Update:
CSPAN 3 has live coverage of today’s House Subcommittee hearing, questioning the heads of BP, Halliburton, Transocean and Cameron (the manufacturer of the blowout preventer).
Live CSPAN 3 feed is here:
The consensus media view is that the three main companies who share some responsibility for the still gushing oil disaster pointed their fingers at each other with no one taking responsibility. That was to be expected, because the executives for BP, Transocean and Halliburton realize there are billions of dollars in potential liability to be shared among them.
So the Committee hearings Tuesday contained no explicit admissions that anyone had done something wrong in the days and hours leading up to the catastrophic blowout. Nevertheless, the second hearing of the day, by the Senate Environmental Committee, helped focus on the breakdown in the environmental review process required by the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). It exposed a legal timebomb.
We already know that this particular drilling project, like many others in the Gulf, had been subjected to only cursory NEPA review. The process allowed a generic but inadequate environmental impact assessment (EIS) to be performed to permit leasing and drilling over a wide region. Once that broad-area hurdle was cleared, individual wells would be covered with only minor additional reviews by the Mineral Management Service (MMS).
So if industry could weaken the generic EIS — by essentially writing it for Interior/MMS — it could establish the industry storyline that massive blowouts are unthinkable, that minor blowouts are unlikely, and that whatever spills might result from such minor events could be readily contained and their impacts mitigated with readily available and tested strategies. Hence, there are no unacceptable environmental impacts, and the impacts that might occur in that very unlikely event are acceptable and can be mitigated with proven methods.
That’s the pattern all industries have used to weaken NEPA. But the reality of the BP disaster proves, as every coal mining disaster proves, that story was a massive, lethal fraud. None of it was true. Catastrophic accidents are possible; indeed they may be inevitable, given the dangerous, sometimes unknowable conditions in which deepwater drilling (and mining) occurs.
And once these inevitable catastrophes happen, we’re well beyond the capabilities of traditional responses, remedies and mitigation measures. We’re making it up. We still don’t know how to stop a continuing catastrophe, and we’re woefully unprepared to deal with the consequences, let alone to make the surrounding environment whole again. In addition to the immediate deaths, vast areas can be rendered "dead zones," and whole communities, for hundreds of miles of coastline, can be economically and environmentally devastated.
The Obama Administration made a token gesture yesterday (was it to divert attention?), arguably helpful, proposing to split up MMS so that the office that collects royalties doesn’t conflict or influence the office that oversees safety. Fine, do it. But the degradation of NEPA and the acceptance of a benevolent, fraudulent view of dangers and their consequences could have occurred — and does occur — under bifurcated organizations and combined agencies alike.
The fundamental problem is corporate power and influence over deliberately weakened government regulators and policy makers. There are massive amounts of money at stake, functioning in a political process that allows that money to corrupt our politics and governing institutions. Nothing has been proposed by this Administration or enacted by Congress to fix those problems.
In the meantime, what needs to sink into our government’s collective consciousness is that the BP Oil Disaster has now defined a clear and compelling legal challenge to the deadly inadequacy of every EIS and safety review on which the entire offshore drilling program floats.
No agency can now claim that what we’re doing is safe, that catastrophic accidents can’t occur, or even that they’re unlikely. No agency can assert that we know what to do when it happens, that industry knows how to stop the catastrophe, or that we can contain the damage to reasonable/acceptable levels. Even if somehow the industry manages to staunch BP’s gushing flow with its latest schemes, there’s no assurance the next catastrophe will fit this pattern and be fixable the same way.
Those arguments are now as dead in the water as the fish and wildlife that will increasingly wash up on the shores of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Florida. And no further deepwater drilling can legally occur — assuming we’re still a nation of laws — as long as that’s true. Let that sink in, Congress.




66 Comments

thanks Scarecrow, rec.
while searching for something else this am, came across this diary over at Big Orange – this amateur video graphically underscores your message:
http://current.com/news/92426752_amateur-video-of-gulf-oil-slick-worse-than-bp-admits.htm
my standing apology if prev posted.
Thanks for posting that link; I’d seen the video and its very sad.
It’s obviously some lower ranking nobodies fault. Leave it to these bigwigs to roll the shit ball downhill, that’s the Corp. way. In the end the janitor on board the rig whose now dead will be held responsible by these gentlemen and their fancy lawyers. Obama will not settle though until they blame at least two other dead employees. Then the bail out will begin.
