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With the predominantly foreign fantasy regarding a ‘Green’ Iranian revolution basically over, it is easier to focus attention on divisions within Iran’s dominant political factions. A rupture appears to be manifesting itself more and more between the followers of President Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Khamenei.
While Ahmadinejad has the disadvantage of being a temporary, elected office holder, he nevertheless appears to be holding his ground with determination. He acts like he enjoys a stronger support base than one would have expected. Most commentators see the Revolutionary Guards as his main base of support. But this would normally not be quite enough unless there was a plan for establishing military rule. So far there is little sign of the military rising to challenge the clerics led by Khamenei.
In fact, Khamenei is officially the Supreme Commander of all the armed forces, and appoints the top leaders within the latter as well as the judiciary. So far, there is little indication that the military is about to throw the baby out with the water.
Regardless, Ahmadinejad’s trump card may be none other than demographics. He appears to enjoy the support of a rising younger generation of non-clerical, future leaders organizing on the sidelines in order to grab power at the expense of the older generation of clerical or pro-clerical revolutionaries.
Signs of this power struggle are evident in Iran’s media, especially with the most recent debates surrounding the President’s Chief of Staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei.
Ahmadinejad has come under much fire recently for his rhetoric and street talk. Khamenei himself gave indirect warnings over the President’s use of language. But the real divisions can be seen in a couple of foreign policy announcement of late.
In an interview with Al Jazeera on 22 August, Ahmadinejad made a direct offer of friendship to the US though with a typically taunting style that spoke from a position of strength.
However, Press TV reports that Khamenei is opposed to talks with the US:
“Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei is opposed to talks with the US because they want to push any negotiation to the way they want and they halt it unilaterally if it is not favorable to them, deputy head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of Iran’s Parliament (Majlis) Hossein Ebrahimi said on Monday.”
Concurrently, the head of Iran’s judiciary, Sadeq Larijani, launched a direct attack against those lobbying for rapprochement with USA: “Resuming diplomatic ties with the U.S. is not something that anybody in different branches of government could decide about,” he noted.
Meanwhile, “In a decree issued on Sunday President Ahmadinejad appointed Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei as his special envoy for the Middle East affairs…The move came despite widespread criticism against Mashaei for his controversial remarks about the Iranian and Islamic ideology.”
But leave it to one of the most divisive figures to call for unity: “Expediency Council Chairman Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has said it is essential to maintain unity in the face of outside threats… Now, the people and authorities are facing difficult tests, thus they should show patience and make efforts to pass these tests, Rafsanjani told a gathering of clerics in Tehran on Sunday.”
And Khamenei made another appeal to the younger generation:
“Students should analyze and adopt a clear stance on issues that are linked to the country’s destiny, such as the Tehran declaration, the UN Security Council resolution, and the unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union,” the Leader said at a meeting with thousands of university students in Tehran on Sunday… Commenting on the 2009 Tehran University dormitory incident, the Leader said the issue has not been pursued seriously enough… Ayatollah Khamenei stated that lack of motivation in certain relevant organizations has hindered efforts to follow up the matter and added that the issue should be investigated more thoroughly.
And so a power struggle for hearts and minds continues while a distinct fissure is evident in who exactly determines foreign policy.
What would become of the Islamic Republic without an imminent foreign threat?
21 Comments
Thanks for sharing these insights, niloufar. Once again, there’s an existential threat at the root of conflict, but the threat is a perception and could readily be discussed and negotiated were but the parties involved to have an open dialog.
BTW, your embedded graphic appears not to have been licensed for public viewing and could not be seen. I’ve removed the code as it left an icon where an image would have been.
re. the graphics, thanks for removing it. i think it was my own mistake how i set the viewing options when i uploaded pictures. i think it is a shame that we cannot simply upload our own photos directly from our own computers.
I know it’s an inconvenience, but you can imagine the kinds of abuse that spambots can wreak with images uploaded from a desktop — especially those that are loaded with executable code. Thanks for understanding.
The clerical establishment in Iran is not as divided as people may think. But one intersting point you brought out was the way that the Revolutionary Guard might start show signs of division with the Clerics. I wonder what that kind of change would mean for the region. Pakistan if really just a junta when you peel back the layers. If Iran became a military dictatorship, bereft of its clerical power, would it last?
Mossadegh was ultimately betrayed by the clerics and allowed to collapse because they no more wanted a Communist regime (or communist-sympathetic regime) than they did an Anglo-American run regime. But in the end, they saw a utility in giving Mossadegh to his enemies and allowing the Shah to stand. They plotted how to take down the Shah in their own time, on their own dime, for their own power. And they did so.
The Clerics will protect their power base. IF the US tries to purchase a military coup, it better think three times about the consequences of that. Saddam Hussein was a useful frankenstein’s monseter, but even that had its consequences. Can the US afford to manufacture another junta in the region?
