Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner asked the public for suggestions about valuation of the toxic waste taxpayers are going to be choking on under his plan. This is a complicated problem, but there is a place to start.
A big part of the toxic waste is securitized assets. This is a debt issued by a special purpose vehicle, like a business trust or a limited liability company. The SPV is set up by a commercial bank, or an investment bank, or some other financial institution. The sponsor sells the debt to investors, and the money is used to buy a portfolio of assets. The SPV has no other business, so revenue from the assets is the only source of a return for the investors.
The simplest form is mortgage pass-through bonds. The pool consists of a single class of asset, like home mortgage notes or commercial real estate notes. Each month the cash received is used to pay for administrative expenses, and the balance is used to pay first interest, then principal to the investors. The principal reductions come when people sell or refinance, or lose the home in foreclosure.
Then things get complicated. The special purpose vehicle can issue several classes of securities. Most of the securities are debt instruments, like bonds or debentures. There is also an equity class, like stock, which gets anything left over. The terms of the bonds are set out in long documents, written by highly trained and expensively educated lawyers who ought to have real work instead of this serfdom. I hope most of them are or will soon be looking for jobs at Legal Aid, trying to expiate their guilt or at least pick up a paycheck. But I digress.
The point of the complicated documents is that there are several levels of priority of the debt instruments. When the SPV makes the bond payments, it pays one class in full what ever it is entitled to at that time, then the next class gets paid in full, and the next class. If there is not enough for one class, then too bad, and the lower priority people get nothing. The people in the know call these levels tranches (pronounced “traunsh” because the word is French for slice). The tranches have names like Senior, Senior Subordinated, Mezzanine, and trash equity. The losses fall first on the equity, then on the Mezzanines, and then the next higher tranche.
From here, things get really complicated. CDOs can have all kinds of assets in them: stocks, bonds, other CDO securities, corporate loans, even credit default swaps, and all kinds of combinations.
It isn’t that hard to value the simplest form, the pass-through mortgage backed securities. The pools are large enough that historical statistics are valid for each pool at the outset, and as we get experience with the pool, that is, as we see how the borrowers are doing, we can make pretty close estimates of the value of the bonds. If we really cared, we could sample the borrowers whose mortgages are in the pool about their jobs and savings. The data in these calculations is historical data about the performance of the actual mortgages in the pool, so we can feel pretty good about it and our valuation.
It isn’t so easy when we get into the more complicated asset pools. The current scheme for valuing these is mathematical, at least at the outset when valuing them for initial sale. Here is a popular description. Detailed explanations of models are available on the web. I like the abstract of this one:
Gaussian copula is by far the most popular copula used in the financial industry in default dependency modeling. However, it has a major drawback— it does not exhibit tail dependence, a very important property for copula. The essence of tail dependence is the interdependence when extreme events occur, say, defaults of corporate bonds. In this paper we show that some tail dependence can be restored by introducing stochastic volatility on a Gaussian copula. Using perturbation methods we then derive an approximate copula—called perturbed Gaussian copula in this paper.
The author is saying that when things get to the extremes, like really serious recessions, the most popular model simply doesn’t work. Obviously no one will use that model to value toxic waste.
That suggests that the first step is collection of actual data about each of the assets comprising each and every piece of toxic waste. So, I asked my stockbroker, an old-timer, about this. He says in all the meetings and conference calls he has sat through on this stuff, no one has ever said this kind of data collection was under way.
Maybe they’re trying to introduce stochastic volatility into the Gaussian copula model at the tail by getting taxpayers to bail them out of their stupidity, which would be really perturbing.



52 Comments

Keep talking, we’re beginning to get it. Thanks masaccio!
Aww, masaccio, take heart.
I always show some tail dependence by introducing stochastic volatility on my Gaussian copula. Always. Every single time.
And when I wave my magic wand while introducing that stochastic volatility, why, I can tell you the value of those tranches in less than two minutes. Provided I chant the correct formulas about weight drag ratios and heat transfer distribution.
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Heartfelt thanks for another exceptional diary.
IMHO, you are out-reporting much of the US economic and business press.
Just today, it hit me that the Wall Street Journal was bought out by Murdock and has been laying people off for at least a year now.
