I have to run, but one last quick thing: I think you’re on to something, re: emulating the tea party, but it has to create a credible threat in order to be taken seriously. I also think that organized labor — historically, a key component of the Dem party coalition — could use a shot of progressive energy as well. So rebuilding the labor movement wouldn’t be a bad place to start — org labor integrates economic and political concerns and is certainly a credible organizational force to be reckoned with.

Thanks again, Bev, for putting this together. And thanks to Ari for hosting.

But most of all, thanks to the FDL community for this spirited — and at times heated — chat. Just what I needed on this chilly Chicago evening…

Happy holidays, all. Thanks for having me.

(More info on my book can be found on my website, here.)

I haven’t, sorry, but that’s fascinating. didn’t know that.

Agreed. But don’t you think part of the problem was that soaring rhetoric itself? Personally, I thought he promised more than he (or anyone) could ever possibly deliver. So those who bought into the rhetoric may have been expecting Obama to be Lincoln + MLK + Gandhi + Jesus all rolled into one. How, then, could they not be disappointed? He is to blame for this, to be sure, for raising expectations to such heights. But a lot of people bought into it despite its pie-in-the-sky quality. The great disillusionment felt by so many today seems (to me, at least) like the other side of the “hope” coin. Wasn’t it inevitable?

Jon, yes, you said it better than I did, but that’s the point I was just trying to make @74

Thanks RevBev. I think that a lot of this, honestly, comes down to context. Facing a Republican-controlled House, Obama is going to have to draw sharper distinctions and use the bully pulpit to communicate his (not our) priorities better. With large Dem majorities, the incentive was to pursue an insider strategy of negotiating with the powers that be to get legislation done. In the next two years, especially with the reelection campaign upon him, I wouldn’t be surprised at all if Obama uses his rhetorical skills more effectively. The more he clarifies his positions, the better off we’ll be. Part of the disappointment, as you say, has come from the ambiguity of his positions. He has floated way too much stuff out there (public option only the most conspicuous example). That’s the way you negotiate and legislate, but it’s not the way you lead. So perhaps under new competitive conditions, his positions will be clearer, and even if folks don’t agree with him, at least they’ll know where he stands (as Bush used to say!).

Ok…realizing that I stepped into dangerous territory here, I wonder if I could ask for your constructive response to the party-building issue:

Is there any way for Obama to recapture the support of progressives who supported him in ’08?

Is the Democratic Party salvageable? Or is a tea-party like movement the best way forward for progressives?

i.e., what should the party-building strategy be, going forward?

I don’t disagree that these bills don’t represent real challenges to existing power structures. HCR, financial, etc. — these laws take existing authorities as a given and don’t challenge them or try to undermine them in any significant way.

But this congress has been one of the most productive in recent history, and Obama has to be given some credit for that, no? During the campaign, Clinton supporters argued that without significant experience in government, he’d fail to get anything done, he’d get lost in the labyrinthine system of government.

And while differently tailored policies might have been more desirable, the alternative was never those policies — it was McCain-crafted policies or nothing (the status quo). I don’t think you guys will agree with me, but my point is simply that what has gotten done has been (a) historically impressive, in terms of productivity, and (b) probably better than any realistic alternative

On the issue of “party building” and whether Obama is up to the task, I’d like to point out that although Republican presidents tended to do it in a certain way — very top-down, national committee providing resources and services to state parties, etc. — there’s not only one way to do it.

Party building isn’t a “one-size-fits-all” proposition: given the makeup of the Democratic Party, Obama might very well pursue party-building strategies in the coming years that are unlike what we’ve seen in the past.

Decentralizing operations seems (to me, at least) to be the way to go. He should accept that he’s lost the love of many previously-energized activists, and embrace it. Use the resources and capacities of the national party machinery to empower the grassroots, help local and state-wide candidates, let the party do (and say) different things in different areas. If certain activists want to work for local candidates but not for Obama in ’12, let them — help them, empower them, equip them with the tools to do it. (If only because their efforts to bring out more Democratic voters will help Obama at the aggregate level anyway!)

Though Obama doesn’t appear to have fought for very many progressive priorities, I’m not sure he gets enough credit from the left for the pretty impressive list of important things he has accomplished (and can credibly claim as personal accomplishments, where he put a lot of energy into getting them done). Compared to other presidents, he’s been very good at getting legislation passed that reflect his priorities — if not perfectly, then pretty darn close…

Do you guys disagree?

RevBev, My point was that I think he could have waded into more symbolic fights, if only to mobilize his supporters. Not doing so was a strategic error, I think. Plus, you never know if you can succeed until you try, right?!?! And DADT would seem to be a good example of this. Had Obama pushed for it harder, not only would the repeal have passed, but he would have gotten a lot more credit for doing so.

So you (and Teddy) agree that this was a missed opportunity for Obama to show his progressive creds? And ultimately more of a disappointment than a victory (no repeal of DOMA, etc.)?

Ari, I’d be equally interested in your thoughts on this question.

To my mind, tea party activists are generally latent Republicans who now define themselves as something other than Republicans. They’re never going to vote for Democrats, though, which is why they are de facto Republicans.

They’re not a party, per se: they fit much better into the category of “social movement,” but in some ways they’re more organized than that (in terms of $ and organizational structure), in some ways less so (hard to know what the core unifying purposes and incentives are across the group).