And would the clerics be so gone as the US might hope? Religion is a powerful force. Trading one villainy for the next villainy is a dicey move for both the people of Iran and the West. But if the MIC wants a sustained conflict for the sake of profit, then maybe either option will suit them just fine.
Great diary!
Well, look what happened when we installed the Shah….he was, of course, even more repressive than the clerics and Iran was NOT ready to move into secularism.
Even with the street riots, I suspect engineered by American/Israeli ops, the country doesn’t seem on the verge of throwing off the power structure they have.
Yes, but I suspect a key part of that is the average age of Iranian population. With so many so young who’ve known nothing but the current power dynamic, how do they learn to rebel and start over?
That’s not an argument in favor of our intervention, which I agree was probably a big part of the Green Revolution. It’s a challenge we need to continue to study since real revolution must be organic and driven from within, and this country simply doesn’t have the institutional knowledge about driving change.
I’m more concerned about how we achieve real change in our own country, you know, the country that we actually have direct responsibility for. How do we learn to stop buying into fake change, how do we learn to make our country more peaceful and humane?
There’s no better way we could bring about positive change in Iran than by bringing about positive change in the US.
You know there’s a parallel between both the U.S. and Iran, right? Lots of youngsters who’ve never known anything but their rather conservative leadership, who have been initiated into political activism, but don’t have enough accessible institutional knowledge combined with systemic and persistent encouragement and empowerment to make sustained change?
Um, yeah. We might be able to change Iran if we figured out how to do it ourselves. Or vice versa: learn from them.
[edit: Oh, and as long as we make it all about us, we Americans and our problems to the exclusion of others, we continue to nurture the seeds of radicalism.]
agree with you that ‘the country doesn’t seem on the verge of throwing off the power structure they have’. and at least some of the rioting last year was instigated by foreigners for sure. problem is, too many iranian expats scattered across the world and especially those in the west are far too happy to collaborate with foreign plots. in my view, this is mainly because of emotional confusion than anything else. of course cia, aipac and mossad are superb at making the most of this misguidedness.
thanks for the encouragement :)
the iranian political establishment is extremely difficult to read. there are several layers of bureaucracy and even more layers of ideology, some of which is just there for pure show. ahmadinejad presents a very confusing picture, and i am only starting to learn more about all of this. if you look at the controversy surrounding ‘mashaei’ you will see how a secularist push appears to be coming out of the ahmadinejad camp! mashaei has expressly stated that iran should promote iranian characteristics rather than islamic ones…
i am not convinced that a military dictatorship is on the cards for iran. the armed forces appear split too. in fact, the most pronounced rupture appears to be within the ranks of the military. there are rumours of shouting matches occurring in some of their recent meetings with pro and anti-ahmadinejad figures having a go at each other.
all these cracks are ‘natural’ events in an evolving system that is no more than thirty years old. in a historical context, the iranian revolution is still fairly young. what i describe here is not a rupture that would lead to a regime change. it would be more like reform from within. and this of course is a superior form of reform :)
Maybe among us but the Neocons and the Right Wing Media I think not. Reality never stops belief.
in my view, it does not really matter what the neocons think. what matters more – in this context – is what iranians inside iran think. they will determine the course of events as far as the iranian government goes. our understanding of how things are shaping up inside iran is what i am trying to contribute to.
Could this be good cop bad cop?
Interesting topic.
I’ve always thought that the primary rupture was in terms of domestic economic policy. Traditionally, the military has tended to push for more modernization than the clerics/landholds are comfortable with. Compared to the clerics, Ahmadinejad is a pro-development economic populist.
To me, the Green revolution looked like some Iranian clerical astroturfing to push out Ahmadinejad. Basically, they’d just have ditched the development and kept everything else more or less the same.
As for foreign policy, no matter what the different power bases in Iran say publicly, I think they tend to agree privately. It’s really hard to tell when there’s a real split as opposed to intentionally mixed messages.
re. foreign policy, yes there is much agreement among iranians – not just the within the system – regarding the big questions such as nuclear energy, iran’s security and position in the region, usa, russia, taleban, israel etc. iranians tend to have a keen sense of national interest and a near-obsessive determination to be ‘independent’. the latter goes a long way to explain the disdain for the shah. he clearly was a foreign puppet. the main difference is in the style of conveying such messages. ahmadinejad is not one to mince his words!
i would say that your image of the clerics when it comes to economic policy is a little reductionist. they do have a strong appreciation for economic development, and they tend to be split along standard economic/political outlooks ranging from socialism to laissez fairism.
ahmadinejad – the first non-clerical president since the iran-iraq war – has enforced some very fundamental economic changes (a mixed bag of right and left policies) that no one else has had the gall to implement. the most difficult of these relate to removal of huge subsidies on fuel and some other key items. others in the past have been scared of widespread rioting, but he has managed to bring in such changes, and most people have accepted them as necessary. his biggest challenge is in establishing a proper taxation system, as iranians don’t like paying taxes (very much like the americans?!). to me, without more taxation, greater democracy is unlikely to flourish. if only my compatriots could see it that way…
I am quite taken with Khameni’s instructions to students:
It sounds so like Chairman Mao. In the 60s a bunch of authority figures tried to tell US students how to think. It seems to have worked with a significant number of students. But there were many who distrusted authority figures for a good reason: Richard Nixon and his band of murderous thugs were trying to get them killed in an immoral war.