I wouldn’t claim that a more independent WSJ would have prevented this mess, because the problems with CDO, CDS’s, and deregulation go back in time before Murdock bought the WSJ.
Nevertheless, I’ve been horrified at the dismal nonsense on much of what’s supposed to pass for economic discussion.
You’ve singlehandedly done more heavy lifting than a couple news outfits that come to my mind.
And this isn’t simply an abstract question.
I don’t think more than 3 or 4 members of the US Senate really grasp the dynamics that you lay out here. That Senate debate whine session last week might have been bearable if the GOP members had any grasp of what you lay out here. Unfortunately, I think they believe that Adam Smith is still alive, buying groceries in Edinburgh.
(Just an odd note — Jimmy Carter on Rachel Maddow in another browser window is just such a refreshing sight to see. Strange to think that he’s been kept in the background for an entire generation, and now has outlasted so many of the people who did him dirt. Miraculous.)
Thanks for the link and the information. Sounds like Masaccio has worked with copulas. I can add my two cents. A big problem with finance is trying to describe probability distributions that might have hundreds of dimensions -for example, to describe simultaneously the joint probability of returns of hundreds of investments that might be hightly correlated across dozens of economic or financial sectors.
Multivariate disributions with that many variables are very difficult to describe, or estimate, from data.
I think an intutive way to describe copula is to say it is a fancy mathematical trick to describe, or estimate, a multivariate distribution by turning each individual distribution into a very simple one, and then looking at the relationships between those simple distributions.
They’ve been used in statistics, engineering, meteorology, and other applied fields, and successfully. But all these are cases where you can get tons of data, and in engineering you can do controlled experiments. The big point is that in these successful cases, you can be confident that you will be using the results to estimate soemthing within the cloud of data you have gathered and studied. You don’t try to extrapolate the results out into cases you have never seen.
I read in Nakedcapitalism blog that analysts used these copula techniques with only two or three years of data. And they didn’t seem to think much about the fact that you cannot predict the dependencies between investment returns in a downturn, or a recession, or a housing bust, or a financial panic, if you only have data that started in the middle of a boom.
And, in particular, you have no data at all for a financial system during a downturn that was wired together with new fancy derivative securities and investment insurance policies (credit default swaps) -since many of them did not exist in 1990 and 2001.
So, beneath the fancy mathematics, it is common sense. It is like having a car manual that says you can increase your car’s mileage a little bit by increasing the tire pressure by a few pounds of pressure. Then some one comes along and looks at the manual and tries to quintuple the mileage by adding so much pressure that the tire blows up.
Then there is the problem that distributions in finance are not the well behaved distributions you learn about in beginning statistics. Most people have known that for a long time. Finance PhD students certainly knew that when I was in school. But they could not do fancy math and prove theorems with the real world messy distributions. You can’t use lots of fancy statistics that make you look smart, you can only use cruder technqies that do not give you simple formulas that allow you to extrapolate into situations you have never seen. So they just assumed the nice ones. That may have been another problem.
Or, maybe some of the new math-phycis-engineering financial techies making their paper fortunes until last years did not know that.
A long time ago I suggested sampling components of complex financial instruments but as all of these valuations are fairly arbitrary, I decided it was probably easier to first determine if there was any possible value other than zero that could be applied to them and if there could then this value should reflect a pre-bubble price for the underlying asset or a current stock price, etc. The key was this take place inside a nationalization framework because it was the government would need only a working number to determine the amount of recapitalization needed that for the bank to be reasonably solvent. The problem we have now is that all this is hidden. If we could actually see what is there, we could begin to make good first order estimates of value and as we progressed these could be refined as needed.
But as I point out above these valuations don’t need to be exact if the government is doing both the valuing and the recapitalization.
You are a gifted teacher. Thanks.
Thanks masaccio
digg is open.
Thanks.
Hard to see loss of a home in foreclosure generating revenue to the SPV, unless there is equity in the property. In that case a subordinate lender might bid it in to protect its position or a third party might buy it on spec. In cyclical bad times that rarely (if ever) happens.
OTOH, I suppose the SPV might let the property go to a cash purchaser for substantially less than the principal balance. This happened during the depression. Is it happening now?
These articles really help me to understand the complexities going on “underneath” my predatory mortgage.