The Chinese used to have a concept of ‘Mandate of Heaven’ to explain changes in dynasties. Signs of a change in mandate were floods, earthquakes and other natural disasters that in ordinary times a functioning state could mitigate, but in periods of decay simply ran their course in suffering and prolonged misery. I wonder if we are in one of those phases.
CSPAN 3 has live coverage of the House Subcommittee hearing, questioning the heads of BP, Halliburton, Transocean and Cameron (the manufacturers of the blowout preventer).
Live feed is here:
http://www.c-span.org/Watch/C-SPAN3_wm.aspx
Thanks for the post, Scarecrow.
Thanks for the video link, CBL.
Today’s House hearings are far more technical and detailed re causes of Oilpocalypse than yesterday’s Senate hearings. On the one hand, I’m interested in the fact finding (Transocean’s talkinghead has just admitted it was a mistake to assume the BOP would work). On the other hand, focusing on deviations from correct procedure makes it easy to assume that the “correct procedure” is, actually, the correct thing to do. We need to understand the specifics of what went wrong but we also need to move away from fossil fuels as a whole.
It was mentioned somewhere that 3 BP executives were on the rig when it exploded. Does anyone know if they survived?
Interesting. I hadn’t heard of that before, but I think it’s as good an explanation as anything else. If the shoe fits and all that carry-on…
Thanks v. much for the posts. With respect, I would argue that “it” HAS sunk in, but as a prior post here posits, they’re all just looking for the convenient “fall guy.” I don’t think these cretins (including congress, etc) give a rats patoot about anything except what’s lining their pockets.
I’ve said it before, but it amazes me that they can see no further than the noses on their faces, and they care solely and only about how rich they can get in this lifetime. They clearly could care less about their own children, grandchildren, etc. No amount of money is going to keep people safe when the going gets really bad, but these greedy jerks cannot see it. UGH.
Thanks for that question. I’ve been wondering about that, too. There’s been precious little info coming about who the actual 11 people were that died and what their positions are. Interesting that they are so cagey about that, isn’t it?
In future, no oil wells should be drilled in more than five feet of water. This way, we can give snorkels to Sarah Palin, Dick Cheney, Ruby Julianne and all the other “drill, baby, drillers,” and let them close the leaks in the drilling pipes…
A saltwater Dustbowl…….
We’ve had several lines of testimony in the House Subcommittee hearing. The Committee staff put together a technical summary of the blowout, and various members are using that for questions.
Among the points raised today (more or less):
1. There were some warning signs in pressure differentials which were documented by the operators well before the blowout. Not clear why they didn’t respond.
2. The BOP maker concedes that the BOP can become inoperable in a number of circumstances, so there’s no basis for assuming it will function as the fail-safe (or as witnesses said yesterday) “fail-close” mechanism. This means that the claims in environmental statements that in the event a blowout occurred in the well, the BOP would handle it, were false.
3. Turns out the BOP can be damaged when gas pressure pushes materials up the well through the BOP — the sand and other materials can literally start cutting it up.
4. The BOP has redundant means to shut off flows, but all failed here. E.g., Stupak had a useful demonstration in which he pinched a straw, and connected straws and sheared staws, in conjunction with questions showing how each of these could fail — and were predictable.
5. And the most valuable test on a BOP can’t be performed under real conditions, because it literally shears the pipe. But while they’ve been tested shearing pipes on shore, they may not sheer the casing, and probably don’t work to shear at the seams/connections between pipes, because that junction is thicker and harder to shear.
6. The “worst case” analysis BP performed all assumed the BOP works. There’s no analysis of what happens when it fails, even though BOPs had failed in the past.
They don’t want to put a personal face on the people who died. It somehow makes it worse, as they well know.
We’re in a phase of the results of having a government that functions only to serve exploitive corporations and all the misery that brings ordinary citizens – scarce jobs, home foreclosures, environmental and health degradation, death and injury from empire building, etc.
None of this is from NATURAL disasters.
Republican Charlie Melancon, a long time supporter of drilling says,
“I can’t, in good conscience, support continued deepwater drilling until” until they figure out how to do it safely.
initial reports reflect BP execs got off the rig alive – I’ll nose around NOLA.com to see what I can find
wrt to the EIS — the idea that blowout/spills won’t impact local areas assumed the distance would protect the shores, yet that didn’t happen.
