May you purchase innovative private insurance – ancient American curse, circa AD 2009
Medicare turns 44 this Thursday (July 30), and fittingly, single-payer advocates will gather in Washington to lobby and rally in support of extending, improving, and providing universal access to this successful, popular, “uniquely American” national insurance program. (Any Brooklynite who wants to catch a lift with me early Thursday morning, let me know in comments.)
Few people of any ideological stripe hesitate to acknowledge Medicare as, for most intents and purposes, a single-payer system. Yet in many respects, it also makes sense to regard today’s Medicare as an example of a “robust public option” in competition with private plans.
Private insurers have been permitted to muscle in on Medicare’s action since 1997, with subsidized private insurance plans initially called Medicare + Choice and later Medicare Advantage. In fact, even earlier (starting in 1985), Medicare recipients had the option of joining federally subsidized but privately administered Medicare HMOs. Currently, about one-quarter of Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in private Medicare Advantage programs of various types.
Today’s public-private hybrid Medicare system differs in many respects from proposed Obamacare hybrid systems. For example, in Medicare, the public plan is the default and the profit-driven plans are the “options,” whereas in Obamacare it would be the other way around. Another key distinction, of course, is that Medicare plans, whether traditional or private, are funded primarily (but not entirely… I’m getting to that) by tax dollars, unlike insurance plans for the under-65 set in the current system or, with just a touch more help from Uncle Sam, under Obamacare.
Still, to an admittedly imperfect degree, today’s hybrid Medicare system provides a laboratory for testing the core assumption of the “public option” concept: that competition from a public plan can keep profit-driven insurers “honest.”
The Medicare HMO Experience
So, let’s start with the warning from critics like David Himmelstein and others that in a hybrid system, the private plans will — actively, passively, or both — skim the healthier (ie, more profitable) patients and dump the sicker ones on the public plan. That certainly pertained during the first decade of experience with Medicare HMOs, as documented in a 1997 article in the New England Journal of Medicine. The title pretty much says it all: "The Medicare-HMO Revolving Door — The Healthy Go In and the Sick Go Out."
An HMO’s emphasis on preventive services and integrated disease management, while meritorious, helps healthier patients more than sicker ones. Up to 1997, Medicare beneficiaries could opt in or out of Medicare HMOs and traditional fee-for-service Medicare from month to month. The NEJM authors showed that when members of Medicare HMOs got sick and required coverage for more expensive care, they exited HMOs in droves in favor of traditional Medicare. This kept the HMOs off the hook for patients’ biggest expenses. That’s pretty much the definition of adverse selection.
The pitch for Medicare HMOs, which subsequently became the broader pitch for Medicare Advantage plans, was that “innovative” private plans with varied menus of benefits, forged in the foundry of free-market creativity, provide Medicare beneficiaries with the blessing of “choice” (choice of benefit packages, that is, as distinct from choice of providers, which almost invariably shrinks rather than expands with private plans).
Those same buzzwords of innovation and choice permeate today’s dubious arguments by public option boosters for why death-by-spreadsheet companies still somehow deserve an unelectrified seat at the table in any forthcoming “reformed” system.
Medicare (dis)Advantage Programs
Today’s Medicare Advantage options include not just HMOs but private fee-for-service policies, PPOs, and other types of plans. Seniors, in focusing their hopefully still-agile faculties on whether to choose from among such plans or the “public option” of traditional Medicare, need to weigh how the plans juggle costs (including premiums and co-pays) and services (which may include bundled Medicare Part D prescription drug benefits and/or Medigap coverage, both of which traditional Medicare beneficiaries need to purchase separately).
Such complexity breeds perplexity, and for insurance companies, as Wendell Potter confirmed, consumer confusion is not a bug but a feature. Befuddlement is a profit center.
Medicare Advantage rolls have grown dramatically in recent years thanks in large measure to aggressive and often deceptive marketing practices. Insurers have wooed seniors with temporary waivers of monthly premiums that subsequently kick in and then balloon. As this essential article by Bloomberg’s Avram Goldstein notes, Medicare Advantage monthly premiums nationwide rose an average of 13 percent at the start of 2009, about five times the increase seen at the beginning of 2008.
In lieu of increased premiums, Goldstein reports, some companies effect a bait-and-switch by way of rejiggered benefits; for example, UnitedHealth Group Inc., the largest Medicare Advantage provider, increased beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket costs on a number of its plans going into 2009. That means more surprise bills to beneficiaries who thought they were covered.
Many Medicare Advantage programs offer attractive, and perfectly fine, health-promoting perks, such as gym memberships. But the true test of coverage is how the insurer handles, or attempts to worm out of, the big-ticket medical bills accompanying major illness or injury. As noted in this 2008 article by Maggie Mahar of the Century Fund, many seniors discover too late that when they slip off the treadmill, they fall through the tracks.