However, maybe I am wrong here, but I feel that the heavy lobbying against judges restructuring these loans, and the way the industry wants the problem solved only keeps the secret. The secret is unregulated and illegal fees, bad accounting, and fraud. They don’t want the American people to discover that literally millions of people lost their home to law violations. If this comes out, much like the torture issue, the FISA issue, The Plame Outing, the United states would have to deal with something much bigger than it can fathom. How do you make restitution to people who lost their homes in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, much less save homes for ones still hanging in there. They don’t care if you can pay your loan. I can, I have. They want the fees. And they (GMAC homecomings financial) continues to fight to keep these fees in the game). They are not interested in getting these loans paid at normal rates. They never have been. Until we get a handle on this truth, until we listen to the true problem, until some one looks at my paper work and has a plan to stop them, we are not going to solve the problem. It’s going on large scale, it’s not just my case. It’s millions of cases, involving mainstream financial institutions.
This is what happened. I am a first hand witness. You can look at millions of posts all complaining of exactly the same kind of violations as the ones I experienced in my loan. They have successfully kept the finger pointed at everyone else.
If literally millions lost their homes because of TILA and RESPA violations…what is going to happen when it’s finally validated? When we finally face the fact that we can’t regulate these fees because foreign entities own some of these tranches and want their fees collected? I think that American have been the victim of “financial terrorism” in the banking industry. And I think everyone is covering the problem, afraid to face the truth and the consequences that will result when the truth is finally known.
This is so much bigger a problem than we know how to handle.
Looking at a limited historical time period and expecting mathematical models based on those data to be perfect tools for predicting the future is a classic error to be avoided in statistical analysis.
Yet these folks were betting the ranch on this stuff. And the leadership of these Wall Street firms, who probably went to business school before Black and Scholes invented their option pricing model, appear to be unaware of the extent to which this type of trading put the firms they lead at risk.
If people want to gamble with these models, they should do it with their own money – not the capital pool upon which the banking system is based.
Bring back Glass-Steagall!!
I majored in math, so reading the stuff comes a bit easier. Your idea that this stuff is coming from math physics engineer techies is right. Here is a classic example:
From here, they begin a discussion of the uncertainty principle and it’s application to the problem.
It is also the case that use of models in finance is dangerous, because we really don’t have any reason to trust any equation about the future of a corporation, or any segment of the economy. The past does not predict the future in the stock market.
Most of the mortgage pools are first mortgages. When the house eventually sells, the cash comes back.
There are pools of second mortgages and home equity lines of credit. When the house goes into foreclosure, they have to decide whether to bid in the amount owed on the first mortgage. If they think there is sufficient equity, they can do that. In that case, the first mortgage is made whole. The second gets whatever the house brings.
I understand that most seconds don’t do anything. They most likely will be wiped out in foreclosure. The only exception is when an outsider shows up at the foreclosure and bids more than the first mortgage. Then the excess goes to the second.
What you are advocating is what I have been screaming about for months.
We need to get an army of people to put on the green eyeshades and start making pencil dust in an all out effort to figure out what this stuff is worth.
I wonder if they are doing it and not talking. Of course, maybe they’re too scared to look, afraid of what they’ll find and who might get blamed.
Financial distributions are chaotic. Any classical statistics or math fail, because of the non-linear feedback in chaotic systems. Non-linear feedback is characteristic of humans.
Engineers rarely, if ever, consider non-liner feedback because are trying very hard to make their system exist in a linear range of behavior. Non linear behavior has a special name in engineering: “failure”.
With the exception of ordinance, which is designed to fail explosively (and sometimes does it in the wrong place, see failure).
All of the reading I’ve done a math applied to finance has made assumptions about external events (ignored them), ignored exogenous variables, assumed invalid populations for modeling behavior (sub prime defaults = classical mortgage defaults), and never included chaotic analysis, mainly because the equilibrium state after a strange attractor is non-determinate (not know and non calculable).
Application if Ito’s lemma is an example of ignoring exogonous variables and ignoring chaos theory.
The legal profession has words for this behavior: Negligence and fraud.
Geithner for what it’s worth said that Treasury was coming up for its stress testing various scenarios for valuing
crap assetslegacy loans.What he didn’t say is if such assets would be valued at pre-bubble and mark to market levels, both of which would show the banks to be insolvent.
