed price. In this case, the warrant must also be convertible to senior debt if the financial institution fails, which should mean we come ahead of a lot of other creditors even in the event of bankruptcy.
Here is the applicable language from section 113:
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary may not purchase, or make any commitment to purchase, any troubled asset under the authority of this Act, unless the Secretary receives from the financial institution from which such assets are to be purchased— (A) in the case of a financial institution, the securities of which are traded on a national securities exchange, a warrant giving the right to the Secretary to receive nonvoting common stock or preferred stock in such financial institution, or voting stock with respect to which, the Secretary agrees not to exercise voting power, as the Secretary determines appropriate; or (B) in the case of any financial institution other than one described in subparagraph (A), a warrant for common or preferred stock, or a senior debt instrument from such financial institution, as described in paragraph (2)(C).
The Treasury must get an equity position. The only real question is how much. I know Paulson opposed this provision, and may try to eviscerate it in operation. However, there are several oversight boards to hold his feet to the fire, the purchases are required to be disclosed, apparently on the internet, and Paulson may view this as an opportunity to squeeze the juice out of Goldman Sachs’ competitors.
One of the goals of the TARP, as the bailout bill calls the troubled asset relief program, is to recapitalize financial institutions, by paying more for troubled assets than their book value, which should have been marked to market at very low prices. Those low prices have badly impaired the capital structures of many lenders, making them unwilling to lend. By overpaying, we increase their capital. The hope is that this will encourage more lending.
The Treasury is required to set up rules for acquisitions, and this warrant requirement should be covered. One rule should be that the exercise price is the price of the stock of the financial institution on the date the troubled assets are purchased. Another should be that the more we overpay, the more equity we get. And one more: the more worthless the troubled assets are, the more equity we get. This last rule would mean that for mortgage based securities we get one level of equity, for credit default swaps and other trash we get a whole heck of a lot more.
Even if Paulson is in the tank for his competition, I don’t think he can use up all, or even a large part of, the money in the few weeks between the time the program is up and running, which is supposed to take as much as six weeks, and January 20, 2009, when the Obama administration takes over operation of the program. I do not doubt that the new people will insist on punitive warrants, designed to insure that taxpayers profit.



15 Comments




Earlier versions of the bill gave the Secretary the option of what you describe or doing something else. Is the bill as passed clear that section you cite the only option? Or is there another approach he can try that does not trigger this section?
As far as I know that is the only provision related to this issue. This provision is substantially unchanged from the first version I have, dated September 27. I think there was an earlier draft I don’t have where the warrant provision only applied if the purchase was more than a fixed amount, maybe $300 million.
Thanks. Have you seen any other sections that provide guidance (or limit discretion) wrt to how this would be implemented, e.g., is it clear the stock you get = the purchase price (or something else) or could the Secretary set that artificially lower. It would be interesting is there is a provision that says in implementing this section, that Secretary shall give priority to maximizing taxpayer value, or something like that.
The concern earlier was that Paulson didn’t want to do this and if given discretion would either minimize its use or minimize its goal. Since his preference was well known last week, it would have made sense for the Dems to insert more protective language on how this imnportant section was to be implemented. Thanks for the post. Very helpful.
Do you have a link to the version you’re using? The link I’ve got suddenly craps out on page 15
Never mind, found one.
Looks about right. There is a ton of discretion to the Treasury Secretary. If you trust the Secretary, you might make a profit. Might not too, there’s still a powerful information asymetry operating and various other assumptions.
I will add that specifying non-voting shares is completely, well, bogus.
The Financial Stability Oversight Board consists of Bernanke, Paulson, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Chairman of the SEC, and the Secretary of HUD. Among other things, it is required to ensure that the policies of Treasury are consistent with protecting taxpayers under sect. 113.
Sect. 116(a)(1)(A)(iv) requires the Comptroller General to oversee the protection of taxpayers, which I assume is a reference to sect. 113.
The Comptroller General reports every 60 days to the Special Inspector General for the TARP, and to the appropriate committees of Congress, and may submit special reports as warranted.
The Special Inspector General is established in sect. 121. This person will look at the TARP for compliance with applicable law. This section doesn’t reference 113, and I can’t be sure that section is within the purview of the IG.
