Tucked away among the numerous amendments to the Baucus bill is a provision that would automatically reduce the subsidies individuals would receive when purchasing insurance from the new exchanges. The CBO highlighted this provision as part of its analysis of the net costs of the Baucus bill.

The automatic cuts would kick in in any year in which the White House Office of Management and Budget determined that the bill would produce a net budget deficit. In analyzing this automatic provision, the CBO forecasts that budget deficits could result in years 2015 through 2018, resulting in average subsidy cuts of about 15 percent. If deficits were worse the projected, the reductions in subsidies would be even higher.

The idea of an automatic trigger for cost reductions emerged a few months ago when CBO first showed how reluctant it was to score hoped-for savings in Medicare/Medicaid programs. To overcome this reluctance and make the bills appear more budget neutral, think tanks recommended "fail-safe" mechanisms that would automatically kick in to raise revenues or impose cost cuts in the event that expected savings didn’t materialize.

But this particular automatic trigger could have a pernicious effect on making insurance less affordable for those required to purchase insurance in the exchange.

Here’s the discussion (p. 8) in the CBO analysis of the Baucus bill:

“Failsafe” Budgeting Mechanism

An amendment adopted by the committee would require that, beginning in 2012, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) certify annually whether or not the provisions of the legislation are projected to increase the budget deficit in the coming year. If the Director determined that they were projected to increase the deficit, he or she would be required to notify the Congress, and exchange subsidies would be automatically adjusted to avoid the estimated increase in the deficit for that year.

The estimates presented in this preliminary analysis do notincorporate the potential effects of using this proposed failsafe mechanism, although CBO and JCT estimate that the amended mark would increase the deficit in fiscal years 2015 through 2018. Many of the budgetary effects of this proposal would appear as part of larger aggregates in the budget and would not be readily observable. Consequently, its overall budgetary impact could not be identified, and OMB’s estimating assumptions and procedures would determine whether and how this failsafe procedure was implemented. It is therefore difficult to predict whether the proposed failsafe mechanism would result in a budget-neutral impact in each year. If the mechanism was implemented to reduce exchange subsidy rates in some years, it would probably result in significant reductions to the dollar volume of such subsidies and associated reductions in coverage. Under CBO and JCT’s estimates of the deficit impact for the proposal, the failsafe provisions would require a reduction in exchange subsidies averaging about 15 percent during the years 2015 through 2018.

I don’t recall any previous coverage of this automatic trigger for cuts in premium subsidies. But since many Democrats are already concerned about insurance affordability and the inadequate level of subsidies in the Baucus bill, this seems a provision that deserves a lot more attention.

GoogleDocs link to CBO letter to Baucus

For examples of "failsafe" mechanisms, see Center for American Progess, Financing Health Care Reform
AP/HuffPo, report on CBO score for Baucus bill
Igor Volsky/Think Progress, compares CBO scores for original and amended Baucus bills