Completely OT, but possibly interesting. Iridium Satellite LLC (one of the Sats destroyed) has some interesting business connections.
CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. – Two big communications satellites collided in the first-ever crash of two intact spacecraft in orbit, shooting out a pair of massive debris clouds and posing a slight risk to the international space station.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/200…..I5m.0PLBIF
BETHESDA, Md., Aug. 6 /PRNewswire/ — Iridium Satellite LLC, the global supplier of mobile satellite communication services, announces the completion of $210 million senior secured credit facilities.
The facilities include senior term loan facilities in an aggregate principal amount of $200 million, including a $98 million four-year first lien Tranche A term loan facility, a $62 million five-year first lien Tranche B term loan facility, and a $40 million six-year second lien term loan facility. In addition, the facilities include a $10 million three-year revolving credit facility.
Lehman Brothers Inc. and Morgan Stanley Senior Funding, Inc. acted as joint lead arrangers and joint bookrunners of the credit facility. Lehman Commercial Paper Inc. served as Administrative Agent, and Morgan Stanley Senior Funding, Inc. served as Syndication Agent, for the facilities.
http://www.redorbit.com/news/b…..index.html
You write:
Too true. But, reading the linked “description” (from Hsu’s blog in 2005), indicates to me that not only is the model shaky (e.g., people making bets about recession-era values based on boom-era information, otherwise known as garbage in, garbage out) but the model was recognized as being seriously misused as early as 2005, and misused by people who failed to understand (or were told to overlook – one can’t leave out the pressure of supervisors and the need to make bigger profits) its subtleties and was being fed crappy information.
I remember 20 plus years ago reading the big thick book (the name of which I forget) which explained how fractal mathematics was discovered and developed and how a fractal was seriously susceptible to miniscule changes in the initial conditions. At the time, my desktop had BASIC, which allowed me to write some simple programs to fool around with fractals to see just what the author was talking about.
These guys are in the same situation, though I doubt they even had the slightest clue of how sensitive the systems they designed were to even miniscule changes in the initial conditions (info plugged into the model). And, if they were, they blew through them in their lust for profit. (Thank you, mutual blowjob society bond-rating agencies for your craptastic work….)
They were worse than blind.
In short, if you’re gonna offer risk protection (otherwise known as insurance), obey the long-established rules of underwriting. Like having adequate reserves.
And, if you won’t willingly obey those rules, the government should make you.
And good actuarial data.
One of those clowns today actually came right out and said that they won’t lend money to someone/anyone because the value of what they are lending them money for may be worth less than what a loan would be for…i.e., they are waiting until the bottom falls completely out…i.e., your $100,000 house is worth $10,000 or maybe one cent…or….NOTHING!
Then..you know what they will do if they are allowed to continue with this charade? They will buy up everybody’s property for zero on the “dollar”.
They know that there is nothing there to establish anything’s worth, because nothing has any value anymore. If you have a house that isn’t in a place with a fabulous view of the ocean or on a golf course or Gawd…even Dubai’s Paradise Island stuff is worthless…Even “they” can’t afford it really…we just let them live there with the wealth that they have stolen from the people the world over.
Because…the worth is only established by what someone is willing and “able” to pay for it. Firstly, they have “disabled” the world from being able to pay for anything. Secondly, they have tried to hide the “means” by which those that supposedly have the means, could pay for anything…and certainly, they are hurting.
The wealthy of the world are wearing clothes that they bought with no real money…all on credit…all the bling. Who wants to buy bling??? Markopolos (the whistleblower) laid it right out there to Congress. Hear me now….. The wealthy, including the royalty of Europe…are flat out broke…because of Madoff…Well, not just because of Madoff…because of all of the bogus financial contrived wealth and talk about “pixie dust”…Geez.
The Rich are Broke!!! That is why the world is in chaos.
I get the feeling here that what the banks are doing is a giant con game designed to socialize the risk and privatize the profits, isolating the risk from the profits. I think any plan to “buy up” these toxic assets only rewards the bozos who got us into this fix in the first place.
If these banks can’t manage their assets, declare them bankrupt and turn them over to the FDIC. And meanwhile, accelerate all probes of illegal activities. These guys won’t fly straight until some of them start to serve time in jail.