You dismiss the Green Movement, but I suspect it springs from the same sense that authorities are horribly wrong, and it will not go away so easily.
i did not mean to be dismissive of the greens altogether. the point was that the greens were no revolutionaries, and the western depiction of the movement is based on fantasy. i myself voted for mousavi. but to somehow portray the likes of mousavi and khatami or refsanjani as some kind of challenge to the regime itself was pure fantasy. it’s based on a western discourse that had a specific goal totally unrelated to what the greens were really about.
the infiltration of foreign influences within the movement undermined it, leading to riots and a violent crackdown. fact is, refusing to accept the result of elections just because we lost is rather undemocratic. the greens became reactionary and quite dangerously anti-democratic in that sense.
i would agree with your comments about khamenei to some extent. however, he is no ‘mao’ in the sense that mao was the biggest mass murderer in history. khamenei is all about indoctrination, but not so violently.
My impression is that the Revolutionary Guards are the real force with veto and enforcement power – exceeding that of the clerics or military or any given family. The parliament and president seem to discuss, then get agreement from those with real power, and then act. Granted it is not unlike how Obama acts – but we like to believe that Obama GAVE veto power to the rich and corporate, while in Iran the clerics and Guard just HAVE power. I have a soft spot for Iran – especially in contrast to Pakistan’s 5 family rule and the taking of US aid since 1958 and Ike via Under-Sec of Commerce Olmstead’s transfer of “Atoms for Peace” money (and black box money and actual economic aid money) and the transfer of that money by the 5 families to London and Swiss bank accounts. The 5 families also believe in no taxation of the rich resulting in a country that can not provide much in the way of services and provides near nothing when floods come, so I like the idea that Iran is trying to get its tax rules out from under the fears of those with money. If Dulles had not convinced Ike to end democracy in Iran and favor “oil” as a national security issue (as the CIA has done ever since), we might be well be now in a very close friendly relationship.
Thanks for the information and point of view – it is good to hear from those close to the topic.
Iran will be unified by an external enemy, the USA. Our empire loving media and the neocons will gin up a foolish enterprise that creates a conflict with Iran with or without the help of Israel.
Left to their own devices Iran will destroy itself just like we are destroying ourselves by putting the power in the hands of a few elites. Pollution, shortages of water and food, wicked weather and slave labor based economy will add to the confusion and give opportunities to a few greedy bastards to seize power with lies.
pls see this:
The Times They are A-Changin’
delighted to hear about your affection for iran. i completely agree about the friendship potential :)
i find your approach to the issues extremely sympathetic. i am an expat, and would not wish to pretend otherwise. my english should give me away :)
the tax issue also relates to economic diversification and security as in less dependence on oil. both of these are central aims of iran’s current government. of course it may all happen much faster in peace times…
regarding your main point about the Guards: i think we need to be careful with describing the Guards as something akin to a fascist power. after the elections, they were basically called on to deal with disturbances by the losing side. one could see their role last year as protecting what little democracy we have! their use of violence was excessive, but not more so than in many other countries, including several us allies, such as israel and saudi arabia.
the other key point about them is that they too are fractured. even at the top. ahmadinejad is just one of many in the system with very close links to the guards. larijani, the current speaker of the parliament; rezaei, ex-head of the guards and another of the candidates who lost to ahmadinejad in the last elections; ghalibaf, tehran’s current mayor and a future presidential hopeful – all these guys have close links to the guards, but they are not united in any sense other than maintaining the system.
the guards’ influence could also be seen as an organic outpouring of some of its most brilliant leadership talent into the civilian sphere after the end of an eight-year war in 1988. this is also true in the private sector sphere. so much noise about contracts going to the guards or their network without anyone ever acknowledging that the guards engineers and commanders are among the most capable owners of technology and science as well as entrepreneurship ability in iran. it is necessary somehow as part of a demobilization and peace project at the end of a long war. this is not meant as any justification for corruption. not at all. i simply mean that their presence in such power nodes should be expected. the longer-term outcome could be demilitarisation of the guards. if there were no foreign threat, this would be among top national priorities.