Some of the worst marketing practices, including door-to-door solicitation, may have been curbed following legislative and regulatory actions taken in 2008, according to a Congressional Research Service report published this March (pdf). However, as the report’s author, Paulette Morgan, noted, “While it appears that the legislation resolved many of the issues, Congress will have to wait and see whether or not those conducting the abusive practices are able to circumvent the changes to the law.” In other words, never underestimate the capacity of “innovative” insurers to discover ways to screw beneficiaries in the service of their investors.
"Honest" Cost Control?
In the stilted parlance that dominates mainstream discourse on health care reform, “honesty” typically translates to “cost control.” By that technocratic measure, Medicare Advantage programs have been an unmitigated bust, as amply documented by – don’t be surprised – Jacob Hacker, the father of the public option concept. Allow me to quote at length from a briefing document he issued through the Institute for America’s Future in December 2008 (pdf):
[The] Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has found that administrative costs under the public Medicare plan are less than 2 percent of expenditures, compared with approximately 11 percent of spending by private plans under Medicare Advantage. This is a near perfect “apples to apples” comparison of administrative costs, because the public Medicare plan and Medicare Advantage plans are operating under similar rules and treating the same population….
As is well known, Medicare Advantage plans are substantially overpaid relative to what it would have cost to provide coverage to the same enrollee in the public Medicare plan—13 percent more on average per person, as calculated by MedPAC and confirmed by the CBO. This overpayment reflects two main problems: a method for paying plans that subsidizes their participation in Medicare Advantage and the ability of the plans to attract healthier (and hence less costly) people with Medicare. Both of these problems can and should be addressed—in Medicare and in any new framework for public-private competition.
Yet the larger lesson of Medicare Advantage is that private plans do not appear to have strong tools for controlling costs relative to the public Medicare plan. The most tightly regulated HMOs have been shown to perform roughly as efficiently as the public Medicare plan does, but according to MedPAC, most private plans are not as efficient as the public Medicare plan. All but HMOs bid to provide Medicare Part A and Part B benefits for more than the public Medicare plan spends on the same benefits — often much more. Indeed, the fastest-growing category of Medicare Advantage plan, private fee-for-service plans are the least efficient and most costly for Medicare, with their bids for Part A and B benefits fully 108 percent of the public Medicare plan’s costs.
(emphasis in original)
The taxpayer-funded diseconomies of Medicare Advantage plans that Hacker writes about have all but spelled the doom of at least the private fee-for-service Medicare Advantage programs. (Traditional Medicare is fee for service, so these programs are more redundant and provide the least “innovation” of any Medicare Advantage variant.)
As a result, private insurers, standing to lose billions, have innovatively launched scare campaigns to try to preserve Medicare Advantage. Plug “Medicare Advantage” and “astroturf” into Google to learn about the fake letter-writing campaigns in which industry-paid PR firms plunked seniors’ names, without permission, at the bottom of boilerplate letters to editors imploring the President not to deprive them of their cherished private Medicare Advantage plans.
Of Competitive Pressures and Scorpions
So let’s step back for a second. Traditional, public, fee-for-service Medicare beats the pants off private Medicare Advantage plans competing for federal and enrollee dollars. Has this made the private companies more “honest”?
Certainly not in the technocratic sense – they continue to soak both the government and beneficiaries while turning up the pressure, through lobbying, marketing, and stealth to stay in business. Certainly not in the ethical sense; their innovative creativity extends solely to their preservation of market share, not health.
If, as is highly likely, some or all Medicare Advantage programs are about to disappear, they will not have been “competed” into oblivion by the public plan but rather legislated away, by a Congress and President who will have figured out that we’re better off with a Medicare more true to its unadulterated single-payer origins.
And what lessons does Jacob Hacker draw?
To read a Jacob Hacker paper with requisite care, it helps to start with a stiff shot of espresso laced with ginko biloba, ritalin, and Aricept. You need that level of sharpness to stay on top of how he meticulously and conscientiously garners evidence that conclusively supports a point he steadfastly refuses to make.
In the April 2009 expanded sequel to the earlier cited briefing document, Hacker writes,
Even in a greatly reformed market, private health plans will have incentives to engage in practices – such as selecting healthier enrollees or shifting costs onto patients – that undermine health security. A public health insurance plan will not…
(so far, so good)
…and thus can provide an essential source of competitive pressure on private plans to encourage better practices and more effective cost restraint.
"Better practices and more effective cost restraint" in service of whom: beneficiaries or investors?
Hacker is essential reading for powerful arguments in favor of Medicare for All. The notion that competitive pressure from a public plan will be sufficient to prompt the proverbial scorpion to renounce its nature garners no support from our experience with Medicare Advantage. Rather the evidence points the way to what’s genuinely necessary, "politically infeasible" or not.