Bob in HI
It looks like we need to learn something about stress testing. In the Joe Nocera article on risk management from last month, we learn that most risk managers relied on a technique called “Value At Risk”, VaR:
This is criticized by Talebi:
The Federal Reserve has been accepting mortgage backed securities as collateral for loans for at least a year. They must know by now what range of problems to anticipate. They have at least a very good sample of what they are up against by now.
#17:
So, I wonder…did somebody say…so, what do we have that is insured that could go down and we could collect…????
So, I wonder…who benefits???
Also, what “proof” is there that this actually even happened?
Who is the insurer?
Just sayin’
This frikkin’ stinks.
No mo’ bling causes frightful occurances..even in outerspace.
The entire edifice of economics, especially the Chicago school, is based on math. I remember taking macroeconomics in the late 60s. The prof gave a lecture one day on shadow pricing, and its use in government economic planning. He said that the model explained the steps the government should take. I pointed out that if they used the model, other people could use that model to figure out what the government would do and take actions beneficial to themselves. Iteration. I never trusted anything else I ever heard in those classes. Math background will do that for you.
It’s possible. It would depend on the rights of the government to learn about the collateral. After all, until it is forfeited, the income goes to the owner, not the person who holds the collateral. And it would depend on the ability of the Treasury to monitor the information it collected.
lalisa is up with some Blago for those so inclined, no need to leave the discussion with the maestro masaccio, tho.
A good point and one that should have been brought up with Geithner. I agree that VaR, especially in our unsettled times, tells us almost nothing about what real risk is. But it probably is something that Geithner will use to justify the integrity of banks that are obviously and on their face deeply insolvent. I was wondering how he would do it and VaR provides just the kind of BS mechanism for it.
Going back to my comment at 4, I think that real world pricing indices like pre-bubble housing prices or current mark to market should be used to evaluate solvency.
It seems the “stress testing” is merely looking at the effect of different stress scenarios on the value of the assets. But this presumes we have a method to make the valuation in the first place, which is what your post is discussing.
I think what the Congress/media heard was that the “stress test” is the valuation method, and not the scenario analysis you apply on top of that.
Is this distinction correct, and if so, then it suggests the value of the “stress test” is only as good as the underlying valuation method. In other words, Geithner really didn’t tell us anything about how to value these assets. Is this right?
I basically like that idea. My daughter and I were talking about the problem of figuring out what it is safe to pay for a house, using that model: if the prices of houses were a straight line, what would they have gone to today. Then we make some adjustments, and try figuring out what a realistic price would be today.
That works for hard assets with a history. It won’t work for assets that are derivative of other things, at least not directly.
If a property has an income stream (rents, corpos for sale), then it has value.
Another way to value property is “cost to build” or replacement cost.
Market value, what you are discussing, is only one way of three to value property.
Experienced auditors getting really rough with piles of numbers is precisely what is needed right now. The problem with that approach is that management and/or regulators don’t want the guys on the ground to get too sharp with the pencils, lest the results become…unweildy. But again, you are correct. It is my understanding that Elizabeth Warren’s crew is doing this to some extent. So far at least, she seems pretty no-nonsense to me. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jlm4YetMKgU
I’m pretty sure the term “stress testing” is just a business buzz word, one the sales/marketing people picked up listening to the quantitative people. I don’t think it means what Geithner seemed to be saying. I think it means what Nocera said, which I interpret as changing the VaR model by adding some terms to represent serious general problems. Take a look at the wikipedia article:
This is what you are saying. It uses the model with harsh scenarios. Therefore, there is no progress because the model itself is the problem and isn’t being changed.
Someone needs to ask Geithner what he means, and who is going to do this “stress testing”.
I haven’t read the comments… but something strikes me as odd.
How can they manage all these little bits of revenue streams from the originating debtor or whatever the “instrument is” without having some sort of accounting of what’s going on. Isn’t there some sort of accounting ledger? I don’t understand how they can distribute earnings when they don’t know who paid, how much, who didn’t and so forth.
In the best of times there’s oddles of money pouring in and so there’s plenty to go around. But when the instruments are non performing or bogus then there ISN’T money to go around. Can’t they identify all the performers and non performers????
Several of my friends know Warren personally, and say she is everything she seems to be and more.