Melancon wants to know if that distance was negotiated. BP says, in effect, the idea that distance will save us is normal.
Melancon calls for an independent investigation, audit.
isn’t he retiring ?
The witnesses confirmed that yesterday.
The issue is I think less that the blowout preventer can fail – all engineered devices can fail – but more that there was no fallback mechanism AFAIK. You never rely on a single point of technology for security in an operation. You have a fallback plan. The blowout preventer has three different capacities for shutting off a well, this is redundancy. The trouble is, there was no plan in place for the blowout preventer itself not activating.
So again, focusing on the potential for the blowout preventer shear mechanism to fail under some circumstances is probably not the best point to focus on – instead, why not ask what was there to back up the preventer? The real shoddiness that took place here was less industrial and more Federal. The MMS should have been an agency that would demand a much bigger plan for predictable failures (such as the BOP failing to deploy) and it was not.
He was running for Senate against Vitter. Dunno where that stands.
I think they viewed the BOP as the backup, last-resort mechanism, which by definition, that was the last stop before uh, oh.
Jack Moore, CEO of Cameron, who manufactured this BOP, says they’re pretting reliable if well maintained and tested and provided there’s nothing in the flow to prevent them from operating. Of course, if you have stuff blowup from below, that’s what would occur.
thx – he still has a campaign website – but waaay behind Diaper Boy in the fundraising and per wiki, still double digit lead for Vitter in all polling
Lest we forget, MMS had become so corrupt that MMS staffers were sleeping with the corporate representatives.
But I would not underestimate reorganization. You are dealing with a bunch of civil service employees (burrowed in?) who have corrupted the office. Even with cause they are hard to get rid of. Reorganization allows one to create an isolation office where they can no longer do harm and provides the opportunity to re-jigger the salary levels because there might not be as many plum level jobs to cover everybody. And one hopes that the corrupt ones will take the hint.
Melancon is running for US Senate against Vitter.
Questions from John Dingell: how has the BOP been modified? Transocean said it was modified in 2005, at their and BP request. Doesn’t follow up.
I would like to get some information published that has not been
discussed, let me set up the information we need published with some reality that pretty much nobody knows;
the oil produced in America is not owned by the oil industry, they “lease” the right to mine this national resouce and somehow have been given the further right to sell our stuff on the open market where we have to bid on our stuff by countries like china
they then pay their lease fee, to which people like bush forgave at a time when they enjoyed more profit then any company in the entire history of planet earh and possibly the universe
so that’s the set up, now here is the question;
how much oil has spilled as compared with our national needs, one week?..two?…a month?
what?
we need to get that information and then adjust our rhetoric around that figure
now, whatever information that is, we need to first point out, that’s the amount of AMERICAN resouces bp has squandered, so they need to be no only liable for the damages but also the amount of resources they have ruined
this “might” be a loop hole where we fan sue them for more then the damage cap that was discussed on previous threads
but if that number is significant, say a three month supply, that’s about a third of all the oil experts expect to find in anwar
so this information is important to get publisized
Reminds me of the original transmission about Challenger:
“Houston, we have a major malfunction.”
That’s a good question. I was amazed, I know, naive me, that when the first dome failed to fix the problem, it was reported that BP was scrambling to come up with a different fix. Scrambling? After how many days? Even I have back up plans in place for failures in my life.
US typically uses about 20 million bbls/day
We get about 9 million bbls/day from domestic sources; the rest is imports
Of that 9 million, we get from 2-2.5 million bbls/day from offshore; the amount of domestic/offshore had been declining, but had slightly in last couple of years because of increase output from the Gulf.
A much smaller percentage comes from Gulf deepwater.
Compare with estimated 5,000 bbls/day gushing from this event.
Good soure is Energy Information Administration of the Dept of Energy.
Oh the power of the understated. Imagine what was going through the engineers minds at Chernobyl when they realized what was going to happen and they couldn’t stop it.
This story from NOLA mentions “several” executives on board for a Safety Award Ceremony. I have heard the number put at both 7 and 11 exec’s.
NOLA Story: http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/gas_surge_shut_well_just_weeks.html
Commonly referred to as the “oh, shit” moment.