I think that a number of folks in that “movement” (as it were) have discovered the power of the outside-in strategy. They’re not going to “blend” into the Republican Party — why would they? Their power comes from being on the outside looking in. This is a conflicted posture, of course, as more self-identified tea partiers win elective office, caucus with the party, etc. etc.

But progressives could take a page from the tea party playbook, to be sure.

The problem is that liberals have been establishing “outside” groups for decades, applying pressure from the outside, etc., and so that strategy may have lost some of its bite on the left.

In addition, what has differentiated the tea party activists is that they’re willing to march in the street saying crazy things. Not sure progressives will do the same thing, at least not so long as Obama throws a bone their way every once in a while. That’s harsh, but I think you know what I mean.

I don’t think Obama has realized the important political byproducts of fighting for something — even if he isn’t likely to get it. GWBush got this when he pushed for constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage. Was never going to happen, but it mobilized the troops. Had Obama really pushed for something like DC statehood — or the public option — or ending the Bush millionaire tax cuts — he might not have gotten them, but an authentic push for these progressive priorities might have paid dividends in terms of building activist enthusiasm. (But you guys don’t need me to tell you that!)

On this subject: How much credit do you guys give Obama for repealing DADT? Or …was it more Liberman’s (and other senators’) doing?? I wonder if this great news will actually go down as a missed opportunity for Obama to show the “base” that he was willing to fight for their priorities.

Hah! Well right, I think GHWB thought he could cash in more than he was able to, in ’80.

Obviously there were many more factors that went into RR ’80 than the party building that happened in the early ’70s. But the organization-building that the Republicans were doing as early as the 1950s(!) had cumulative effects, making it easier for successors to build on earlier efforts. For example, Gerald Ford was an important party-building president, but his efforts have gone entirely unappreciated. Bill Brock gets most of the glory (RNC chairman during Carter’s presidency) because his term ended in RR’s victory. But it’s all about incremental, cumulative organizational development.

Ari, I read Sam Graham-Felsen’s op/ed in the WashPost (here), where he argues that folks on the ’08 list needed to be consulted more in policymaking.

My response is this: wasn’t the lesson of ’08 that change comes from the outside-in? Maybe those seeking more progressive policy change shouldn’t have ever expected the new president to come asking for their advice. Once he was inaugurated, he became the president, and had to deal with all kinds of constraints and inside-Washington pressures.

Isn’t the lesson that progressive change is ALWAYS dependent upon pressure coming from the outside? Can’t lose sight of that, even once a slightly more progressive president gets into office.

Jane, it’s an honor to have you here for this. Thanks for your questions.

I think that party-building becomes much easier when the goal is electoral, rather than policy-related.

During his first two years, Obama used OFA exclusively to generate publicity and support for his policy agenda. This was always a losing proposition, I think, because as you note, it’s hard to keep everyone on board when the main activity involves selling policies that reasonable people disagree about. Elections are far easier — candidate X vs. candidate Y — whoever is closer to your position on issues, you may go work for so that the opposition doesn’t win.

Nevertheless, we don’t get the impression that Obama has tried very hard to keep the party’s activist base engaged and it’s not clear what kinds of new investments his team has made in the party’s infrastructure, operations, etc. So it hasn’t been a first two years filled with the kind of organizational party-building activities that we saw during earlier Republican presidencies.

The fascinating thing for me about CREEP is that even though Nixon kept his ’72 campaign entirely separate from the Republican Party, and was willing to mobilize Democratic voters and even help Democratic candidates if it helped him win reelection, this anti-party behavior was more the exception than the rule.

In fact, after the dust settled from the ’72 campaign, Nixon tried to fold the remnants of CREEP into the RNC. Voter lists, donor lists, and left over money — some $3 million — were to be sent over to the RNC to help then-RNC chair George Bush build the GOP into the “New Majority” party in America. Of course the CREEP funds became tainted and were never sent over. But the voter files were, most of the donor lists were, and this data was used constructively by state party chairmen to build their local parties. An interesting story that hasn’t really gotten out there. (But it’s in the book!)

Teddy, really great questions.

JFK, LBJ, Carter, and Clinton all took over the DNC, exploited its capacities, and gave virtually nothing back, in a constructive manner, to strengthen the party. If they didn’t completely disband their campaign apparatuses, they tended to keep them separate, “on hold” for the next election.

Jimmy Carter, for example, had his “Carter Network” of 150,000 or so supporters. He sent them numerous mailings, held a convention, had superactivists to the White House, etc. But he never encouraged them to join the Democratic Party or work for its candidates or causes.

Obama has done something different. By folding OFA into the DNC, he at least opens the possibility that his campaign apparatus could be used for constructive party-building purposes. As I noted above, I don’t think he did that during his first two years. But as electoral conditions have changed, he may perceive a stronger incentive to invest in his party organization. Unlike his Democratic predecessors, OFA is already IN the DNC. So he has the tools to do something more constructive, if he chooses. At least, that’s what it looks like from the outside. Ari Melber’s instructive report, which we did a book salon on FDL a while back, shows that there’s a pretty thick veil of secrecy over the entire operation.

I’ll get to CREEP in a minute…

This was Ari’s point, exactly in his op-ed. I’ll let him respond, as I’m sure he has some interesting thoughts on this point…