Part of the problem is that the owners of almost any financial asset that aggregates underlying assets has no real visibility of the actual performance of those assets beyond the quarterly check (or lack thereof) for his return. If this question is addressed then buyers, sellers, regulators, rating agencies will have a uniform basis upon which to apply their disparate models to determine “value” in their eyes.
Proposals along this line have been put forward by TYI,LLC. Their web site is at http://www.tyillc.com/ and makes interesting reading.
My impressions of her so far have been very favorable. Smart as a whip, very diplomatic, and on the assignment like a pit bull. Just what the doctor ordered.
Fees are so insidious. I call people who earn them (commissions) and fees computed and not related to work down, leeches. This is completely BOGUS.
People should be paid for the labor. More skilled -higher pay. END OF STORY
With respect to mortgages, the person who has the historical information about performing and non-performing loans is the mortgage servicing company. The other instruments are held by trusts, so I assume that the trust people are keeping track. However, they are only administrators, not financial people, and they are not going to be able to help evaluate the instrument. After all, these are complicated and have huge future components. Mortgages are trivial in comparison.
Note that the source of the income is irrelevant to the investor. Their only interest is the cash.
Send in the fraud squad
Of course no one’s gathering the data. That’s because this data also merits the descriptor “evidence”.
I know that there is some nice-sounding rationalization for the existence of these financial instruments. Something that involves “distributing risks” and “keeping liquidity in the market”, etc., etc. These instruments probably also cure bad breath, retard men’s hair loss, and repel mosquitoes. But I have yet to see anyone explain why we needed something other than the well-understood tools (interest payments, securing the loan with title to the property) of plain old-fashioned mortgages to manage the risk that the borrower might default. And I don’t see how shuffling around the debt in some shell game with these new instruments in any way changes the fact that the borrower is going to be keeping the same amount of somebody’s money tied up during the life of the mortgage.
Sure, I’m just some ignorant schmuck, but since you’re asking me as a taxpayer to become the proud owner of these intruments, I think someone needs to at least try to explain to me what legitimate function these new instruments might possibly have accomplished better or more efficiently than plain old mortgages. I need their legitimate function explained because they have an obvious utility as vehicles of fraud, since neither regulators nor investors understand how they work. And decoupling your assets from any clear relation to any underlying value is definitely de rigeur if you want your new market to be able to pyramid.
No one is going to gather data on this stuff. It’s never going to be Science Friday over at Big Shitpile. Until and unless we send in people to gather the evidence, the shitpile is going to remain opaque.
To take a totally different tack at the problem: Any method of valuing a given asset is going to have a cost. For example, a method that simply applies a formula to a bunch of data that’s already at hand is going to be less expensive than a method that requires sending somebody out to do field research. So (1) How much can the interested parties afford to pay to determine a given asset’s value, (2) Are the affordable methods likely to provide high enough quality valuations to be useful in solving this crisis at the national level, and (3) If more expensive methods would provide better results at the national level, could the USG assist by providing the money to cover that funding gap?
A fundamental issue isn’t being discussed.
We’re assuming the toxic assets problem is crucial, but it is crucial only because of the way banks handle them. Banks are looking at the toxic assets and deciding not to loan money. They don’t seem to care if their decision to turn off the money spigot is killing the economy.
I prefer fixing the mortgage problem, so bankers can get on with loaning money. However, liberal economists might argue that simply letting them do their thing and killing the economy is the better way. Obviously these economists are NOT politicians or real people.
The fundamental issue not being discussed is the freedom of bankers to destroy our economy.
It’s a lot more power than Al Qaeda has and they could do this even if they didn’t have the obvious excuse of toxic assets to lean on.
How can a nation with a real economy as large and as dependent on banking as ours continue with a banking system where a small handful of bankers (supposedly people, but obviously idiots) can choose to destroy everyone else and the government supposedly has no recourse but to watch?
What is the responsibility of bankers, especially in the big banks, with regard to the nation’s economy?
What is the responsibility of government with regard to the financial industry?
Even if we paid off blackmailers or bought their toxic assets, so they got out of this without losses, someone would have to ask if it’s just.
Oh, another thing, Geithner’s ideas might be good, but his presentations lacked clarity and like a lot of business propositions you don’t understand it might be bad.
If you can’t understand it then how can you evaluate it properly. He needs to clarify it or change it to something people can understand.