Jay Inslee, D. Wash, focusing on why they didn’t have a remote, acoutic activator for the BOP.
But the BOP didn’t function even when the subs went down to manually activate it, so it’s not clear to me this would have made a difference, eg, if the BOP was damaged by the materials gushing through it when the blowout occurred at the bottom of the well.
Lois Capps, D. California, asking question about how much of the oil gets captured by employing booms. She cites study saying it captures only 15% and asks the panel, is that right?
Yes, says, the guy from Transocean.
she also notes that the process may actually cause more damage than it prevents.
She asks, why don’t we have better technology to contain/clean up the spills, equal to the technology we have to drilling/extraction?
You and I have been “there”, SD.
But the ruling classes are, intrinsically, above such “moments” …
That is what underlings are for. You know, the “few bad apples” who screwed it up?
DW
That’s my take, too. I guess where I am coming from is that, amidst all the finger-pointing, witch hunting, media sensationalism, etc., that the politicians have produced in terms of concrete changes following this disaster:
1) A rapidly quieted-down proposal to break up the MMS
2) A “climate change bill” that punts leadership on offshore drilling to the States and otherwise is a grab bag for the extraction industries.
I think focusing on the industry is not the first goal. Of course the industry tried to cut costs on planning and execution. Of course the industry tried to corrupt the agency they had to deal with. That is what industry does. The real issue is the Federal response. Sure, they sent in everything they had when the leak showed up and the oil slick started forming. But the real problem is that the Federal government just will not stand up to industry.
Looking at the legislation responses to the disaster right now, I am not holding my breath to see the Obama administration and the Congressional Democrat majority roar into action.
Michael Whitney has a fresh cross-post already in progress: Obama’s Drug Strategy All Talk, No Walk
It is a good question. Twenty years after the Valdez spill we still rely on Skimmers, Dawn detergent, and ineffective booms. I think anyone who has ever set through a corporate Capital Review will understand completely why it is this way. Cleanup doesn’t have a 12 month payback.
All I’ve read suggests that there are several methods of shutting off flow contained in the BOP. The last being hydraulic rams that literally smash the pipe. What I’m hearing is this particular BOP had multiple failures?
I found a fantastic website that has explanations of how oil rig equipment works.
They have a very interesting note at the bottom of the page describing BOP operation;
How Does Well Control Work?
“It is vitally important to recognize and address the situation as quickly and safely as possible, and then act accordingly.
“The great challenge for the crew is recognizing a developing well control incident and taking appropriate action,” Cooper emphasized.”
W4B;
The crew on the drilling floor are the first line of defense, evidently, if they see a dangerous situation about to happen, they have control the BOP to stop the flow of material coming up, but if the crew on the drilling floor have just been blown up by a gas explosion, all control of the BOP might now be lost, which I believe is the reason that some BOPs are fitted with acoustic controls that can recieve an acoustic control signal to allow operation remotely.
It’s sad to think of the possibility that although the explosion may have damaged the controls on the surface, if the BOP had been fitted with an acoustic control system, it may have still been possible to activate the BOP remotely up until the time that debris from the sinking platform damaged the BOP. (assuming that the reason the BOP didn’t work is related to the sinking of the rig.)
I don’t think so. Looks like the new dynasty’s the same as the old dynasty. We may be all dead meat before this is through. Talk about short sighted…
Either this incident could have been prevented or it was due to inherent tail risk–a small probability of a hugely catastrophic event. Various parties want to show that it could have been prevented–one of the corporations made a mistake they shouldn’t have made, or the regulators failed to enforce some rule that would have precluded it. And if we can just identify how it could have not happened, we can “fix that” and go back to business as usual.
I have little doubt that instead this incident was due to inherent risk, small and perhaps even unknowable, but finite. The implications in this case are much clearer–if we don’t want to risk spoiling our coastal ecosystems for generations by a “once-in-a-lifetime” incident, we can’t allow any drilling activity that introduces this small but finite risk.
Given that it looks increasingly unlikely that BP will be able to turn off the gusher any time soon, I’ll be very surprised if there are any politicians left within say six months that will dare vote to allow new offshore drilling. The less obvious answer is what to do about the rigs that are already out there today.
The coastal state Republicans will be saying “if only we had known”, while at the same time continuing to ignore other tail risks (coal mining disasters, banking meltdowns) and some even not so “tail” risks (global warming).