As I stated, I don’t have any reason to trust Paulson. On the other hand, given the rapacity of the investment bankers, it may make his competitive juices flow, or he may want to screw his former and future competitors. And the dems gave it a shot on the oversight front.
“Even if Paulson is in the tank for his competition, I don’t think he can use up all, or even a large part of, the money in the few weeks between the time the program is up and running, which is supposed to take as much as six weeks, and January 20, 2009, when the Obama administration takes over operation of the program.”
The link I put in my diary to the WaPo article about Paulson’s efforts has been removed(and I haven’t bothered to look in an archival for it) but here is some info from the UK dated tomorrow:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/new…..risis.html
“I do not doubt that the new people will insist on punitive warrants, designed to insure that taxpayers profit.” -and what leads you to such optimism? Please keep in mind that the legislation -as I pointed out- allows for actions by ‘interim asst.’s’ until and if the Congress approves the appointments. “But the US Treasury does not have the staff to make the decisions about which banks and which debts to buy up” and that won’t change once a new admin comes into place.
And this is truly a ‘judgment call’: (E) EXERCISE PRICE.—The exercise price
10 for any warrant issued pursuant to this subsection shall be set by the Secretary, in the interest of the taxpayers.
Thanks for posting this Masaccio; the more info the public can get the better; and I have now fixed the links in the diary I posted so you might want to peruse it.
a warrant giving the right to the Secretary to receive nonvoting common stock or preferred stock in such financial institution, or voting stock with respect to which, the Secretary agrees not to exercise voting power, as the Secretary determines appropriate;
My bold I don’t speech legalese but what happens if the Secretary does deen it appropriate to receive voting stock? I mean sure Paulson wouldn’t but Obama’s Treasury Secretary might. In other words we own the company maybe now there will be more consumer friendly banks.
I wonder how the GOP will survive without all the bank lobbyists buying them lunch now that the Government owns them?
I also assume the banks won’t be giving to the GOP or DLC Dems anymore?
Ubetchiam: thanks for the link. I think it is important that the Treasury Secretary cannot act until he posts his rules for acting.
ThingsComeUndone: voting stock would enable the Treasury Secretary or his agent to elect a board of directors. This was just unacceptable to republicans. Paulson will have to control a number of aspects of the financial institutions using covenants in the warrants. For example, they will probably bar dividends to common or preferred stock until exercise, and will probably limit executive compensation until exercise.
Thanks for posting on this. I was hoping someone here would pick it up and go more in-depth.
I know it’s not perfect…but I’m glad it made it into the bill with more subtle language in terms of it being slightly changed while leaving the ‘window” of possible benefit to the tax payer…
This American Life did do a pretty good job with their overview of the crisis and is worth a listen…
http://www.thislife.org/?gclid…..QAodaiaMEA
I offer thanks as well.
All too often facts get lost in the hyperventilating against ‘greedy wall street’ types.
Does your version contain these portion of the same section (113)?
Also, if you look at SEC. 102. INSURANCE OF TROUBLED ASSETS, it’s pretty much a blank check to Paulson to set up insurance for crap paper any way he wants. IANAL, but this bill sure looks like a big giveaway to me. If he’s in the tank for Wall Street, I think he could run through the money before January, but it’s more likely IMO that he’ll use the insurance option and let the bill come due after he’s gone.
MayDaze, yes, but again, this is subject to rules to be stated publicly by the Secretary of the Treasury. An earlier draft had a much higher minimum, $300,000,000, if I recall. I expect the limit to be set at $100,000,000 by Paulson, but to be significantly reduced early next year.
Section 102 was the price set by the creepy republicans to secure a yes vote from the Eric Cantors of that underground world.
I don’t understand very much about all the finance stuff, but I bring some background in environmental studies to statements like this — which I believe Mr. George Soros has also raised as a concern. In terms of predator/prey dynamics, this is an ideal strategy for a predator.
Which is why it concerns me so much.
I assume that massaccio’s point is that the Dems have tried to place measures by which the asymmetry of info can be reduced, but I couldn’t diagram any of this out to save my soul. Which means that, fundamentally, I’m still confused.