This is a good point. I’m pretty sure the cost is trivial in Ginnie Mae securities and most Fannie and Freddie securities, which are mortgage based. The models we use are heavily fact based, and go back years, so there are historical data sets that are not unlike today’s mortgage market.
From there it gets more complicated, as I say. I have some ideas, and may post some of them. Let me just say that valuing the more complex securities would have been impossible before the advent of computers. I’m pretty sure we can figure out a fair way to value them at a reasonable price. Current models won’t work, so the first thing is to figure out what the assets are, and then to see how to evaluate the pieces.
Interesting site.
The data is all there. In the case of mortgages the servicer has detailed information. A similar situation exists for auto loans, credit card receivables and even medical receivables.
What does not exist is the ability of the owner of a piece of a given pool to access the underlying records of the assets that are particular to his deal from the (potentially) multiple servicers. He has to rely upon the originator of the pool for this information and it is not freely available. Certainly it is not available to prospective buyers that have no present interest in the pool.
These factors combine to cause a reliance upon third party ratings agencies and/or the sources of the pools, both of which are completely discredited by the market.
Debating the model to apply to non-existent data is fairly pointless. Get the data and decide how you, or your consultant, should use it. Other parties will make other valuation choices, resulting in values that have the confidence of those making them.
If this is done, there is the potential for a buyer to see a value above the value seen by an owner, and that makes a market.
So who are the originators of the pools?
Darn close to what Lucas got his Prize for.
This is good for these securities to the extent they are pass-through. For the sliced up CDOs, valuation is harder, but it ought to be doable. For the pools that have other stuff in them it gets worse. Still, every pool is made up of stuff, and getting values for the stuff is the first step.
The fundamental issue not being discussed is the freedom of bankers to destroy our economy.
It is something to think about, isn’t it? What other rationale for serious regulation of that industry should be necessary?
The investment banks, Morgan, Lehman, Bear,Merrill, Saloman etc. and the investment banking arms of the large commercial banks, Citi, UBS and others.
Presently, they do not seem to be in favor of any process whereby the pools that they issued can be valued except by themselves.
Garbage in, garbage out
The detailed information that the servicer has about the borrower would be great if it could be trusted to have even been accurate in the first place, much less still accurate now that the borrower has had an excellent chance to have already lost his job. But for some reason, the validity of which I’ve never been able to ascertain, we allowed a market to grow up in which the originators of mortgages acquired a huge moral hazard in doing due diligence on their borrowers, because they knew that they were going to offload these turkey mortgages before they exploded. We know that at least some of them actively encouraged borrowers to just lie aboutr their ability to repay so that the originator could ring the cash register with fees on a mortgage it wouldn’t have to pay any downside on.
Good luck with Massacio’s idea that analysis from a historical baseline period before we put out these incentives to systematic fraud will yield an initial accurate valuation of at least large pools of these mortgages. I’m sure that individuals have been lying about their creditworthiness since about the time of Hammurabi, and if it were just the baseline level of dishonesty we were dealing with, historical controls already have that built into the overall risk they calcualte. But I’m not sure where you’re going to find the right historical control for a market where the lying was institutionalized, systematically encouraged by at least some originators. It’s the uncertainty as to the extent and exactly which originators were involved, which we’ll never know until the indictments are unsealed, quite aside from changes in employment of the borrower especially even where the original data was honest, that makes valuations everywhere in the market so uncertain.
My original question stands, and until you can answer it to the satisfaction of the ordinary voter who is expected to shoulder the costs of unsorting this mess, the uncertainty about what data is reliable and what is not is going to remain hardened into an assumption that any outward representations in these markets are dishonest until proven innocent. What was the legitimate function of such markets? What did they do that plain old mortgages couldn’t do as well? If you can’t give a good answer to those questions, I’m going to be left thinking that, for the originators, creating a moral hazard was a feature, not a bug, to having an originator systematically sell mortgages early in their lives. I’m going to be left thinking that the folks who bought these hazardous mortgages were complacent about that hazard because they didn’t really care about mortgages as anything but an excuse to create another type of instrument easy to pyramid because no one understood them or their relation to the value of the underlying mortgages. Maybe this market isn’t able to move this stuff because I’m not the only one thinking these admittedly unkind thoughts.