This is a not so unexpected story. Kind of fits into the regulatory capture theme.
BP won’t allow release of video
Well, if the sobering stats, math and science of what’s in Tiber Field, how fast it’s gushing and where it’s headed don’t choke ya, that vid sure will.
Had not seen it, thanks cbl2 for sharing it.
They should be playing that at the hearings, methinks.
Scarecrow, another great read, coverage of the disaster and the hearings, so bless ya for all you do.
The lowest set of pipe rams (there are 3) were modified so that a set of rams could be inserted upside down to seal the BOP from the wellbore and permit testing of the BOP on an active well before setting and cementing casing.
Wow.
Wonder if we’ll find out (#1) if the mud operators/observers were indeed pulled off the job/clock early to save money. That posit was suggested in comments at Oil Drum Dot Com somewhere in day 3 of this disaster.
It DOES appear so far, that gas came up from the well head (from 30K feet below it) either thru the piping or out of the piping. It expanded incredibly as others have documented it HAS to under that PSI down there, and either it sparked on or around the rig, or it was sucked into the diesel generators intake systems and over revved them to explode themselves.
Other than Oil Drum Dot Com, or Truthsky, and FDL, I’m not reading much about those potentials.
Your list is stunning, SC, thanks again for your work.
And thanks to all others too, who have contributed at FDL or Seminal. Seymour, librty, at LEAST two others I forget, cbl2 I believe has posted on this, or shared linky’s and facts. FDL, aside from maybe Oil Drum, or some other engineering sites, has led the way on the day by day unfolding of all of this.
Sick as the disaster is and is GOING to be, for FDL to keep pursuing the truth (as opposed to the PR Machinations of BP, TransO, Halleybutt, or the Obama Admin and its agencies) . . . for FDL to open eyes and get details out is a great and mighty effort in of itself.
This reader thanks you all.
There was a second “remote” control panel that fully operates the BOP in the “toolpusher’s” office in the rig accommodation, protected by blast walls. There was at least one additional toolpusher on the rig (the guy who directs drilling operations during the day) who would have been summoned for the emergency muster. His emergency muster station is in the office where the panel is located until the decision is made to abandon the rig, in which case an acoustic control (had there been one on the rig) would have been taken to the lifeboat by one of the DP (Dynamic Positioning) operators.
For me, from all I’ve read about the incident itself, it appears rising methane hydrates that were frozen, warmed up somehow, and unfroze . . . got to the surface, and somehow either exploded or cause the explosion(s) in the diesel generators . . . this is the source culprit nature provided.
Now, figuring that we’ve read there’s some 6 BILLION barrels of oil in Tiber Field, and there’s some 3 BILLION barrels of gas down there (I believe this was known as early as 2009 sometime or why else would have those leases been purchased back in ’01) it’s impossible (I would think) that no one did the math on what happens if you hit frozen methane gas at 30K+ ft below) and it rises to the surface, either in piping or out of piping.
Given that might be the key issue here, gas, it’s sick that US Policies (under Bush at the time) allowed drill rigs and the Deepwater Horizon (drilled MANY wells in The Gulf prior to the one that blew) to operate without the level of EIS, worst case scenerio’s stated, and BACKUP safety they have in North Sea and elsewhere around the world.
There’s a lot of culpable neglience and greed to go around . . . the system’s broke, corrupted and faulty. And it’s going to be the death of itself and us, before this is all over (system as is, not Gulf Gusher).
We, and the planet, cannot survive this broken system much longer, I don’t think.
WRT info above, links have already been established by others, and Wiki. I’m not making that stuff up, it’s been recorded and reported here at FDL, already, by others.
Interesting . . . given the level of corruption left over from BushCo and previe admins in ALL our government agencies, levels I’ll fully agree Obama has done LITTLE if ANYthing about, it’s a wonder the system has not fully collapsed long before.
We are the USSR, and Rome, all over again. Top to bottom.
Nice insights, thanks for sharing.
From Oil Drum, the oceanographer last Sat. at the conference, and a few other sources (including Wiki) I thought it was well agreed there’s been about 25K Barrels a day gushing, equal to about 1 MILLION GALLONS a day, gushing.