15 Comments







I’m not sure this is a great comparison. Medicare Advantage and other such plans are not the result of competition between private plans and Medicare, they are the result of corrupt politicians voting for something that hurts seniors.
So, what you’ve pointed out here is the necessity of progressives to defend a public option (if/when one gets passed) from encroachment via legislation from private industry. Which will indeed be necessary.
Now, why hasn’t Medicare made private insurance better for the rest of us? That would be an interesting question to ask. My answer is that Medicare plays to a distinct market, and so private industry has been forced to do its worst elsewhere, something the public option would eliminate.
I stated several key limitations of the comparison up front, but really, if Jacob Hacker can point to the deficiencies of Medicare Advantage programs as a strong cautionary tale regarding the construction of a broader public-private hybrid system, I don’t see why you wouldn’t take your putative mentor seriously.
Where did I ever say anything to the effect that MA plans are a “result of competition between private plans and Medicare”? They ARE the competition for Medicare and beneficiary dollars.
Medicare Advantage programs may indeed be rooted in corrupt politics, but really, do you want to go there? If the system weren’t corrupt, we’d be discussing the relative merits of HR 676 vs HR 193 rather than the distinctions between the crumbs on offer between HR 3200 and the Senate HELP bill.
The public option as it’s shaping up in Congress doesn’t need defense from private encroachment, because it’s being delivered to us pre-encroached, with private insurance still predominant. Moreover, HCAN is officially indifferent to whether the public plan derives from Medicare, as Hacker wisely counsels, or is essentially a private nonprofit company. Encroach much?
Your last paragraph makes no sense at all. Did I not go to considerable effort to show that Medicare Advantage programs are prime examples of for-profit insurers doing their worst in the Medicare market (not “elsewhere”)?
Seriously, Jason, if you don’t have the wherewithal to respond directly and germanely, please don’t bother.
I think we’re talking past each other a bit.
When Obama says the public option will keep insurance companies honest, he’s talking about a competitive mechanism. As in, by being a good example, by driving down prices, by being popular with customers, a public option would force private insurers to do the same.
Now, you’re argument is in part that private insurers have corrupted Medicare in some areas, and that this has led to bad practices. I agree with this.
But that’s not how the public option is set up in any proposal, at least not right now. As it is set up, it operates either like a private company without the private pressure for profits and shareholders and such, or more like Medicare (depending on the proposal). But it, as set up, is not corrupted by private insurance. So, as set up, it would function to keep insurance companies honest, because it would be in a competitive relationship with private insurance.
Now, again, I agree that Medicare Advantage and others are a cautionary tale. If we pass a public option, we will have to constantly defend it from corruption. But, as set up, I don’t believe it would be corrupted naturally. It would take an act of Congress to corrupt it, much like it took at act of Congress to start things like Medicare Advantage.
This is blurring the issue. The public option would be run by the public, not by private companies. The fact that it leaves room for private industry does not turn it into Medicare Advantage, where a government program is run by private industry. That’s two different things.
So, if you’re making a larger point that a public option could turn into something Medicare Advantage-like at some point, yes, I’d agree. This is something to defend against in the future.
But as envisioned in the proposal right now, I don’t see how that happens without an act of Congress. Which means 60 votes and all those other things. Not impossible, but Congress could repeal Medicare if it wanted to. It can do whatever it wants.
We will have to defend our victories against encroachment. I’m just not seeing the premise of the argument as valid, that because Congress in the past decided to taint Medicare means that the public option here will never keep the industry honest. If the public option is not changed in the future by Congress, it will indeed compete with private industry. We could debate whether it will be large or powerful enough to do its job, but I hope you’ll agree that it won’t become like Medicare Advantage unless we lose a fight in Congress.
I appreciate the more detailed comment.
My main point is not, as you say, that a public option under Obamacare would run the risk of turning into Medicare Advantage. My main point is that if as truly robust a public plan as Medicare can’t drive down costs, force efficiencies, and enforce good behavior (that’s a part of “making them honest”) in the private plans with which it competes, the likelihood of a more constricted public plan forcing such changes among private insurers in the under-65 market is doubtful.
Ah, ok, we’re getting somewhere.
There are two points here.
First, a public plan like Medicare couldn’t enforce good behavior only because Congress didn’t let it. For years, it was the only game in the senior market, so in that sense, it forced good behavior from private insurance (ie. no behavior). But Congress opened the door on that. Now, the way Congress opened the door guaranteed that Medicare would be tainted. I might even argue that Congress would have done better just to allow private companies to compete for the same customers as Medicare, as opposed to forcing private companies to sell services under Medicare’s name, with government subsidies. However, that’s not what happened.
So, a public option, as conceived now, would not be tainted in the same way unless Congress in the future changed it. That is a problem, but it’s not really a strike against the public option as far as I’m concerned, it’s rather a strike against Congress.
Now, the another point is that Medicare operates in a restricted market (65+), with a much larger, non-restricted market next door. Insurance companies can hone their bad practices in the non-restricted market and then try to hone in on the restricted market, as they’ve done. With the health reform bills on the table, there is some blanket restrictions on private insurance, so that already starts enforcing good behavior across the board. And, the public option would be competing in the same pool, in a general sense, again enforcing discipline across the board.
So, yeah, we could have a debate about whether the public option can do what its goals are, but I don’t see how the public option doesn’t put pressure on insurance companies unless Congress changes how the public option works. It probably goes without saying that Congress making those sorts of changes is something I’d oppose.
We’re still talking across each other, but at least you’re trying to argue from differences between the Medicare and below-65 markets, which I acknowledge are considerable. I’m not going to debate all the points I find dubious in your last comment because in large measure we’ve been there and done that. I’m curious whether my post has struck a chord, or a discord, for any other readers.
Yeah, I think you’re right. Though, in general, I did find the post interesting, especially because most people don’t examine Medicare Advantage nearly as much as they should. Thanks for the discussion.
ralpbon, Thanks for a very good analysis. Jason, in view of Paul Krugman’s recent analysis of the health insurance “market,” and the constraints placed on eligibility for the public option in HR 3200, can one reasonably anticipate that, even if HR 3200 is enacted without major change, it will have an appreciable impact on health insurance costs and price inflation over the next six years?
Six years? I don’t know. I’d have to look at the graphs again, but I’m not sure you saw a big differentiation between Medicare prices and everyone else’s prices in six years. However, those differences did emerge, as will these. Especially because I’d expect the public option to work so well that the Secretary of HHS would exercise her right to expand the exchange (and therefore the public option) in 2015.
Jason,
Thnaks for your reply. Sorry to be so persistent. But I’m asking why you think that will happen. Evidently CBO doesn’t think so, and Kip Sullvan gives a pretty good argument here suggesting that it won’t. So, again, why do you believe what you do? Or to put this another way, why do you think that your view of the future stands up to critical evaluation better than Sullivan’s?
Because both Kip and the CBO are looking at this like a wonk, focused solely on policy, and not looking at how things work in the real world, which includes things like politics.
First, the CBO. They only project out 10 years at the most, but they really are only accurate within 5 years. The public option won’t have expanded too much in their time frame.
Now, my counter example is to look at other large social programs like Social Security or Medicare. Those programs have done nothing but expand. Why would this be any different?
Single payer is dead. The public option is in the ICU on a vent and the prognosis is grim.
What is interesting to me in the healthcare debate are all the dogs that didn’t bark. We have the experience of a dozen countries that produce better health results than us at lower cost. They were nowhere to be seen. Even in our own country we have the experience of Medicare. What do those who are familiar with Medicare think are its strengths and its weaknesses? What are their thoughts on how it is funded and how it controls costs? If I were just looking at the Congressional debate and the media coverage, I would have no idea.
This silence should tell us that there is a zero emphasis on any kind of public plan. If that were insufficient, there is the way the Blue Dogs are strutting around and the way “progressive” members of Congress are avoiding commitment to a public plan. And if that were not enough, the fact that a public option even at this late date has no content we can point to and whose implementation will be delayed until 2013 should ring any remaining alarm bells that need ringing.
The public option is an afterthought, something for the rubes, to make them think that this sellout is “reform”. As far as I can see, even the rubes aren’t buying it. But that won’t stop Obama and the Congress from selling us out anyway.
Thanks, Hugh. I’m afraid your right. But we do have a month or so to do our best to change things and frame things differently. I think progressives all ought to get behind single payer. I know some of us (though not I) want to end up with a strong public option. But I think that the best way to get to that place is to push single payer. SP is the easiest of the alternatives to understand because it can be sold as an extension of Medicare. When it’s scored by CBO it’s likely to undercut the Blue Dogs’ argument about “costs.” Finally, any serious rise in pressure for single player from the public will introduce at least some fear into the situation for the Blue Dogs and they are more likely to come to come to the table. I don’t think they’re afraid of the HR 3200 with its weak public option at all. Paradoxically, that’s why they’re willing to go out on a limb to try to kill it. After all, what are they risking. If it passes, it won’t cut into their business much, anyway. Also, Jason, I think HCAN definitely made a mistake in throwing its weight behind the public option. It was really bad strategy, and I think we’re all paying for it now. You ought to shift and get behind Anthony Weiner’s amendment to substitute HR 676 for HR 3200, and Obama should now shift ground and try to sell HR 676 to the public.
They were real programs. The public option is just a ploy to give political cover to an otherwise horrendous plan. It has no content. And as I write this, it looks like it has no existence either.
Jason,
Thanks for your reply. I’ve decided to blog about our exchange later today under the title “How Things Work in the Real World?”