Are you looking for the LINKS and facts behind that ‘common knowledge’ thought train? Others here at FDL have provided them . . . I guess I’m not so sure what your goal is WRT the details, NOR how that impacts the rhetoric.
Is it your contention the MSM is still echoing 5K barrels? I’m not watching or listening or reading any MSM, so I don’t know what they are saying (why I read FDL, I learn what the MSM is misstating MUCH EASIER than I would if I had to MONITOR the MSM!).
Have always appreciated your comments and postings, BTW . . . just not clear where yer coming from or headed on this one . . . . I have tons of bookmarks, maybe I can offer up something to help you once I know your needs.
Ahhhhhhh! DOH!!!
NOW I get it!!
That’s brilliant Perris!!!
Figure 1 Million gallons daily since day one as a base minimum.
OUR lost resources (and the open market’s) squandered and wasted by BP, TO, Halleybutt, et al.
Along with the damages to enviro, econ from the enviro from fishing to tourism, etc.
Yeah, lost resources . . . make ‘em pay up for that! I love it.
I have to keep repeating myself . . . that 5K is BP and US Govt based PR.
Other’s, of many varieties, have suggested (with reason) the gushing is likely 25K or more daily. Barrels.
Am I wrong in thinking this, somehow, despite it being in so many FDL posts, links, and such?
JFC is that depressing . . . . sigh.
You don’t think we can get better?
One of which would have been the crimping of the pipe down below, maybe at the well head? Wouldn’t that also have impacted the BOP? Aside from the burst of gas that seems to have pushed up mud, sediment and such from 30K ft of pressure from below, expanding rapidly as it rose?
You’ve had some great comments and thoughts on all this from day one, I sure appreciate your input, BTW.
Great finds linky wise, and your conclusion is fascinating. You too, lately, have stepped up and shared Seminal postings and comments . . . all with keen insights. Thanks.
Interesting, thanks for the insights.
Any thoughts about whether mud operators/observers were pulled off the clock early to save money, and how that (if true) might have impacted the disaster?
I’d be interested to know if any of the BOP controls are automatic, because most of what I’ve read has emphasized the necessity that the crew be ready to respond and take action?
From everything I’ve read, it sounds as if the time between the crew on the drilling floor calling for help and the explosion was just a matter of a few minutes, so maybe the backup toolpusher never made it to his emergency muster station before it was too late?
My guess, and I know we should careful with guesses, but it seems probable that whatever went wrong, went wrong very fast and most likely damaged the BOP right off the bat.
I have heard just today that there was some sort of failed test just hours before the incident, but there were no other details.
Thanks for the info, I appreciate your, and OFG’s contributions to this discussion.
I would imagine it’s quite hard to think about this sort of thing happening to people with whom you share so much experience, even though you might not know them personally.
I seriously doubt the mud loggers were pulled off. They would have been monitoring the operation 24 hours a day and are vital in monitoring critical displacement operations like cementing the casing. They may have been printing logs for BP and finishing their end of well reports which could have been a distraction, but the Driller has the same monitoring instrumentation and would have been on alert for any anomalies in the return flow from the well (caused by rapid gas expansion near the surface) during displacement.
If a gas bubble was above the BOP before it was detected, but still 5,000 feet below the rig, closing the BOP may have saved the well but would not have prevented the initial eruption of mud or the ensuing fire) The Diverter, just below the rig floor would have been activated to divert the mud flow over the side through large open ended pipes (This may be a possibility since gas is soluble in the synthetic oil base mud used in drilling in the Gulf of Mexico to prevent swelling shales from closing the open hole well bore.)
Holy shit. I *believe* this is a huge oil repository, and this was suggested when the discovery was first announced long before the drilling was authorized. I *believe* the information about how big this field could be was purposefully not widely disseminated by BP for corporate reasons. We will be *finding* out about this the hard way. The video shows a pipe broken in two, not just breached, completely snapped off.
All any of us can do is guess right now. I wasn’t there on the Horizon, but I have been in many locations around the world on similar rigs in similar situations. This one was bad.
The men on the Deepwater Horizon were trained to prevent situations like this from happening and to react to them if they did. Whatever happened likely did happen extremely fast, making it doubly hard to deal with effectively.
The facts will come out in the investigation. A lot of people who are familiar with the daily operations on deepwater drilling rigs will be watching closely and reading the reports. No one will be able to cover up anything.